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Introduction: Racial Injustice in Houston and the Mexican American
Mobilization against Police Violence
Before pushing Joe Campos Torres into Houston’s Buffalo Bayou on the night of May 5,
1977, Houston Police officer Terry Denson yelled, “Let’s see if this wetback can swim!” Denson,
along with five other white policemen (Louis Kinney, Glen Brinkmeyer, Joseph Janish, Stephen
Orlando, and Carless Elliot) had arrested Torres after responding to a complaint of a drunken
disturbance at Club 27 in East End, an ethnic community.1 Torres, a twenty-three-year-old native
of Houston, had been apprehended the previous December at this same night club for similar
charges. During both incidents, the recently discharged ex-U.S. Army Ranger and Vietnam veteran
invoked his advance skills in Taekwondo to threaten the officers arresting him.2 On this night, the
officers turned to “street justice” to “quiet” the foolhardy arrestee. The lawmen drove Torres to a
secret location known as “the hole,” at 1200 Commerce Street, where all of them (except for Elliot)
participated in beating the handcuffed man.3 His killing would spark a wave of protest that ensured
that Houston’s long history of police brutality against ethnic Mexicans and other minorities
(especially African Americans) would come to the forefront in Texas, if not the nation in general.
The Houston Police Department’s (HPD) use of “street justice”—that is an informal
systemic method of racial oppression meant to control the minority communities in the aftermath
of Jim Crow’s demise — against Joe Torres on the night of his death, and the judicial injustice that
followed in the state and federal trials, provides a window into larger issues of race and racism that
reinforced white dominance and shaped ethnic Mexicans’ experience in East Texas throughout the
twentieth century. The HPD was a mechanisms of the city’s status quo that reinforced the racial
dominance of white Houstonians. From 1940 to 1970, the HPD found it necessary to implement
effective police models to control wayward minorities and uphold the racial structure of white
1

B. G. Bond, “City of Houston Inter Officer Correspondence: Indefinite Suspension of Police Officer T.W.
Denson, May 12, 1977,” in Juan Emilio Herrera, “Mexican-Americans in the Press: Coverage of the Torres Case in
the Houston Chronicle and Post” (master’s thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1980), 31.
2 Janet Sanders, “Torres Case Defense Ruined, Attorney Say,” Houston Chronicle, September 30, 1977,
vertical file, H-Police Misconduct-Jose Campos Torres-1798-1979, Houston Metropolitan Research Center, Houston
Public Library.
3 Bond, “City of Houston,” 31.
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supremacy. By the 1950s and 1960s, policing helped racialized the ethnic-Mexican community as
criminal and larger amounts of police oppression were permitted. Mexican-American activists
increasingly found their voice excluded in the policing of their communities. In the late 1960s,
following the passage of the Civil Rights Act, which emphasized due process, the HPD
incorporated the practice of street justice as part of its subculture as a means to defy what it
perceived were greater rights for criminals.
This heightened police aggression and lawlessness against the ethnic-Mexican community
(as well as African Americans) ensured that citizens would live in fear of law-enforcement officers
and that any opposition to their power would be silenced. The 1977 police murder of Joe Torres
represented a culmination of police lawlessness that over three decades racialized the people,
oppressed the community, and silenced activists’ voice from the affairs of discriminatory policing
practices. It also was the moment when police violence, institutional racism, and the absence of
justice galvanized ethnic Mexicans under an effective strategy to reform the police and pursue
justice. Thus, this study seeks to understand the circumstances that allowed for Joe Torres’s killing
and the reforms that followed his unjust death. It is fundamentally concerned with understanding
how the Houston Police Department’s power grew, the corruption that followed in the guise of
police brutality against ethnic Mexicans, and how community activists and city officials reined in
that abuse and reformed the department in order to better serve the citizens of the Bayou City.
To better situate my study, it is necessary to provide a sense of the dynamics of Houston’s
Mexican-American history. Houston historians, including Arnoldo De León and Thomas Krenick,
have written general histories of the Bayou City that portray Mexican Americans as developing a
vibrant bicultural society that accommodated the traits of Anglo-Houstonians and gained support
of white associates to improve the conditions for Hispanics.4 More recently, historian Robert
Treviño in The Church in the Barrio: Mexican American Ethno-Catholicism in Houston has moved
away from the accommodation model to show that ethnic Mexicans in Houston utilized “ethno4

Thomas Krenick, Del Pueblo: A History of Houston’s Hispanic Community, 2nd ed. (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 2.
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Catholicism” to sustain their sense of ethnic identity and find ways to cope with their marginality
in the Catholic Church and American society.5 This transition in identity is the subject of historian
Guadalupe San Miguel’s Brown, Not White: School Integration and the Chicano Movement in
Houston which focuses on how ethnic Mexicans accepted a nonwhite racial status and forged a
new politic of struggle based on mass mobilization and protest in the early 1970s.6 He argues that
ethnic Mexicans and Chicanos rejected whiteness and in turn challenged Houston Independent
School District officials who took a lukewarm approach to desegregating the city’s public schools.7
More recently, historians have examined ethnic Mexicans’ experience as a racialized group
living under the cultural constraints of Jim Crow society. Tyina Steptoe has argued that ethnic
Mexicans in Houston represented a “history of mixing (metizaje) that challenged dominant notions
of whiteness and racial purity.”8 She claims people of Mexican descent were legally white, but
Anglos defined a language of difference by 1930 that set them apart culturally. In response, ethnic
Mexican avoided repression of Jim Crow by making claims to whiteness.9 Similarly, Brian
Behnken, in Fighting Their Own Battles, included Houston in a multiracial history on Texas that
examined African American and Mexican Americans’ action to overcome the dual system of de
jure and de facto Jim Crowism. He argues, “Jim Crow actually contributed to the emergence of
two separate freedom movements…[because] Jim Crow not only separated blacks and Mexican
Americans from whites, but also from each other.”10 Like Steptoe, he includes Houston Mexicans
fight to be racially positioned as white, but argues it distant them from joining African-American
activists during the Civil Rights Era. His discussion on police brutality in Houston focused on the
suppression of Black Power activists and only mentioned the Torres incident in passing.
5 Robert Treviño, The Church in the Barrio: Mexican American Ethno-Catholicism in Houston (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 13.
6 Guadalupe San Miguel, Brown, Not White: School Integration and the Chicano Movement in Houston
(College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2001), xii.
7 Ibid., 201.
8 Tyina Steptoe, Houston Bound: Culture and Color in Jim Crow City (Oakland: University of California
Press, 2016), 9.
9 Ibid., 15.
10 Brian Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battle: Mexican Americans, African Americans, and the Struggle
for Civil Rights in Texas (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 6.
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Few historians have written an extensive critical examination of Mexican Houstonians’
experience with racism and law enforcement as it led up to Torres’s murder and its aftermath. In
his survey history of Houston, Krenick acknowledges that police brutality and injustice were a
constant feature of life for Mexicans in Houston since the 1920s. He briefly links the 1937 Houston
police killing of Eplidio Cortez, which resulted in the acquittal of the two officers who caused his
death, to the Joe Torres case.11 He states that the police’s racist violence was ongoing and “anyone
of color or within the white counterculture” could be susceptible to the HPD’s misconduct.12
Historian and political scientist Dwight Watson in Race and the Houston Police Department,
1930-1990: A Change did Come analyzes the role of police in the transformation of Jim Crow
South, and he argues that police leadership tried to maintain racial subordination despite social
change. He offers a critical examination of the intersection between the HPD’s practice of racism
and brutality as it is linked to the agenda of activists during the Torres controversy. He positions
the two-year-long Torres controversy as a watershed moment in Houston and Southern history that
reformed the racist policies of the law-enforcement system.13 In an article, Brian Behnken
expanded his examination of the Joe Torres incident, alongside the Dallas police killing of Santos
Rodríguez, to argue that the Chicano movement and concepts of chicanismo continued after 1972.
He claimed the Torres incident was the most intense period of protest within the Houston Chicano
movement.14
The transformation of ethnic-Mexican history in Houston has increasingly displayed the
constraints of race and racism in Jim Crow society. Previous studies agree that Torres’s death
galvanized the ethnic community and created a more dynamic class of leaders among ethnic
Mexicans. Much of the literature focuses more extensively on the tensions between police and the

11

Krenick, Del Pueblo, 48.
Ibid., 105.
13 Dwight Watson, Race and the Houston Police Department, 1930-1990: A Change did Come (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 128-129.
14 Brian Behnken, “‘We Want Justice!’: Police Murder, Mexican American Community Response, and the
Chicano Movement,” in The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism edited by Dan Berger. (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press, 2010), 196, 201.
12
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ethnic-Mexican community relations from the 1960s onward. Building upon this historiography,
my study positions Torres’s death and ethnic Mexicans’ place in the city against the backdrop of
HPD’s protection of Jim Crow society and white supremacy since the 1930s. With this in mind,
rather than concentrate on police-community relations since the 1960s, I consider the long-term
relations between police and the ethnic community to locate the moments when policing Jim Crow
racialized ethnic Mexicans, oppressed the community, and silenced activists’ voice from the affairs
of discriminatory policing practices. By bringing together the history of the department and the
community, this study seeks to illuminate how Mexican Houstonians living with violence, racism,
and injustice used the tools of their oppressors to empower, resist, and protect themselves.
This study seeks to recover and analyze the processes of police oppression that criminalized
and suppressed the ethnic-Mexican community in Houston. For the most part, Chicano/a historians
have examined cities and regions with an ethnic Mexican presence linked to the Spanish colonial
and Mexican eras, and thus have given little attention to examining “new” Chicano communities,
like Houston’s, that took root in the twentieth century.15 The influx of Mexican immigrants there
throughout the twentieth-century transformed racial identity in East Texas. To understand policeethnic Mexican community relations in this city, it is first necessary to explain the local conditions
from which it emerged. When Houston was founded in 1836, new white Texas settlers viewed
themselves as a distinct Anglo-Saxon race involved in a racial conflict with Mexicans.16 After the
Texas Revolution, in a symbolic act of degradation, Houston founders Augustus and John Allen
placed Mexican prisoners of war, who were defeated and captured in the Battle of San Jacinto,
alongside black slaves, to clear the bayou land that became the town.17
Houston was built upon a slave economy that developed with the colonization of East
Texas. The Bayou City is located in Harris County, and it is surrounded by neighboring counties
15

Robert Treviño, The Church in the Barrio: Mexican American Ethno-Catholicism in Houston (Chapel
Hill: Univerity of North Carolina Press, 2006), 7.
16 Robert Heizer and Alan Almquist, The Other Californians: Prejudice and Discrimination Under Spain,
Mexico, and the United States to 1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 142, 148; Edward Escobar,
Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 18-19.
17 Steptoe, Houston Bound, 24.
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that once held unfree African-American majorities of between 70 and 80 percent at the outbreak
of the Civil War. The young town’s location made it the connective route between the Port of
Galveston Island and the “Texas Sugar Bowl.” The countryside southwest of Houston produced
not only the moneymaking sweetener, but also highly profitable cotton on plantations in Brazoria,
Wharton and Fort Bend County.18 The city thrived on the productivity and economy of slave
labor which also influenced the notions of race and power common to a society based on unfree
labor. Anglo-Saxons’ power in Houston was granted in the racial binaries of white-and-black that
were rooted to the traditions of the peculiar institution.
The notions of race and power that developed in East Texas slave societies were an
outgrowth of the plantation ideology forged over two centuries in the Southeast United States and
brought westward by slave-holders and bonds people during the Antebellum Era. The elite
slaveholding class used its economic power in an agricultural, plantation-based society to impose
values and recreate the white-over-black racial hierarchy of the plantation regime in East Texas.19
With the demise of this “ancien regime” after the Civil War, this tradition was threatened and white
power was reasserted and defined through Jim Crow statutes that emerged in the late nineteenthand early twentieth-century.20 The Democrat-ruled local government in Houston adopted measures
to disfranchise blacks and relegate them to an inferior status in society.21 The law-enforcement
system of Harris County and the prison in Fort Bend County became a nexus of power that
entrapped African Americans for noncompliance to Jim Crow statutes. The black community
remained in-check by the physical embodiment of white supremacy in the local law enforcement
and the threat of force labor at the rural prisons.22
Although ethnic Mexicans did not have a bigger presence in the city until the twentieth
century, Anglo Houstonians would have been informed of the statewide treatment of ethnic

18

Ibid.
Ibid., 25-26.
20 Ibid., 30.
21 Watson, Race and the Houston Police, 29-30.
22 Steptoe, Houston Bound, 22.
19
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Mexicans that questioned their whiteness. The United States’ war with Mexico reinforced among
white Texans concepts of their racial supremacy despite the promise of citizenship rights and
property protection entitled to ethnic Mexicans in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In south
and central Texas, Anglos defined Mexicans as a conquered population, who were not entitled to
the privileges of citizenship rights and property protection entailed in the treaty.23 Moreover, Texas
Mexicans were unworthy of the privileges of whiteness, because of their history of racial hybridity
and interracial contact between indigenous groups, Spanish colonizers, and Africans.24 The rise of
the Anglo-dominate capitalist system in the late nineteenth-century depleted the landed wealth of
Tejanos in areas like the Rio Grande Valley,25 and a system of Jim Crow was erected that spatially
divided ethnic Mexican from whites and reinforced the racial hierarchy of white supremacy.26
Anglo Houstonians were informed of this history and used it to justify the de jure practice of Jim
Crow toward ethnic Mexicans in the twentieth century.
This study of police-community relations locates the racial criminalization of ethnic
Mexicans across four decades from 1930s to the 1970s. It focuses on the HPD’s reinforcement of
white supremacy in Jim Crow society across four different models of policing among the Houston
Police Department. The HPD implemented these different models to respond to societal concerns
of juvenile delinquency and the unrest during the Civil Rights Era, but it taunted the ethnic
community with over arrest, profiling, and abuse. “Racial Injustice in Houston, Texas: The
Mexican American Mobilization against the Police Killing of Joe Campos Torres” brings to light
how ethnic Mexicans found their voice excluded in the patrolling of their communities. With Jim
Crow in place, ethnic Mexicans failed to have a viable voice to combat police discrimination and
violence until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Supreme Court ruling in Mapp v. Ohio and
Miranda v. Arizona. The protection of citizens’ due process rights opened a judicial and legal

23

Heizer and Almquist, The Other Californians, 142, 148; Escobar, Making of a Political Identity, 18-19.
Escobar, Making of a Political Identity, 18-19; Steptoe, Houston Bound, 81-82.
25 Armando Alonzo, Tejano Legacy: Rancheros and Settlers in South Texas, 1734-1900 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 6, 141-142.
26 Steptoe, Houston Bound, 84-85.
24
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avenue to fight discriminatory police practices and misconduct; however, not before the HPD
increased their aggression to control minorities and social activists through the informal practice
of street justice. As such, it is possible to conceive that Houston, Texas had a longstanding history
of police oppression against the ethnic-Mexican community. It is from this past of police violence
that mobilized efforts for Torres matured into a successful movement that reformed the lawenforcement system in Texas.
Central to understanding police oppression of the ethnic-Mexican community is the system
of Jim Crow. Houston as a Southern city emphasized a racial legacy of slavery, Reconstruction,
and Jim Crow. Blacks and Mexican Americans faced a rigid system of de jure racial separation
and de facto segregation within Houston society.27 Racism impeded police services to minorities
for generations.28 This study borrows from Steptoe and Watson to position Jim Crow as the most
powerful force that governed the HPD’s conduct, attitudes, and customs. Steptoe held that Jim
Crow segregation influenced cultural norms at which Anglos used cultural differences to set ethnic
Mexicans apart from them. She stated, “policing culture was a fundamental part of enforcing racial
differences.”29 The police department had a pivotal role as the enforcer of white supremacy.
According to Watson, the maintenance of Jim Crow was “deemed more important than the law.”
This study considers how the cultural racism of Jim Crow perpetuated the first period of
dispossession of ethnic Mexicans in the 1930s and the policing of the pachuco subculture in the
1940s. The HPD suppression of juvenile delinquency with the War on Crime in the 1950s indicated
the entrapping of ethnic-Mexican youths within law enforcement’s nexus of power for
noncompliance to Jim Crow’s normative. Responsible for “holding the color line,” the HPD acted
as a barrier to change even after the demise of Jim Crow.30
Another concept to understand the operation of police oppression is the influence of the
HPD’s subculture upon Anglo officers. In the 1930s, Watson explained paternalism was the
27

Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battle, 5.
Steptoe, Houston Bound, 6.
29 Ibid., 12.
30 Watson, Race and the Houston Police, 4.
28
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prevailing attitude of the HPD. This attitude to set wayward citizens straight like a father also
contributed to the desire for law and order that accepted violence to control crime.31 This dynamic
aimed to invoke fear in citizens to ensure respect for the law, but it also opened a space for police
to create a subculture that reinforced white supremacy and their authority to maintain it. During
the 1950s, the HPD shifted to the crime-fighting orientation of the war-on-crime model which
pitted police against criminals. Police developed a mode of thought that crime represented a
disdain for white authority. This mentality placed police at odds with the “criminal element” that
it must forcefully control and prevent.32 When Jim Crow was dismantled, protection of suspects
and prisoners’ rights through due process only fostered a greater sense of the “police-against-theworld mind-set.”33 At this point, I treat the concept of the police subculture as a counter-hegemonic
discourse to national policy that offered lawmen another space to erect the oppressive and informal
model of street justice. This study demonstrates that the police subculture among Anglo officers
prevented higher levels of professionalism within the force, which fostered the prevalence of white
supremacy and discriminatory police practices.
This study’s interpretation of Houston’s racial superstructures and the development of
ethnic Mexicans’ discourse of empowerment are influenced by the ideas of Marxist scholar Louis
Althusser. In Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, he offers insight into the mechanisms of
state power that can be applied to understanding the ideologies and superstructures of a dominant
race and the ensuing struggles related to oppression. According to Althusser, “state apparatuses”
of state power consist of two bodies, institutions and ideology. Institutions, like the police, are
“repressive” state apparatuses and function by violence,34 repressive state apparatuses (RSA) will
be represented in this study as the mechanism of the Anglo status quo, such as the Houston City
Council, law enforcement, and judicial courts. “Ideological state apparatuses” (ISA), on the other

31

Ibid., 19.
Escobar, Making of a Political Identity, 199.
33 Watson, Race and the Houston Police Department, 68.
34 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (1971 repr., New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2001) 96, 99.
32
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hand, function “by ideology” and promote the “ruling class” of the state power.35 For the purposes
of this study Houston’s cultural mechanism, like schools and newspapers, can be viewed as ISAs.
Throughout this study, state apparatuses function to protect “whiteness,” reinforce Jim
Crow society, and define the “other.” This framework informs the way I examine the power and
autonomy of the mechanism of the status quo, like the police who beat and killed Torres because
of race, as well as explain how the cultural and repressive mechanism (the newspapers and court
system) worked together to influence lenient punishments for the officers. Moreover, Althusser
explains that exploited people are able to find means and occasions to express itself within the
apparatuses of the state, “either by the utilization of their contradictions, or by conquering combat
position in them in struggle.”36 Altusser’s ideas aid in situating the varying MexicanAmerican/Chicano dialogues of enfranchisement within the broader framework of the racial status
quo, and shed greater light on the ways that activists used the tools of their oppressors to resist,
embolden, and protect themselves against violence, racism, and injustice.
The four police models I survey seek to understand the links between the police, race, and
social change. Chapter one examines how the enactment of the 1943 Juvenile Court Act helped
Mexican-American police and activists forge better ties between their community and the police.
Initially, ethnic Mexicans were located within an ethno-racial middle ground at which the lines of
separation in Jim Crow were not so rigidly maintain as with African Americans. 37 The Great
Depression ushered in the anti-immigration movement, and Mexicans’ ethnicity became racialized
as un-American, leading to their first dispossession with deportation and formalized tactics within
the law-enforcement system. Juvenile delinquency among Mexican-American zoot-suiters and
gangs in the 1940s enabled youth movements to define their American identity and gain a sense
of autonomy to defend their neighborhoods against oppressive law-enforcement measures. This
chapter shows that the implementation of the Juvenile Court Act of 1943 allowed a new bicultural
35

Ibid., 97-98.
Ibid., 99.
37 Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1997), 41.
36
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generation of activists and citizens to reverse negative criminal perceptions of their race and work
directly with law enforcement to (re) claim their place within white society. The creation of the
Latin-American division in 1942 allowed officers of Mexican-descent to patrol their communities,
as well as encouraged police to serve youths in ethnic communities by working directly with civic
betterment groups. Ethnic-Mexican activists in return were permitted to incorporate their notions
of Americanism within the methods of the city’s law enforcement.
In chapter two, however, the increase of juvenile delinquency and gang activity among
ethnic-Mexican youths during the 1950s led law enforcement officials to perpetuate racial
perceptions of the group as a whole and implement a war-on-crime model of policing to make the
law-enforcement system a preventive force in the maintenance of Jim Crow. Juvenile delinquency
was a city-wide problem among all juveniles, including white youths, in post-World War II
society. Houston’s status quo, however, redirected its attention to ethnic-Mexican delinquents,
who were believed to defy the norms of society and disregarded the authority of law and order.
The HPD officials responded by shifting their strategy from the social worker model of civil
guardianship to the larger war-on-crime model. My examination of the Crime Prevention
Division’s annual reports indicated that the over arrest rates of ethnic Mexicans supported the citywide notion of a “Latin American Problem” and became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The HPD’s
discriminatory tactics associated ethnic-Mexican youths with crime and in the process not only
racialized them but the community as a whole. In addition, police-community relations declined
as law enforcement challenged the validity of lawyer and LULAC member John J. Herrera from
contesting the war on Latin-American delinquency. With public outcry suppressed, law enforcers
defended “rough” procedures as a crucial tool to effectively combat delinquency.38
Chapter three examines law enforcement reforms during the Civil Rights Era and considers
how lawmen manipulated the due process model to maintain its subordination over the ethnic-

38
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Mexican community and forcibly control the pace of social and institutional change.39 The Civil
Rights Era signaled the demise of Jim Crow and coercive police practices, and it guaranteed
citizens’ rights to procedural due process. These civil reforms only agitated the HPD’s
unwillingness to alter attitudes or traditional police practices. To reestablish itself as a “thin blue
line” that maintained the racial order despite national reforms, police officers erected the informal
patrol model of “street justice.”40 I scrutinized the 1972 Texas Law Enforcement Handbook to
demonstrate how lawmen abused the “color of law” to seemingly appear to comply with police
procedure. The color of law, along with the code of silence, helped officers make an unlawful
arrest, retroactively lawful.41 By the color of law, I mean the appearance of enforcing criminal
statutes to commit an unlawful arrest, then falsifying or finding probable cause to make it
retroactively lawful. The code of silence is a cultural norm among police that officers should
neither report on nor incriminate fellow lawmen who engage in misconduct.42 Street justice
reaffirmed the police’s power to control the ethnic-Mexican communities after Jim Crow.
Moreover, the law-enforcement system’s double-standard assured police would not be held
accountable for illegal actions.
Chapter four focuses on the resurgence of Mexican-American organizations’ quest for civil
rights in the late 1970s. After police suppressed the Black Power and Chicano movements,
Mexican-American activists erected a new ethnic political mobilization to reform law enforcement
and challenge the whitewashing of justice.43 Mexican activists commandeered the language of due
process and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution to define a discourse of racial unity
and civil rights empowerment. Thus, the movement that eventually organized for Torres displayed
knowledge of this double-standard which allowed it to forge a more sophisticated and mature civil

39
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rights struggle against police brutality. The death of Joe Torres at the hands of five HPD officers,
opened a path for Mexican-American and Chicano activists to become a viable voice behind the
movement for police reform in the latter 1970s. The Mexican-Americans mobilization for Torres
commandeered tactics from the past decade to establish effective reforms in police procedures and
secured federal intervention by the U.S. Department of Justice against four of the officers who
murdered Torres.
Chapter five explores the moments of tensions between police-community relations and
the court trials for Torres that contributed to the Moody Park Uprising in May 1978. Arnoldo De
León once concluded that the Moody Park Uprising was a “spontaneous” event with no particular
goal for the Mexican-American community’s civil rights.44 My examination of this disturbance
shows that the event was a result of actions that occurred over time.
This study is an attempt to understand a sliver of Houston’s ethnic Mexican past via the
window of police-community relations. In order to recover this history of police-community
relations and Mexican American empowerment, I relied on a variety of sources. Much of the
information regarding police procedures and models came from the state law enforcement
handbooks, juvenile probation records of Harris County, state government news releases, local
newspapers, and private collections that carried correspondences, newsletters, and annual reports
from the Harris County Grand Jury. Sources on the early Mexican American and police relations
were derived from private collections and the major daily newspaper, the Houston Chronicle.
Sources that captured the Mexican-American mobilization against street justice came from the
state and local LULAC collections, state representative’s private collection, local bilingual and
Chicano newspapers, HPD police chief speeches and studies, and various other collections
belonging to Mexican-American activists.
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Chapter 1: “Gangdom Style”: How Pachuco Culture Opened PoliceCommunity Relations in the 1940s
In 1943, the Houston Chronicle featured dramatic headlines aimed at getting its readers to
take notice of what it deemed was a wave of juvenile delinquency among Mexican-American
youths influenced by the zoot-suit phenomenon and the pachuco subculture. For example, one read
“Junior Gang Activities in City Being Probed: New Upsurge of Crime Blamed on Groups Formed
to Carry on Shakedown Rackets,”1 while another resounded the unlawfulness of youths declaring,
“Two of Gang declared to be Juveniles: Pair Changed in Death of Joe Pacheco.”2 As youth crimes
became more severe, so did the actions of law enforcement, city officials, and the white media,
who developed a newfound gaze that fixated on Mexican-American youths. This view was part
and parcel of the Jim Crow system’s opinion of minorities and ensured that ethnic-Mexican youths
were looked upon as part of a nationwide race problem growing over the decade. However, by
1945 these headlines changed and reflected a positive view of Houston’s ethnic population. For
instance the newspaper now proclaimed, “Gang Leader Pledges Aid in Building Sports” and
“Baseball Replacing Knife for Latin-American Boys.”3 In order to understand this change, it is
important to examine the events that took place in the city and how ethnic Mexicans reversed the
negative repercussions of gang criminality.
This chapter considers how juvenile delinquency among Mexican-American zoot-suiters
and gangs enabled youth movements to define their American identity and helped them gain
autonomy that in turn was used to defend their neighborhoods against oppressive systemic racism
perpetrated by law enforcement measures. For youths, pachuquismo—or gang activity – emerged
as a counter-hegemonic discourse of contestation that encouraged them to stand against Jim Crow
and the racial discrimination they witnessed as children or youths in the 1930s. The anti1
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on Shakedown Rackets,” Houston Chronicle, January 11, 1943.
2 “Two of Gang declared to be Juveniles: Pair Changed in Death of Joe Pacheco,” Houston Chronicle,
April 9, 1943
3 “Gang Leader Pledges Aid in Building Sports,” Houston Chronicle, July 27, 1945; “Baseball Replacing
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immigration movement served to racialize ethnic Mexicans as un-American and included
formalized tactics within the law enforcement system to challenge the legality of their whiteness
within Jim Crow Houston. The zoot-suit phenomenon threatened to isolate youths as criminals and
un-American, and the city law enforcement looked toward Los Angeles to sensationalized the
crime wave and bring heavy-handed tactics. The enactment of the 1943 Juvenile Court Act helped
Mexican Americans to forge better ties between their community and the police.
This chapter argues that the implementation of the Juvenile Court Act allowed a new
bicultural generation of activists to reverse negative criminal perceptions of their race and work
directly with law enforcement to (re) claim their place within white society. The city and state’s
fear of delinquency among white youths pushed this legislation; it sought to maintain Jim Crow’s
racial integrity in a wartime society. In addition, it opened a moment of amicable policecommunity relations defined within the terms of Civil Guardianship. Under this policy, police
were designated as social workers serving youth in ethnic communities and were encouraged to
work with civic betterment groups. Activists in return were permitted to incorporate their notions
of Americanism within the methods of the city’s law enforcement. This legislation empowered
Mexican-American activists to control and mediate the patrolling of their community, which
resulted in reversing the derogatory image of youths and decreased crime.
The 1930s and 1940s proved to be profound decades in establishing racial exclusion of
ethnic Mexicans in Houston, because in the early twentieth century this same community
experienced a degree of social inclusion that allowed their small presence to remain unmolested
by a normative segregationist society. Unlike Tejanos in the Rio Grande Valley of South Texas
who were socially and economically displaced by Anglo segregationist, the earliest colonias – or
Mexican enclaves – in Houston were not subjected to the spatial divisions or the racial hierarchy
of Jim Crow.4 In the Rio Grande Valley, capitalist growth and nation-building opened economic
4 Before the 1880s, Texas Mexican and Anglos accommodations in social, economic, and political affairs
allowed both groups to undergo a process of acculturation. Some Texas Mexicans adopted or negotiated Anglo
customs, legal traditions, social institutions, and values within their Spanish and mejicano foundation. Likewise,
some Anglo newcomers Hispanicized by absorbing Tejano social and cultural elements, such as the Spanish

17

and landed opportunities for Anglo Americans. The old order of surviving Hispanic ranching
families of the Texas borderlands found their power stripped by Anglo segregationists and their
political dominance reduced to rural enclaves.5 Anglos subjugated Tejanos within a system of
racial segregation modeled after the Jim Crow practices of the South. In Houston, however, the
Jim Crow statutes that emerged at the turn of the century reinforced the Anglo status quo and
limited the social mobility of African Americans.6 The small ethnic colonia, that approximated
roughly 2,000 persons before 1910, did not encourage a struggle for economic and political power
between Anglos and ethnic Mexicans as it did in South Texas.7 Legal measures were adopted to
disfranchise blacks and relegate them to an inferior status in society.8 Ethnic Mexicans among the
first generation of immigrants into Houston were legally and socially considered white.
The black-white dichotomy that separated Anglos and African Americans in Houston
society was not so rigidly maintained with ethnic Mexicans, which allowed them to locate
themselves amidst an ethno-racial middle ground.9 According to historian Tyina Steptoe, “the few
ethnic Mexicans living in Houston were… legally marked as white. Legally, then they had access
to white space.”10 The ethnic-Mexican populace built their communities within or near Anglo
neighborhoods between the 1910s and 1920s. Barrios formed near the working class district of
Second Ward in inner downtown; this neighborhood later became known as Segundo Barrio.11
West of downtown, and adjacent to El Segundo Barrio, another Mexican enclave formed in the
Sixth Ward. North of downtown in the First Ward, the Northside neighborhood formed. The largest
language, intermarriage, adoption practices, and even the practice of compadrazgo. Armando Alonzo, Tejano
Legacy: Rancheros and Settlers in South Texas, 1734-1900 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998),
6, 141-142; Tyina Steptoe, Houston Bound: Culture and Color in Jim Crow City (Oakland: University of California
Press, 2016), 84-85.
5 Alonzo, Tejano Legacy, 70.
6 Dwight Watson, Race and the Houston Police Department, 1930-1990: A Change did Come (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 30.
7 Arnoldo De Leόn, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt: Mexican Americans in Houston, 2nd ed. (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 9, 7
8 Steptoe, Houston Bound, 29-30.
9 Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1997), 41.
10 Steptoe, Houston Bound, 84-86.
11 Ibid., 79; De Leόn, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt, 12.
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Mexican settlement, Magnolia Park, grew some four miles from the city center, in the southeastern
part of Houston, near the ship channel.12 Houston was comprised of six districts, and the ethnic
enclaves had little direct contact with the African-American communities in the Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Wards.13
Moreover, Houston’s small ethnic-Mexican population did not experience the racial
tensions that occurred toward thousands of immigrants who crossed over into Texas to flee
Mexico’s revolution in 1910. According to historian Neil Foley, the mass exit of immigrants from
that country due to its civil war created in the minds of many Anglo segregationists the fear of a
“second color[ed] menace.”14 In Central Texas, the rise of immigrant workers in its cotton culture
caused the displacement of poor white and black sharecroppers. White landowners’ increasingly
employed Mexicans, because unlike white or black tenants, they did not demand concessions from
employers like lower rent and less supervision. 15 Although immigration into Houston occurred
with the outbreak of the revolution, ethnic Mexicans comprised roughly five-percent of the city’s
population of 78,800 in 1910 and 138,276 inhabitants ten years later.16 The African-American
population still overwhelmed the ethnic-Mexican presence by five times in the 1920s (comprising
30 percent of the population).17 Ethnic Mexicans worked in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, but
the size of immigrant populace could not substantiate fears within Anglos of a “second color
menace” that impacted other areas of Central Texans.18
This small community of first-generation Mexican immigrants were able to develop a
national consciousness of lo Mexicano within their barrio that maintained interest in the affairs of
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their home country. This consciousness called for the accommodation of the socioeconomic and
political structure of the American society while enforcing a dedication to the values of the old
country. The immigrant generation also formulated ethnic organizations, businesses, cultural
institutions, and newspapers to support and preserve their Mexicanness.19 With Jim Crow at bay,
immigrants’ consciousness of lo mexicano helped them to establish their presence in Houston. By
the outbreak of the Great Depression, their status as immigrants loyal to their mother country
inadvertently functioned to restrict their power to engage in civil rights activities and made them
susceptible to racism and discrimination.20
The influx of ethnic-Mexicans migrants seeking economic and social improvement pushed
them to the forefront of a nativists’ anti-immigration backlash. They were attracted to Houston
because of its expanding oil-related industries, jobs available in railroad lines, and in the postWorld War I era, Texas-Mexican migrants were also relocating to Houston for the petrochemical
industries.21 The influx of ethnic Mexicans caused the population to more than double from 6,000
to 15,000 by 1930, which caused Anglos to look to national concerns of an immigration problem.22
Nativists’ animosity towards Mexicans used the same anti-immigrant discourses pitted against
newcomers from Eastern and Southern Europe, which underlined foreigners’ inability to
nationalize and whiten.23 Nativists, like Raymond Carroll, argued Mexicans were ideologically
not Americans and intentionally isolated themselves in their communities to continue embracing
the culture of their homeland: “Americanism [was] a mask put on for Election Day, job hunting,
and relief getting.”24 For the status quo in Houston, the immigrant generation’s embracement of lo
Mexicano served to isolate the barrios from the rest of Houston, which fed into the anti-
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immigration sentiment.25 Nativists’ anti-immigration discourse informed Anglo Americans that
Mexican newcomers did not qualify to be American citizens U.S. patriotism.
In Houston, like throughout the state, white Americans racialized ethnic Mexicans as the
“other” by invoking nineteenth-century perceptions that underscored racial hybridity. Anglos
called upon a longstanding state history that argued that Texas Mexicans were a conquered
population not entitled to the citizens’ rights protected in whiteness, because Spanish colonizers
consorted and took part in sexual intercourse with blacks and indigenous groups.26 With the
outbreak of the Great Depression, eugenicists like Isaac Marcossen argued that Mexican
immigrants were racial liabilities who threaten the integrity of the “human breeding stock of future
Americans.”27 This perception could further be entertained, in part, because the people who
migrated from Mexico typically acknowledged three racial groups that did not conform to the
U.S.’s legally enforced black/white racial binary: raza blanca (white race), raza indigena (Indian
race); and raza mezclada (mixed race). 28 The status quo examined ethnic Mexicans proximity to
blackness to distance them from whiteness and justify the separation of the small ethnic
community from larger society.29
The Great Depression became the first experience of dispossession for ethnic Mexicans in
Houston, because of their race many were denied American status and the protections that it
ensured. Threatened with social and economic insecurities, Anglo Americans from all sectors of
society carried out a series of discriminatory actions that aimed to strip Mexican Americans of
their place in the economy. Before the depression, sixty-percent of Mexican Houstonians worked
in “low blue collar” positions and were well represented in the service sectors. By the winter of
1930-1931, hundreds of ethnic Mexicans were unemployed, and city authorities refused to provide
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work relief to those who could not prove their citizenship. 30 Many local businesses reduced their
work force or limited their hiring of Mexicans to employ white workers. In addition, industry and
organized labor took steps to guard blue collar occupations. They successfully persuaded the
creation of ordinances in the City of Houston and within Harris County to adopt rules requiring all
employees, laborers, and subcontractors to be residents of six-months standing to qualify for
employment in public works.31 Oil refineries and shipyards maintained a policy of discrimination
against minorities that limited ethnic Mexicans to low-paying manual labor, like ditch digging or
as janitors.32 Pushed out, or limited within the economic sector, ethnic Mexicans also lost the legal
security to remain in the city.
The fervor of the anti-immigration movement led to and caused the repatriation and
deportation of thousands of Mexican Houstonians. Throughout the states bordering Mexico, Anglo
Americans called for repatriation and deportation to solve the racial and economic problem caused
by immigrants. The deportation of Mexicans would preserve the breeding stock of whiteness,
alleviate relief funds for Americans, and create jobs for Anglo employees.33 Historian Arnoldo De
Leόn estimated that at least 2,000, or approximately fifteen-percent, of the city’s ethnic-Mexican
population of 15,000 were returned to Mexico in the 1930s.34 This number was small when
compared to sixty-percent of ethnic Mexicans reportedly deported from Austin, Texas, or the
possible estimation of two million deported nationwide.35 However, organizations formed in
Houston to assist the Mexican Consul to relocate repatriates to Mexico, where they might find
better living conditions. De Leόn’s evidence implied that Houston immigration officials raided
private companies suspected of employing Mexicans. In 1931 such raids netted 152 deportations
in the city. The United States District Court records also indicate that from 1929-1933 a
30
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considerable number of Mexicans faced arrest, imprisonment, and deportation for violation of the
immigration acts.36
Moreover, the racialization of ethnic Mexicans by Anglo Americans made their
communities susceptible to the law enforcement system’s formalized tactics that deprived them of
their civil rights. Throughout the southwestern states with ethnic-Mexican populations, authorities
approved various acts that violated Mexicans’ human rights, such as mass deportation round-ups
and “kangaroo courts” that ignored legal or basic procedural rights. Violence and “scare-head”
tactics were used to encourage voluntary repatriation of unwanted masses of Mexicans.37 Historian
Edward Escobar suggests the anti-immigration arguments also highlighted ethnic Mexicans’
criminal tendencies which justified placing them under the gaze of police control.
He argues that in Los Angeles the police department steadily increased the percentage of
Mexicans arrested, particularly juveniles, in the 1930s. He suggests this corresponded to the large
wave of Mexican immigrants, who entered the United States earlier in the century, coming to age
and running afoul with the law. Furthermore, he implies that the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) arrested Mexicans for violations of sumptuary laws or other “victimless” crimes to lay
the basis for subsequent law-enforcement claims that Mexican juveniles committed an
extraordinarily high number of crimes. By the 1930s, police departments (like the LAPD) were
starting to link race and crime to ethnic Mexicans,38 despite the fact that national studies
determined ethnic Mexicans were no more criminally inclined than any other segment of the
population.39
The Wickersham Commission, a precursor to the President’s Crime Commission and
headed by former attorney general George Wickersham, released in 1931 the Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement that held an overview of Mexicans and criminality. The report
argued that one factor that helped inflate the number of Mexican arrests were that racially
36
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prejudiced law-enforcement officers tended to arrest Mexicans more often than they arrested
whites.40 All of this only fed into known eugenic beliefs among Anglo Americans that held ethnic
Mexicans were a “mongrelized” race of mixed ancestry with brutal leanings like criminality.41 It
also justified local law enforcement agencies severe and unequal treatment toward the ethnic
community.42
Because Anglos viewed Mexicans as nonwhites, the ethnic community in Houston also
began to encounter hostility when dealing with police. The HPD turned to excessive force to
control unlawful Mexicans as evident by the HPD’s killing of Elpidio Cortez in 1937, which the
authorities excused. As a Mexican national, Cortez represented part of the larger immigration
problem of the nation. With his arrest, he also became defined as a criminal, which only
contributed to the belief that cities like Houston took in foreign citizens of ill repute. Although the
Mexican government took an active interest in the trial that occurred in the summer of that same
year, the officers were acquitted of murder with malice.43 The rise in police violence toward
Mexicans throughout the 1930s signaled the status quo’s call upon the law-enforcement system to
use the force of hand directed against African Americans toward the barrios.
Police excessive force toward civilians or prisoners undergirded the interactions between
the HPD and the African-American communities. Since the 1910s, African Americans experienced
the oppression of Jim Crow through daily encounters with one of its mechanism, the Houston
Police. The police buttressed the white power structure and embodied the racist authority. Violence
and harassment were commonly used to demand the black population’s submission.44 African
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Americans, who failed to comply, would be entrapped in the nexus of power that flowed between
law enforcement and the Fort Bend County prison system. The physical embodiment of white
supremacy in the law-enforcement system kept the black community in-check.45 Conflict was not
absent in police-black community relations in Houston. As early as 1917, a race riot erupted
between the HPD and black navy-men.46 HPD’s patrol units were also believed to have been
involved in the June 20, 1928 lynching of Robert Powell (who was held in protective custody and
accused of shooting a police detective).47 The HPD’s killing of Elpidio Cortez in 1937 indicate
that arbitrary law enforcement was used to oppress ethnic Mexicans along racialized lines and
practices employed by lawmen upon African Americans.
While the Second World War eased the nation’s economic despair, Mexican Houstonians
continued to suffer hardships and found themselves stripped of the American dream. By 1941 the
Bayou City’s port was the third largest in the United States and received millions of dollars in
federal funds to assist in building and maintaining the ship channel. Thus the city experienced an
era of relative prosperity and uninterrupted growth in jobs, people, office building, and residential
subdivisions. The oil, gas, and petrochemical industries created jobs and attracted migration into
Houston.48 The Bayou City’s population grew from 292,000 people in 1930 to 384,514 in 1940
with the expansion of the ship channel and industries along with it.49 Repatriation and deportation
had a tremendously negative affect on the Houston ethnic-Mexican population, so much so that it
increased by only 5,000 (to a total of 20,000) in 1940 from 15,000 persons in 1930. The 1930s was
the lowest annual gain in the city’s Mexican-American history.50
For ethnic Mexicans, the American dream was far from reach especially for those who
continued to live in economic squalor and experienced Jim Crow’s social denigration. The Great

45

Steptoe, Houston Bound, 22.
James Martin Sorelle,“The Darker Side of Heaven”: The Black Community in Houston, Texas, 19171945,” (Ph.D dissertation, Kent State University, 1980), 72-75.
47 Watson, Race and the Houston Police, 14.
48 Ibid., 27-28.
49 De Leόn, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt, 23, 51, 55.
50 Ibid., 47-48, 55.
46

25

Depression had worsened the ethnic-Mexican community’s degree of poverty, and by 1940, they
made-up nearly eleven-percent of the city’s poor who were living in substandard housing. 51 The
conditions of the community were daily reminders of authorities’ lesser regard of Mexican
neighborhoods. They remained in poverty-stricken slums and continued to work in low-paying
occupations as operatives, industrial/railroad workers, and lesser types of semi-skilled or skilled
workers. Poverty inevitably compelled youths to go to work mid-way through their adolescent
years, which resulted in poor attendance records and high dropout rates. As of 1950, MexicanAmericans twenty-five years old and over completed only 5.2 years of schooling, compared with
11.4 for Anglos and 7.6 for blacks. Moreover, public schools reminded Mexican-American
students of their inferiority and second-class status while Americanizing them.52
Mexican-American youths who turned to the Pacheco culture for empowerment, grew up
in a society that excluded them on racial grounds. Because ethnic Mexicans in Texas were white
by law, legal scholar Arieala Gross argues that Anglos, “learned over the course of the midtwentieth century to explain their exclusion of Mexican Americans on the basis of language and
culture rather than race.”53 Spanish among ethnic Mexicans was a marker of cultural differences
that Anglos used to stigmatize them as failing to become legitimate citizens. The culture of Jim
Crow fostered a racial logic that promoted hierarchies and social divisions within the spaces of
whiteness.54 City authorities isolated the barrios by manipulating real estate development to
maintain Mexicans in their neighborhoods.55 The effects of the previous decade upon the ethnic
Mexican community had successfully created an atmosphere in 1940s Houston that fostered the
emergence of the pacheuco subculture among youths.
Pachuqismo was a cultural phenomenon among youths in the 1940s that was most
momentous in Los Angeles, California. Rapid migration of all races to the city stressed the
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infrastructure’s ability to serve the expanding population, Mexican barrios were most affected by
the overcrowding.56 The rise of pachuco culture in Los Angeles was linked to extreme poverty,
pervasive discrimination, and police abuse and brutality that resulted in a segment of juveniles and
youths becoming alienated from, and rebelling against, American society. For many youths, this
rebellion was a symbolic challenge to dominant Anglo society that generally excluded them and
also against authority figures, like the police, who oppressed them.57 According to Escobar’s study
of Los Angeles zoot-suiters, an underlining factor that influenced youth’s embracement of
pachuqismo was the discontent that they had “grown up indoctrinated and believing in the
American dream only to discover that, simply because they were Mexican, they could never fully
partake in America's riches.”58 This was also true for many Houston pachucos, who learned to
internalize the racial connotation of the word “Mexican” and grow resentful of its implications.59
The upheavals of the Great Depression resounded within ethnic-Mexican youths to
construct an American identity that protested the anti-immigration/ anti-Mexican sentiment of the
prior decade. The counter identity of pachuquismo challenged the new ethnic consciousness of lo
Americano that originated in the mid-1930s. Members of the rising Mexican-American generation
engaged in political and social activism designed to redefine their racial and American identity.
Ethnic-Mexican activists embraced a new sense of American nationalism, “lo Americano,” which
invoked their white racial privileges and rights within the city and nation. These bicultural activists
attempted to maintain their parents’ culture while staking claim to the racial hierarchy by assuming
the cultural practices of the Anglo majority.60 Mexican-American juveniles distanced themselves
from mainstream society and tried to define their own sense of social inclusion through
delinquency and gang activity.
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Pachucos displayed scorn for the white social order that was unlike the political
negotiations and social accommodations that Mexican-American activists called for. This hostility
to Americanism was expressed through delinquency and gang activity. In addition they adopted
an attitude and lifestyle known as la vida loca (the crazy life).61 In Houston, this attitude was
expressed via some Mexican-American youths engaging in “gangdom style,” which meant that
they would roam the streets seeking “protection” money from people in their community.62
Members of these gangs wore their hair long, dressed in zoot suits, and were armed with either
pistols or knives.63 The nationwide sentiment perceived juvenile delinquents and zoot-suiters as
un-American.
The youth movement was deemed as challenging to American nationalism during a time
of war; however, pachuqismo offered youths a counter response to the racist authority that
oppressed their communities. For many white Americans the zoot-suit ensemble symbolized
Mexican-Americans personal extravagance and the flaunting of their disposable incomes. In
addition, the zoot suit displayed their assertive individualism that challenged the gender norms
prized in the neat, trim look of the servicemen. 64 These youths felt empowered by their numbers
and justified their activities by claiming to protect their neighborhood. It is likely that youths
thought they were guarding their community from other neighborhood gangs. But in wearing the
zoot suit, youths made a public declaration against the status quo that demonstrated they
understood the racial nature of their subordination.65 Their gang activities indicated that in greater
numbers they could resist and be shielded from the white authorities who mistreated and targeted
Mexicans throughout the 1930s.
Following a 1943 investigation, law-enforcement authorities and the grand jury in Harris
County were convinced youth activities threaten society. According to their report, three gangs of
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boys were committing “shakedown rackets” that were responsible for the upsurge of crime within
the Mexican-American community. Police Homicide Lieutenant A. C. Thornton told the Houston
Chronicle that gangs warned people “that they would be beaten if they did not hand over a certain
per cent [sic] of their weekly salary" for protection.66 Gangs reportedly “threaten more serious
beatings if the victims go to [the] police."67 Lieutenant George Bell, claimed these youths
“practiced the life of hardened criminals." 68 Crime among youths became so rampant, that by 1945
the Harris County grand jury informed the public that “50 percent of their cases involved juveniles
and most of these involved Latin-Americans. 69 Juvenile delinquents were connected to two or
three shootings every night in Houston,70 and in early January 1943 they were already connected
to at least five killings.71 One crime that reverberated among the status quo was Joe Pacheco’s
murder in March 13, 1943.
With the Pacheco case, the status quo connected Houston to the delinquency problem in
California to look outward for resolutions to control the city’s problem. In this case, Pacheco
confronted the “Long Hair” gang because they continuously harassed his seventeen-year-old son.
After he threatened to expose the group to police, the “Long Hair” gang supposedly bludgeoned
him to death and placed his body on the Southern Pacific railroad tracks to make it appear as an
accidental death.72 Lt. Thornton, the homicide detective assigned to investigate the murder, most
likely looked to the August 1942 killing of José Díaz in the Los Angeles Sleepy Lagoon incident
to model his investigation into Pacheco’s death. In the Díaz case, twenty-two Mexican-American
youths were successfully convicted for murder despite discrepancies in the proceedings and lack
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of evidence.73 Mexican-American zoot-suiters disregard for authority deemed them as undeserving
of the rights and privileges of full citizenship or membership in a democracy.74
Similar to the Sleepy Lagoon incident, the Pacheco case served as an opportunity for the
city’s white power structure to leverage control over Mexican youths who challenged it. For Lt.
Thornton, the arrest and indictment of the sextet for murder were necessary to “break the back” of
the gang, while also asserting the authority of American culture, law, and authority over rogue
youth gangs. Initially, Justice Ben Moorehead declared Pacheco’s death an accident; however,
Thornton challenged that verdict and began an extensive investigation of his own into the “Long
Hairs.” Convinced it was “Latin-American gangs” who killed Pacheco, he was relentless in his
search to obtain statements from witnesses.75 The witness testimony gathered by Thornton claimed
the gang carried-out the murder with an iron pipe before placing Pacheco on the tracks. The
autopsy report seemingly supported the testimony that Pacheco died from a head injury. 76 The
entire group was indicted for murder. The minority communities were threatened with another
phase of judicial discrimination within Jim Crow. Moreover, newspapers helped to consolidate the
incrimination of the youths, which assured the city was aware of its Latin-American problem.
Newspapers incited the city’s anger toward the societal problem posed by Mexican
Americans, thereby, helping law enforcement to sensationalize Pacheco’s murder and further
isolate the youths from larger society. Juvenile delinquency, as represented in the news coverage
of the Pacheco case, challenged ethnic Mexicans’ whiteness by popularizing the criminal nature
of their youths. Two of the six members of the “Long Hair” gang were juveniles under the age of
fifteen. The remaining gang members were male youths between the ages of nineteen and twentythree years old, but one was a female follower. The leader of the gang was wheelchair bound, and
his brother (one of the six) was a repeat offender who was already indicted for assault to murder.77
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The reports on the culprits likely aimed to draw concern among the status quo that MexicanAmerican delinquents came from any age or sex. Physical health or prior offenses were not a
deterrent in the life of crime.
In June 1943 during the trial of the “Long-Hair” members, Pacheco’s murder was further
sensationalized by local newspaper the Houston Chronicle that carried reports of the Zoot-Suit
Riots in Los Angeles alongside coverage of the trial.78 The Zoot-Suit Riots started when a group
of servicemen on leave in Los Angeles attacked zoot suiters for the racist and anti-American
sentiment their clothing invoked. For days, police watched approvingly as soldiers, sailors, and
civilians attacked ethnic Mexicans and destroyed property.79 By juxtaposing the Pacheco case with
the Zoot-suit Riots, the Houston Chronicle sensationalized official reports to highlight the alleged
pachuco crime wave and provoke hysteria among the masses.80Anglos’ antagonism toward zootsuiters was apparent, when a small riot nearly broke-out in Galveston, Texas (some forty-mile
south of Houston) against three zoot suiters held for vagrancy and believed to be connected to a
stabbing and purse-snatching incident.81
While the zoot-suit backlash in California influenced Houston’s law enforcement and
media to sensationalize ethnic Mexicans involved in delinquency, the LAPD employed very
different methods of crime prevention in the 1940s that fractured police-community relations.
During the war years, LAPD moved to forcefully control the juvenile “criminal element” of the
ethnic-Mexican population of approximately 133,000 (8.06 percent of the total population).82 The
department adopted a police-professionalism model in 1938 that moved it toward the crimefighting-mentality and placed it at odds with large segments of the community.83 Mexican
Americans in Los Angeles saw police misconduct on a daily basis such as, verbal abuse, sexual
harassment, indiscriminate searches, unwarranted arrests, and excessive force. They came to fear
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and even hate LAPD officers in the 1940s.84 In Texas, the Juvenile Court Act of 1943 encouraged
police to implement the Civil Guardianship model to peacefully work with the community; this
opened a period of amicable police relations that averted over-policing and aggression.
The implementation of the 1943 Juvenile Court Act did not take effect to specifically
address delinquency among ethnic-Mexican juvenile delinquents, but to tackle the issue and the
possibility of misbehavior by Anglo youths. Delinquency among youths threatened the integrity
of whiteness, and the state of Texas was underprepared to mediate the proper treatment that would
deter and reform youthful misconduct. Texas public schools could not reinforce compulsory laws
that mandated attendance. For one, the HPD in the early 1940s suffered from a shortage in
manpower and from “antiquated police methods and inefficiency.”85 For a city with a population
of 384,514, there were only 344 officers to patrol its parameters, a ratio of 1 officer to every 1,117
civilians.86 On a similar note, Houston school officials could not control its expanded juvenile
population that corresponded with the expanding demographic of the city in the latter 1930s.87 The
Harris County Grand Jury believed that parents were too busy working to supervise their children’s
school attendance and that this neglect could lead to problems. All these factors allowed white
youths to avoid school and peruse the streets seeking entertainment.88
The state believed the law-enforcement system was dealing with semi-delinquent
juveniles, whose illegal activities were not ‘bad enough’ acts to make the white youth a product of
detention centers.89 These youths were too bad for school, but not bad enough for the prison
system. The threat of possible indecency among white females must have become increasingly
concrete when the grand jury released figures that over nine hundred young women (race not
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stated) were arrested for sexual delinquency from 1943 to 1944. In addition, drinking among
minors had also increased. Harris County lacked a juvenile court, and the police department’s
small jail facility was overcrowded and not large enough to segregate prisoners by crime or race.90
According to the Harris County Grand Jury, jail facilities were a “full generation behind in
development of detention camps and homes where youths may be developed under scientific
supervision rather than be put in jails and penitentiaries.”91 Neither could the semi-delinquent be
left in an environment that could foster truancy and crime.
Harris County authorities and the Houston Police Department found that civil guardianship
within the 1943 Juvenile Court Act of Texas offered a solution to help the semi-delinquent outgrow
“anti-social tendency” and involve the community in the process.92 This vital legislation changed
the course of the city’s handling of delinquent children from a procedure that was criminal to one
based on a “civil guardianship proceeding.”93 Civil guardianship was a “new legal philosophy”
that mandated the courts, police, probation officers, welfare agencies, and the entire public to
recognize and ascertain the societal factors that contributed to delinquency, thereby, determining
and meeting the needs of the individual child.94
The Houston Police Department designed the Crime Prevention Division (CPD) to
implement the specialized services of the civil guardianship in their juvenile proceedings, which
opened an avenue to include ethnic Mexicans in the patrol of their community. The Manual of the
Crime Prevention Division (The Manual of the CPD) designated juvenile investigative details to
be handled by officers of the same-race and/or same-ethnicity of the youth. According to The
Manual of the CPD, “All colored cases are assigned to the colored officer…[and] Cases involving
Latin-American children are assigned to the Latin-American officer…"95 The rationale for the
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CPD’s inclusion of this provision stemmed from its aim to operate “in such a manner that the boy
or girl and their parents will be receptive to a rehabilitation program.” In a city influenced by racial
division, permitting officers of the same race or ethnicity to handle minority juveniles allowed
inequities to prevail, while assuring white juveniles would not be ridiculed or made to feel
conspicuous by an officer of a subordinate race. Civil guardianship, thereby, maintained police
principles to preserve the “integrity” of white supremacy and Jim Crow separation.96 The creation
of the Latin-American division, or squad, in September of 1942, which was composed of three
people with Spanish-surnames, demonstrated law enforcement’s willingness to include officers of
Mexican descent in the patrolling of their communities.97 This group was designed to eliminate
juvenile delinquency specifically in Mexican neighborhoods.
While the number of Mexican Americans on the Latin-American squad represented a large
disparity to the ethnic community, one officer to 10,000 citizens, the power endowed on them was
significant when compared to African-Americans’ history within the department. African
Americans made up twenty-percent of the population, but they only totaled 7 of the 344 officers
in the HPD (1 per every 17,000 black citizens). African Americans were denied training for traffic
detail, forbidden from arresting white citizens, and given limited access to motorized patrol
units.98 Although the Latin-American squad was controlled by Lieutenant George Bell, a white
officer, the CPD allowed its ethnic officers to patrol streets, alleys, beer joints, midnight shows,
skating rinks, and all places of public amusement and recreation in order to remove or control
environmental hazards against minors.99 In its first six-months of operation (September 1943 to
February 1944), the Latin-American division dealt with thirteen gang-related shootings. By 1945,
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the division helped bring gun violence down to almost zero. The squad was also effective in
solving cases and obtaining convictions. From 1944 to 1945, the Latin-American division cleared
or gained convictions for ninety-percent of the 1,731 cases investigated.100 The Chronicle
published the Latin-American squad’s achievements in averting crimes derived from gang activity,
and attributed it as one contributor of decreasing juvenile delinquency.101
Outside of patrolling, Mexican-American activists also had an opportunity to work with
the HPD to reform youths. In keeping with the Juvenile Court Act of 1943, the CPD had an
objective in patrolling the community that included cooperation with “civic-betterment groups.”
Maintaining this objective meant law enforcement was placed in closer proximity to MexicanAmerican activists.102 The Juvenile Probation Department and the CPD had agencies within the
county that focused on recreation, via involvement in the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts, to curb
delinquency among youths.103 Until the early 1940s, the Juvenile Department did not include
trained workers in crime prevention, nor were blacks and ethnic-Mexicans employed who would
be acquainted with, or knew how to cope with sectional area problems. 104 With the HPD not
properly manned to supervise recreational parks or other breeding grounds for juvenile
delinquency,105 reaching out to Mexican-American civic groups became an effective means to gain
the minority community’s help in curbing crime among youths.
Similar to patrolling, police inclusion of Mexican-American organizations was significant
because it displayed a willingness to have the input of the ethnic communities in reducing
delinquency and in the handling of their juveniles. According to the Chronicle, Mexican-American
organizations formed baseball, football and basketball teams to “divert the competitive energies
of Latin-American youths” that got played-out in the “dark alleys.”106 The League of United Latin
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American Citizens (LULAC) was named as being behind the local movement for the betterment
of juveniles,107 but other neighborhood groups formed to address their delinquency. The Good
Citizen League worked with the city health department to show movies that would educate youths
and purchased sports equipment for civic clubs.108 Similarly, the Federation of Mexican LatinAmerican Clubs of Houston formed four boy clubs in June 1945 that over a three-month period
had memberships that exceeded 200 boys from 12 to 18 years old.109 Mexican-American groups
wanted to motivate juveniles to redirect their energy and time away from unlawful behavior. By
encouraging responsible activities among juveniles, activists and youths abided by the recreational
and culture norms of Jim Crow Houston.
Moreover, community activists used the invitation by law enforcement to help curb
juvenile delinquency as an opportunity to challenge the subculture of pachuquismo and encourage
the adoption of lo Americano. The bicultural paradigm of nationality in “lo Americano” continued
to influence Mexican-Americans surge of Americanist sentiment during the United States’
involvement in the Second World War. Whereas pachuquismo encouraged scorn against white
society, Mexican-American activists’ sense of lo Americano stressed an appreciation of American
culture.110 Activists arose from a thriving middle-class of entrepreneurs and professional, who used
their legal “white” status as a fundamental part of their politicking to avoid segregation. They
realized anti-immigration rhetoric questioned their whiteness and thus racialized them all as
“brown,” which could hurt Mexican Americans’ claim to whiteness and relegate them to the
segregation practices of Jim Crow. These activists broke with being identified with Mexico and
“Indianness” to exclaim a racial and national identity of white and American.111 Activists aimed
to inspire youths to embrace “lo Americano” as a means to eliminate prejudices and divert any
new notions of criminality among ethnic Mexicans that could lead to further Anglo subordination.
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For activists, working to reduce delinquency displayed the community’s willingness to
acculturate and be upstanding citizens. Ernest Villarreal, chair of the Federation of Mexican LatinAmerican Clubs, spoke with youths about their obligations as citizens. He explained that criminal
activities posed a danger of creating “spiteful reputations” among the ethnic-Mexican population.
He attacked the reputation being associated with zoot suiters, and stated that the federation wanted
to change the “style” of clothing that was popular among youths. He also encouraged youths “to
abandon their extra-long haircuts, so that in the future the term ‘longhair’ will have no place in
Latin-American sections of Houston.”112 The Federation’s efforts to create a new image for youths
were evident by their use of donations to outfit boys with uniforms (as well as sporting equipment).
Youths were even responsible for fifty-cent monthly dues to display a willingness to pay for things
they wanted, rather than rob or steal them.113 After a decade of discrimination in the 1930s,
Mexican-American activists like Villarreal used recreation to reverse any derogatory image gained
by the pachuco subculture. It was a demonstration to mainstream Houston society that MexicanAmerican youths could become the next generation of upstanding citizens.
Furthermore, with the aid of local Mexican-American activists, the CPD and the LatinAmerican squad were able to achieve their objective to promote constructive channels and divert
negative publicity from delinquency and gangs. According to The Manual of the Crime Prevention
Division, part of protecting youths from lawbreaking would include opposing “publicity in all
cases where juveniles are gaining attention through delinquent acts.”114 The department published
its guidelines for cooperation with the Mexican-American community in the Houston Chronicle.
It aimed to reverberate among all youths that another avenue for recreation existed that had the
approval of the Houston white power structure. Lt. Bell of the Latin-American squad appeared to
be enthusiastic that police-community relations aided youths and exclaimed in the Houston
Chronicle that they were “swapping their pistols and knives for bats, gloves and the pigskins.”115
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In other words, sports teams were the proper “gangs” in Jim Crow Houston for they allowed city
youths to play within the system not against it. This was definitely implied in one news report that
documented the Good Citizen League as successfully negotiating with a gang leader to encourage
his members to play sports instead of urging them to engage in criminal activity. 116 Moreover, by
publishing reports of amicable police-community relations, the HPD was able to challenge a
decade long image that the police, as a mechanism of the power structure, was discriminatory
toward its ethnic-Mexican communities.
Working with Mexican-American organizations helped the CPD meet the agenda of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1943, and the success of interracial interactions in police-community
relations were highlighted in news reports. In the Houston Chronicle, Lt. Bell recognized the
community’s contribution in decreasing delinquency, and he stated: “that the elimination of these
gangs cannot be solely credited to the police department, but to the combined efforts of police,
juvenile authorities, district judges, prominent Latin-American citizens of Houston and various
civic organizations.”117 These reports hint that the integrity of whiteness worked best when all
components of the status quo effectively contributed to reforming the wayward aspects that
challenged society, like delinquency. Mexican gangs were declared eliminated in Houston in 1945,
and two years later the Latin-American division was dissolved.118
The early 1940s represented a period when the Mexican-American generation, via political
activism and delinquent youth movements, redefined its race and reclaimed power that had slowly
diminished since the Great Depression. These actions combatted the tightening of Jim Crow
cultural practices toward the ethnic Mexican population after the 1920s, because of concerns to
protect the integrity of whiteness and American culture. Mexican immigrants and migrants
gravitated toward Houston to live in a society where they would be protected and could thrive in
communities bonded through the common identity of lo Mexicano. The 1930s, however, ushered
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in a decade of anti-immigration and anti-Mexican movements exemplified by repatriation and
deportation campaigns, as well as the increase of police hostility. Mexican Americans understood
their ethnicity was being racialized as nonwhite across the nation—as evidence by the U.S.
government’s establishment of the 1930 Mexican Census. In addition, they were aware that the
status quo increasingly “Jim Crowed” them within culture and society.
Juvenile delinquency and gang activity among Mexican American zoot-suiters allowed
grassroots and political notions of Americanism to be performed in the streets of the barrios and
within one oppressive mechanism of the status quo, law enforcement. Initially, the zoot-suit
backlash in California influenced Houston law enforcement system to oppress ethnic Mexicans
involved in delinquency. The implementation of the Juvenile Court Act of 1943, created to protect
white youths, enabled Mexican-American communities to peacefully work with police to
successfully decrease delinquency and reform the image of youths to upstanding citizens. Unlike
Los Angeles, where a history of over-policing and aggression toward Mexican-Americans caused
citizens to fear, and even hate law enforcement,119 the HPD was an undermanned force and needed
the ethnic-Mexican community’s aid to curb delinquency and restore racial order to society.
The police-community relations that resulted from the civil guardianship represented a
moment when the oppressive Jim Crow system empowered Mexican Americans to aid their
community. The following chapter will demonstrate that by the 1950s, the HPD’s new policemodel (the war-on-crime) increased hostility toward larger segments of society. 120 Unlike the
1940s, the next era of delinquency would usher in the growth of police power and control that
would not entertain the inclusion of Mexican-American activists.
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Chapter 2: Gangs and Juvenile Delinquency in the Criminalization of the
Ethnic-Mexican Community
In the early 1950s, LULAC member and attorney John J. Herrera clashed with the Houston
Police Department over its discriminatory patrolling of ethnic-Mexican youths for delinquency.
Supposedly three dangerous gangs – Magnolia Park, Second Ward, and Capitol Avenue – roamed
the streets of Houston carrying pistols, terrorizing the neighborhoods, burglarizing homes, and
killing each other. Their misbehavior in Jim Crow Houston caused white society to fear
delinquency. Bayou City law-enforcement officials responded by shifting their strategy from the
social worker model of civil guardianship, which had defined patrolling methods in the 1940s, to
a larger war-on-crime model. The war on ethnic-Mexican delinquency marked a new level of
intolerant police methods – dragnets, special squads, profiling, and excessive force – that not only
racially criminalized youths, but also made the community suspect of high crime. Herrera warned
the police that their methods, which entailed launching a “crusade against” an “entire people”
would only hurt their relations with the Mexican community.1
In the eyes of Houston officials, the law-enforcement system needed to be a preventive
force that would restore the order of white supremacy, and it worked with media to promote fear
and criminalize youths. For instance, in March 1950, Houston Chronicle reporter Orie Collins
published a string of articles regarding the outbreak of ethnic-Mexican juvenile gangs and hoodlum
activity. He told of how ethnic-Mexican gang members threatened and intimidated witnesses in
the courts.2 Collins also wrote of telephone threats he received from the “Latin-American
underworld” for his publication of the articles. He claimed a man with a Spanish accent told him,
“If there’s another story in the paper tonight like that one you wrote yesterday, you won’t live to
see the sun rise tomorrow.”3 Additionally, his reports suggested that Mexican-American
delinquents were not American enough to embrace the benefits of citizenship. According to
1
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Collins, these youths were “mostly second or third-generation United States citizens, who have
failed to adopt our ways or even to learn our language.” He emphasized that in the entire city,
“only this racial group engaged in organized hoodlumism [sic].”4 Collins article implied that
ethnic-Mexican delinquents defied the norms of society, were vicious in nature, and held complete
disregard for the authority of law and order.5
Moreover, Houston’s status quo used media to disempower Herrera from contesting the
war on ethnic-Mexican delinquency. Herrera voiced LULAC’s concerns that all the negative
publicity and police tactics classified not only juvenile delinquents as criminals, but a great
majority of honest, law-abiding citizens.6 The law enforcement system – police, the courts, and
state legislation – justified its new model by arguing that these youths were incapable of being
reformed by the ‘civic betterment groups’ that had in the past undergirded amicable police relations
with the ethnic-Mexican community. Justice W. C. Ragan indicated that these youths needed
heavier-handed discipline, to show them that “the law is bigger than these gangs.”7 The Chronicle
once again defended law enforcement by discrediting the validity of the lawyer’s concern for his
community. The newspaper printed LULACer Felix Tijerina’s criticism of the attorney, “as a selfstyled representative of the Mexican people” who was “causing undue publicity to be focused on
the city's Latin Americans.”8 With public outcry suppressed, law enforcers defended “rough”
interrogation procedures as a crucial tool in the war-on-crime.9
This chapter explores how the increase of juvenile delinquency and gang activity among
ethnic-Mexican youths during the 1950s led law-enforcement officials to perpetuate racial
perceptions of the group as a whole, which led to contentious relations with this community. Those
actions represent a seminal moment in police-ethnic Mexican community relations. Delinquency
4
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was a city-wide problem among all juveniles, including white youths. It stemmed from the Second
World War’s disruption of family life and the premature adult subculture that grew in its
aftermath.10 Despite the fact that many from different backgrounds engaged in such activity,
Collins decided to shed a spotlight on ethnic Mexicans. For Collins, ethnic Mexicans represented
a different criminal, who was both white and “colored,” and whom the status quo was failing to
control. With white society living in fear of delinquency, the law-enforcement system embarked
on a crusade against crime to redefine and increase its power, thereby restoring security and
protection to the social order. Thus, as this chapter shows the HPD’s discriminatory tactics
associated ethnic-Mexican youths with crime and in the process not only racialized them but the
community as a whole. In effect, police-community relations declined as law enforcement
challenged the validity of Mexican-American organizations to contest its practices.
Law enforcement played upon the fears of delinquency and the image of ethnic-Mexican
criminality to gain a free hand in controlling the community entirely under its discretion. With the
help of city officials and media, police gained approval for special units and dragnets to control
youths. Their pursuits eventually evolved into profiling. The over arrest rates of ethnic Mexicans
appeared to support the city-wide notion of a “Latin American Problem” and became a selffulfilling prophecy. Moreover, the police war-on-crime model increased the use of excessive force
to teach criminals a lesson and in the process gained respect for law and order. The 1950s was a
period when the HPD expanded its power and discriminatory practices. It did so by silencing the
protest from LULAC and receiving the support of supervisory agencies that overlooked racial
profiling and misconduct. In addition, state legislation created the juvenile courts and expanded
the power of the law enforcement system to control delinquency with probation programs and/or
detention homes.
The expansion of the law enforcement system’s power stemmed from the statewide
delinquency problem and law enforcement’s inability to curb its effect on the wider Anglo society.
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Throughout the 1950s, Texas statistics indicated an adolescent crime wave that was surpassing the
national average. In the mid-1950s, Texas police reportedly contacted 62,000 juveniles.11 While
the national delinquency rate was 12 cases per every 1,000 persons, in Texas the rate was 15 for
every 1,000 persons. State social workers also handled more cases over the national average, with
77 cases per each worker as opposed to the national average of 50. 12 Newspapers declared
delinquency a local problem in cities like Houston, Waco, Galveston, Austin, and Dallas in 1954.13
For the Bayou City, delinquency was an even greater problem because its law enforcement
was not parallel to its demographic growth and subsequently crime increased. In the post-war era,
Houston experienced a 64 percent rise in population, from 384,514 in 1940 to 596,163 in 1950.
This increase resulted from the stable oil industry and expansion of business complexes and
construction.14 The city’s perimeters also jumped from 75 to 390 square miles by the 1960s.
Adding to this “problem” was the police department’s small budget in the 1950s, which made it
difficult to properly equip the undermanned force of 750. Consequently, the rise of juvenile
delinquency – which also included white youths – was viewed as evidence of law enforcement’s
inability to control crime and uphold the larger racial structure.15
To white society, the crime wave was an indication of the overall changing social dynamic
of illegal activity among middle-class Anglo youths. The Houston Chronicle’s Bob Carpenter
wanted to brand youth culture as lower class in origin, but “with middle-class families accounting
for most youthful shoplifting violations it was hard to blame primary poor and working class
11 Reprints from Corpus Christi Caller, c. 1955, Harris County Juvenile Probation Department (HCJPD),
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people for juvenile delinquency.”16 Anglo youths’ main offenses included auto theft, burglary and
petty thievery, as well as a large number of female sex offenders.17 White teens represented the
primary delinquent for the city’s crime wave, as they comprised 60 percent or more of the total
arrested offenders.18
White society feared juvenile delinquency, because it indicated a disruption of the family
in Post-World War II society. According to historian James Gilbert, juvenile delinquency came to
“symbolize a series of fears and expectations about the impact of war on children through rapid
social disorientation and change,” particularly the “disputes over the family and its survival in a
new cultural environment.” The war caused the breakdown of the family with excessive and early
employment of children, geographic mobility, and higher wages suddenly available to the previous
poor or economic marginal population.19 The revival of war production during the Korean conflict
further disrupted the family as absent parents (especially mothers) pushed child raising aside to
“double up” on working at the assembly lines.20
The breakdown of the family also brought to the fore the issue of adult criminal behavior.
Parents taught their children a life of crime. According to the Houston Chronicle, these parents
were “breeders of a second generation of violence” that totaled 15,000 wayward youths.21
Irresponsible parents caused a 20 percent rise in dependency cases in Houston in 1951.22 The city

16 James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America's Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 18; Bob Carpenter, "Tragedies & Tears, Article 2: Few Delinquents I.Q.
Average They Are 'Inferior' or 'Superior,'” Houston Chronicle, June 16, 1951 (hereafter cited as Carpenter,
"Tragedies & Tears, Article 2,” Houston Chronicle).
17 Bob Carpenter, “Tragedies and Tears, Article 14: Juvenile Delinquency in ’50 Takes Big Jump Here.”
Houston Chronicle, February 4, 1951.
18 The Crime Prevention Division (CPD) of the Houston Police Department in 1953, handled over 9,000
youths, and white offenders represented 65 percent of that total. Statistical Reports: Crime Prevention Division of
the Houston Police Department 1953, Crime Prevention Division 1943-1958, HCJPD, HCA, Houston, Texas, CR43,
box 533, folder 16 (hereafter cited as Statistical Reports: Crime Prevention Division 1953, HCA).
19 Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage, 33.
20 Bob Carpenter, "Tragedies and Tears, Article 9: Juvenile Slayers May Point Gun into Your
Unsuspecting Face," Houston Chronicle, June 30, 1951.
21
Bob Carpenter, "Tragedies and Tears, Article 8: Home was Nightmare but Miracle Happened," Houston,
Chronicle, June 23, 1951; Carpenter, “Tragedies & Tears, Article 1,” Houston Chronicle.
22 There were 1433 children under the 'dependent and neglected' classification. Carpenter, "Tragedies and
Tears, Article 14,” Houston Chronicle.
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had to investigate 857 families for child neglect and 1,500 children became wards of the county.23
These youths bore the brunt of neglect, broken family life, and diminishing community services.24
By the mid-1950s, delinquency was a bigger issue for police than syndicated crime which was
nearly nonexistent in the city.25
Moreover, society feared youths were participating in a premature adulthood that indulged
in sex and the consumption of vice. The enormous growth of adolescent labor since the war
attributed to the independence of young people attending high school. 26 Delinquent youths were
believed to be more likely to “play with sin,” because they abused alcohol and “stimulate their
jagged nerves with “goof balls” [barbiturates] or other erotic drugs.”27 According to Houston
Chronicle reporter Bob Carpenter, juvenile drug abuse destroyed “normal inhibitions and pave the
way for degeneracy.” He also believed that female teens “dropped all standards of decency in
orgies,” while male teens joined gangs in petty thievery, ran away from home to escape
punishment, and became fugitives.28 The Harris County Grand Jury labeled juvenile delinquents
the “problem children” of the city.29 To adults, the fashion, music, and customs that teenagers
favored were erecting social barriers that seemed antagonistic to American culture. 30 In short,
juvenile delinquency implied a social problem for whiteness and the Jim Crow order.
To mask the implications of white-teenage behavior, the status quo correlated juvenile
delinquency rates to the growing ethnic Mexican demographic. This population had doubled from
20,000 to 40,000 from the 1940s to the 1950s. New immigration to the city was attributed to the
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post-war era oil industry, but the ethnic populace also experienced natal growth.31 Consequently,
youth crime coincided with the expansion. By 1950, the city experienced a 16 percent jump in
juvenile cases from the previous year. Of those 1,295 youths apprehended, 93 percent of the
violators were under fifteen-years of age.32 Although ethnic Mexicans only composed 6.7 percent
of the city’s total population,33 Mexican-American juveniles unlawfully carrying weapons
comprised nearly 30 percent of the 1,295 youths arrested. Gang killings among ethnic-Mexican
delinquents were also slowly rising, with four reported in 1949 and two within the first three
months of the following year.34 By 1951, authorities found it hard to blame African-American
youths for the rise in crime because they only accounted for less than one-third of the juvenile
cases.35 Newspaper reports emphasized the increase number of incidents among ethnic-Mexican
youths in regards to school vandalism, cases of assault, murder, robbery, and drug possession.36 It
was apparent that through their increasing criminal inclinations, this minority group was once
again becoming the problem race for the status quo.
The status quo’s fight against adolescent law-breaking became fixated on the historically
criminal behavior of ethnic-Mexican youths. Recalling the historicity of criminality among ethnic
Mexicans was common in other cities exacerbated by the juvenile delinquency scare of the 1950s.
Historian Edward Escobar explained that in Los Angeles the police department (LAPD) and
press’s continued belief in the criminality of Mexican-American youths focused on the violent
activities of ethnic-Mexican gangs and intensified the juvenile delinquency scare. 37 Similarly in
Houston, media set-out to highlight what it called “Latin-American delinquency” over all other
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offenders by recalling the recurring problem ethnic-Mexican youths caused over the decade. For
instance, the Houston Chronicle recalled the city’s view of Mexican-American zoot suiters in the
early 1940s and in the following decade depicted ethnic-Mexican delinquents as carrying loaded
pistols, razor-sharp knives, blackjacks and daggers.38 Media reports highlighted the commonality
of ethnic-Mexican delinquent in both eras and encouraged society at large to consider this shared
criminal behavior as inherent. It thereafter, focused its reporting on making Mexican-American
“hoodlumism” an unwanted influence upon the racial status quo.
The media fed into the fear of “Latin-American delinquency” by erecting a new criminal
identity for ethnic-Mexican youths that defined them as threats to society and American justice.
These delinquents were presented as a different criminal than their 1940s counterparts, because
they were “addicted to marijuana, which makes them vicious and gives them the urge to kill.”39
“Vicious” became the new descriptor for the types of crimes Mexican-American youths
participated in, which implied a greater level of disregard for society. The Houston Chronicle
highlighted the notion that not only did “hoodlums” and “gangsters” terrorized the
neighborhoods,40 they also used fear of retaliation to prevent victims from cooperating with the
police.41 According to police inspector L. D. Morrison, the “Latin-American community’s fear of
co-operating with the police in exposing lawbreakers was detrimental to spiritual and civic
improvement.”42 In other words, “vicious delinquents” hindered justice, and in effect, demoralized
the entire ethnic neighborhood through their coercion.
Telling of the newspaper’s accounts was the notion that Mexican-American delinquents
were showing disregard for the law-enforcement system. One article reported an incident of a
group of six knife-carrying-youths, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one years, who twice

38 “Latin American Boy Given 32 Months,” Houston Chronicle; “Six Youths held After Confessing School
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41 “Many Latin Americans Favor Fight on Gangs,” Houston Chronicle, March 12, 1950.
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ignored police orders to disband.43 According to another account by Justice Ragan, “hoodlums”
used intimidation tactics to frighten witnesses of Mexican extraction from speaking the truth within
the criminal courts. He claimed sometimes “the mobsters” leered at witnesses in the courtroom to
frighten them. Supposedly Ragan witnessed a case where a woman filed charges of assault to
murder against her perpetrators, and the defendant had four or five of his gang members enter the
courtroom upon examination to intimidate her.44 Houston’s law-enforcement officials believed
Mexican-American youths had a general lack of respect for law and order – and were ready to
pursue a strategy of discipline that would restore the power of law.
Juvenile delinquency propelled the city’s law-enforcement system to pursue the war-oncrime model that called for police to pursue preventive methods to restore the racial structure and
further Jim Crow the ethnic community. This action replicated the 1920s crusade against crime
that emerged to combat activity stemming from the prohibition of alcohol in the era. According to
historian Jeff Adler’s study on Louisiana in the late 1920s, this campaign emerged in response to
middle-class city dwellers alarm at the overflow of violence into respectable neighborhoods, as
well as the impotence of legal institutions to address or prevent crime. At this time, white
Americans shifted their popular ideas about the role of government and expected legal institutions
to preserve social order. As popular justice changed to the rule of law, law-enforcement institutions
reestablished order with draconian laws, a declaration of a “war on bandits,” the adoption of
aggressive tactics, and increased convictions of lawbreakers.45 In light of this, the Houston Police
Department largely remained attach to traditional policing customs and overlooked institutional
reforms that followed the early war-on-crime.46 By the 1950s, the HPD began to mimic cities with
a sizable ethnic-Mexican population, like Los Angeles, where police metaphorically represented
the “thin blue line” between “civilized” society and anarchy. This metaphor tapped into the white
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populations’ growing anxieties that delinquency caused society to be ripped apart.47 According to
Escobar, white Angelinos, who linked notions of race and criminality, supported the LAPD to
protect them from the growing brown and black populations.48 Police, as law enforcers, stood
between these criminal groups and could restore order with increased power.
The crime-fighting orientation of the war-on-crime model pitted police against adolescent
crime. Delinquency displayed a general disdain for white authority, and the police war-on-crime
mentality placed it at odds with juvenile delinquents. Youths were now the “the criminal element”
that law enforcement had to forcefully try to control.49 The HPD’s shift to the war-on-crime model
was a departure from the civil guardianship practice that define policing in the 1940s, and with it,
the logic to rehabilitate the semi-delinquent. Civil guardianship ushered in a period when police
officers employed a social-worker model to reform juvenile delinquency; it maintained “kindness”
toward the youth and consideration toward their social issues in order to cure delinquency. While
civil guardianship still lingered in discussions on pre-delinquency work,50 the police department
had to reinvent itself from the ineffective force it was into the protective aspect of the war-oncrime that could prevent delinquency while it was on the streets. With society seeking security and
protection against criminal youth, police gained the autonomy needed to implement aggressive
tactics to fight racial minorities who challenged law and order.51
The HPD’s use of war-on-crime tactics against the ethnic-Mexican community included a
new level of racist aggression that was first displayed in response to a string of violent acts
47 Lieutenant Leo Horton of the CPD likely brought back the material needed to understand the mentality
and methods entailed behind the “thin blue line” when he attended the Delinquency Control Institute at the
University of Southern California in the fall of 1953. Statistical Reports: Crime Prevention Division 1953, HCA;
Edward Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999), 162, 187.
48 Escobar, “The Unintended Consequences of the Carceral State,” 181.
49 Escobar, Making of a Political Identity, 199.
50 Civil guardianship was considered a preferable treatment over imprisonment which risked placing a
wedge in the youth’s affection for his parent or develop contempt for the law. The CPD, as well as the Juvenile
Delinquency and Crime Commission (formed in 1953), still encouraged cooperation between citizens and officials
to promote education on juvenile delinquency and crime. See, Draft of the Report of the Juvenile Delinquency &
Probation Committee 1954, HMRC; Statistical Reports: Crime Prevention Division 1953, HCA; Report of Juvenile
Delinquency for 1954, HMRC.
51 Escobar, Making of a Political Identity, 162, 187.
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juveniles committed between February and March 1950. The police created a special unit to
intensify its patrolling and interrogation of ethnic Mexicans after “gang wars” resulted in the
murder of 22-year old Wiley Legget on February 24, 1950. According to the Houston Chronicle,
only one day after the killing, Police Chief B. W. Payne formed a Latin-American squad patterned
after the 1940s division which he believed would be “a weapon for coping” with ethnic-Mexican
delinquency.52 The squad, however, was all white and charged with patrolling ethnic-Mexican
neighborhoods which it viewed as possible areas of high-crime, seeking out the “small percentage”
of criminals causing “considerable trouble.” 53 To spread the small force’s power over gangs and
delinquents, Payne essentially encouraged the use of “dragnets” to be conducted in all the Mexican
American communities for any possible suspects.
Unlike the 1940s method of patrolling, the Latin-American squad and police used dragnets
to target all ethnic-Mexican youths as possible criminals. The squad was authorized to enter the
neighborhoods as a white “posse” and “to pay special attention to gatherings of Latin Americans
on the street and to break up these gatherings and make arrest and file charges wherever this can
be done.”54 These actions allowed anyone to be arrested on the street within the vicinity of a crime
or anyone who resembled the suspect in a case.55 This was seen the first night the squad conducted
an investigation into the Leggett murder; they were reported to have “rounded up 30 LatinAmerican youths for questions in the slaying.” Five of them were held for questioning by police,
because they were performing the Leggett killing in the streets which made them suspects to the
crime.56 Police officers demonstrated their crime-fighting resolve through these raids, which
calmed white fears of social disorder among this racially subordinate population.57 Some of
Payne’s officers embraced these actions as the “old-fashioned policing” needed to combat
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“hoodlums.”58 This act not only over arrested a segment of the population and ensnared many
innocent people, it identified and racialized ethnic-Mexican youths as criminal.
As heinous crimes continued to make local news, government officials’ calls to end the
city’s delinquent terror wave helped further encourage police to invoke discriminatory practices.
On the night of March 5, 1950, one week after Legget’s murder, five ethnic-Mexican youths
between the ages of sixteen and twenty years old took an eighteen-year old female youth from her
fiancée at gunpoint and repeatedly sexually assaulted her.59 Newspapers highlighted the lack of
Christian virtues in the assailants, as they not only defiled her betrothal, but also stole her gold
cross and attacked her within a church yard.60 Two city councilmen criticized Payne for “his
apparent inability or disinclination to handle the [delinquency] situation.”61 Another councilmen
J.S. Griffith stated in the Houston Chronicle, that Payne needed to “[cope] with the situation in
such a manner that depredations by Latin-Americans will cease, regardless of what methods he
might have to adopt.”62 Mexican youths were seemingly out of control, and the gang wars and rape
were viewed by the status quo as evidence that police needed to be more aggressive in confronting
the criminal elements of society. Dragnets and special squads were believed to be appropriate
methods, if they could end the devastations that Mexican Americans were causing white society
and reassert safety.
While the war-on-crime supported the police’s harassment of juvenile delinquents, it also
fostered excessive force upon youths as an informal preventive measure to reinforce Jim Crow.
Since the 1930s, police brutality against minorities was a key practice of the nationwide war-oncrime. The 1931 Wickersham Commission’s Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement held
policemen in many cities routinely tortured suspects to get confessions or admissions of guilt.
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Excessive force within police practices also opened occasion for officers to murder noncompliant
suspects. The Commission found that across the nation law-enforcement officials adopted coercive
tactics against criminals, because they were confident that the public were less inclined to blame
or punish the police for excessive force against such men than released them without penalty. 63
Signs that the HPD employed these tactics were apparent in July 1951, when two
policemen were accused of beating four youths (two juveniles were under seventeen-years of age)
after arresting them for vandalism. The officers claimed they decided to take the youths to the
station for “acting a little smart.” The youths accused the officers of beating them during the drive
to the station.64 The informal practice of excessive force continued, and by March 1953 headlines
indicated that police officers brutalized Mexican-American teenagers after arresting them for
criminal assault of a 27-year-old woman.65 Both accounts showed that police used excessive force
to teach delinquents a lesson about law and order. Moreover, it implied that lawmen literally
reinvented themselves as crime fighters using their force on the street (and the arrest) to the
precinct house (and the interrogation session).66
Inadvertently, these discriminatory police practices also inflated arrest records, which
appealed to and supported the likelihood of Mexican-American criminality. Profiling within
dragnets and special squads resulted in the Crime Prevention Division over arresting ethnicMexican youths in relation to the rest of the community, according to the Statistical Reports of the
Crime Prevention Division in 1953 and 1955. The report for July to December 1953 indicated that
3,431 youths were arrested and categorized as either first or repeat offenders. 67 Although people
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of Mexican descent did not account for a tenth of the population, juveniles from this group
comprised 12 percent of the arrests. White and black first offenders, however, were jailed in rates
proportionate to their demographic: whites comprised 66 percent/ blacks made-up 22 percent.
White and black repeat offenders decreased to 61 percent and 17 percent respectively. On the other
hand, ethnic Mexicans repeat offender rates nearly doubled to 22 percent.68 In other words,
Mexican youth were arrested in rates larger than the rest of the population, and they were twice as
likely to commit a second offense. With crime among Mexican youth going from bad to worse,
police records indicated and supported the societal notion of a race problem.
A further comparison of the first and repeat offender 1953 statistics allows us to see the
effects of the CPD profiling practices upon the over arrest of ethnic-Mexicans youths in
comparison to Anglo and African-Americans. The overall arrest statistics reveal that white
juveniles were targeted at a rate of 1 of every 2.5 persons. Black juveniles were targeted at a rate
of 1 of every 2.3 person. On the other hand, ethnic Mexicans juveniles were targeted at a rate of 1
of every 1 person. This indicate that in a group of two ethnic-Mexican youths, both would be
targeted for arrest. These figures imply that police targeted ethnic-Mexicans juveniles at more than
twice the rate of black or white youths. Against the general population, these numbers suggest that
1 out of every 77 ethnic Mexican was targeted by police; while whites were arrested at 1 out of
every 194 and lawmen apprehended 1 African American for every 178 persons. The CPD
Statistical Reports for January to June 1955 once again told of disparities that existed between the
rates of minority and white repeat offenders. Ethnic-Mexican repeat offenders increased by 1
percent to 23 percent (as well as African Americans), while Anglo Americans first offender arrests
drastically decreased by 7 percent to 54 percent.69 These numbers suggest profiling was
they laid the basis for subsequent law-enforcement claims that Mexican juveniles committed an extraordinarily high
number of crime. Statistical Reports: Crime Prevention Division 1953, HCA
68 Ibid.
69 The overall total of arrest for first offenders showed little change in 1955, with the exception that
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concentrated in ethnic-Mexican communities over the other two racial groups. The 1955 statistics
for the CPD further reveal the ambiguities within criminal offenses that allowed police to target
and control the ethnic Mexican community.
The CPD Statistical Reports for January to June 1955 enables an interpretation of the
effects of new criminal offenses upon ethnic youths and the targeting of the community for
suspicious behaviors. In this report, ethnic Mexicans were largely arrested for offenses such as
assault, burglary, theft, auto theft, disorderly conduct, drunkenness, and suspicion to commit a
crime. More telling of the report, however, were the arrest rates of Mexican repeat offenders for
noncriminal offense. A new category of noncriminal offense, “all other,” was added, which
included being incorrigible, wandering the streets, and loitering. Because these were victimless
offences, the decision as to whether to arrest a youth lay solely with the police officer.70
A projection of “all-other” offenses upon the overall general population revealed that
police profiling practices resulted in the arrest of Mexican Americans at the same percentage rate
as the majority Anglo-American population. Although the total of white repeat offenders, 616,
outnumbered their Mexican counterparts by more than double (258), both were arrested at the
same percent for “all other” non-criminal offense. In retrospect, arrests for “all other” comprised
a small percentage of the overall total of all repeat offenders: 7.7 percent of Anglo arrests, 3.2
percent for Mexican American, and 1.6 for African Americans. 71 However, white and ethnicMexicans repeat offenders were arrested for “all-other” at the same rate of 14 percent, while blacks
were arrested at 7 percent.72 Fourteen-percent of all Mexican-American repeat juvenile offenders
could not walk the streets or congregate on a street corner without being threatened with arrest.
These numbers also imply that the police intentionally arrested repeat offenders, who they
probably recognized from their first offense in order to subject them to a search for contraband or
hold them for suspicious behavior. Interestingly, the rate at which officers arrested African
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Americans for “all-other” offenses only comprised half of that of whites and ethnic-Mexicans.
Lawmen were more interested in harassing the Mexican community to incriminate youths for
suspicious and noncriminal behavior. Unfortunately, the discriminatory practice of profiling
inflated arrest records of youths and supported the city-wide notion of a “Latin American
Problem.”
With police practices seemingly supporting the city-wide notion of a race problem, the
HPD implemented the Juvenile Field Interrogation Plan (FIP) as a formal practice of profiling.
According to the CPD, the FIP was modeled after cities of the West Coast, who used it “to acquaint
the juvenile section of law enforcement with the late-hour activity of teen-agers who may be found
in circumstances not conducive to proper behavior.”73 The CPD’s Juvenile Division used the FIP
as an information gathering procedure to aid in controlling areas of high crime and delinquency.74
The CPD employed it to chart areas where juveniles could be found at late hours, to grow an
information bank on suspects, and reveal the method of gang operations. In practice, the plan acted
as a positive deterrent to late-hour prowling and loitering. Ultimately, the HPD’s implementation
of the FIP displayed the department’s belief in the effectiveness of preventing crime with the waron-crime methods of increase surveillance, patrol, and stop-and-frisk activities in the ethnic or
minority neighborhoods.75
Moreover, police officers had a series of new offenses to support the formalized methods
of profiling entailed in the Field Interrogation Plan. Police officers could call upon a series of new
victim and victimless crimes to arrest or investigate youths, including new categories for murder
and neglect, aggravated assault, other assault (without a weapon), offenses against family and
children, driving while intoxicated, other traffic violations, and miscellaneous offense. By 1958,
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the division’s overall investigations increased by 1,007 cases from the previous year; however,
juvenile arrests decreased by 2.23 percent (107 juvenile arrests) from 1957 to 1958. The FIP, as
the CPD said, effectively “led to [the] elimination or control of conditions in the community which
[sic] were conducive to juvenile delinquency.”76 Furthermore, the police department could use that
small margin of success to justify to the Anglo status quo that their crusade against crime had
helped restore security and protection to society.
The war on crime calmed the larger white society’s fears; however, its inherent
discriminatory practices incited contention between police and Mexican-American representative,
John J. Herrera. An attorney and the district governor of LULAC, Herrera had a penchant for
confronting police discrimination in exchange for more respect and protection.77 He had the
outlook of other members of the Mexican-American generation of the 1940s and 1950s. After
World War II, returning soldiers and veterans became more politically alert and used their service
in the military to undergird their demands for greater social acceptance and equality within
American society. Along similar lines, Herrera encouraged ethnic Mexicans to fight discrimination
by seeking employment within the HPD, thereby enabling the hiring of bilingual officers who
understood the problems and customs of Latin Americans.78 In doing this, he called upon his
constituents to seek employment equality as a means to reduce contention between the police and
the community. Activists also took the lead in fighting the disadvantaged status of ethnic Mexicans
in low wages, menial jobs, substandard housing, and discrimination within the educational system
and police practices.79
In his Houston Chronicle opinion pieces, Herrera wrote of the collaboration between public
officials, the police, and the newspapers to circulate the image of a juvenile outbreak among the
ethnic-Mexican community.80 According to Herrera, there were “no organized gangs of Latin
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Americans in Houston,” but the newspapers played “up the gangsterism while a few police officers
exaggerated it.”81 According to Herrera, the press sensationalized the “so-called Latin American
problem” by publishing public officials’ provocative language and reporting on the severe lawenforcement measures taken against Mexican-American youths – all of which generated an
irrational public fear that juveniles were engaged in a crime wave that threatened the entire city.82
To Herrera, the war-on-crime prosecuted the entire ethnic population of 40,000, as criminal, when
in reality only a small number of youths were engaging in criminal activity and not following Jim
Crow’s model of “good upright citizens.”83 He uncovered the police’s agenda to incite public
hysteria to justify increasing their power, all the while racially criminalizing the entire ethnicMexican population. Moreover, Herrera was not blind to the fact that the ethnic-Mexican
community was absent in the police’s fight against delinquency.
Herrera argued that the HPD’s war-on-crime methods criminalized Mexican-Americans
youths and targeted the ethnic community as a whole. He challenged the practice of calling these
youths “Latin Americans,” because in his mind it denied their Americanness, but also because
“Latin” identity criminalized them and placed them outside the social order. According to Herrera
the media and police department’s “inclusion of the words Latin American in any crime story
cannot be interpreted except as calculated to appeal to the baser instincts of our citizenry, racial
prejudice and discrimination.”84 The status quo’s denial of ethnic Mexicans’ American identity
reinforced the police’s increase of discriminatory power to strip the community of protection. In
addition, Herrera criticized Police Chief B. W. Payne’s decision to form an all-white LatinAmerican Police Squad to combat crime as “discrimination against a minority group.” He accused
Civil Service Director Roy Floyd as refusing to hire Latin-American officers for the force. 85 In
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highlighting the lack of racial diversity on the HPD, Herrera supported his notion that the war-oncrime was a crusade against Mexicans.
To law enforcement, Herrera’s accusations indicated a general lack of respect for their
efforts to restore order and protect society. The department’s war-on-crime represented its
perceived responsibility to maintain the racial customs and attitudes of the status quo.86 For the
HPD to conduct its war-on-crime unhindered by activists, police and city officials had to actively
disapprove Herrera’s notion that the ethnic-Mexican community as a whole was being
criminalized and excluded from the policing of juvenile delinquency. Police and city officials did
this by maintaining the validity of white fear and mediating the appearance of fairness to counter
claims of discrimination.
Police and city officials shaped their response to Herrera’s accusations as a challenge to
the rhetoric of the new generation of Mexican-American activists. City officials employed media
to display that police efforts were performed in fairness to decrease crime and protect the
community. The media deflected Herrera’s accusations in papers by highlighting the reality of
juvenile crime in the newspapers. Often besides Herrera’s comments, the Houston Chronicle listed
the names of youth arrested for robbery, aggravated assault, and attempted rape.87 This practice
illustrated how delinquency was seen as an important issue and the fear that it instilled in society.
Floyd also responded by accusing Mexican Americans of refusing to become police officers. He
claimed he tried to enroll three applicants of Mexican descent into the police training school, but
they “backed down on their applications later without giving any reason.” 88 The Latin-American
squad, thereby, appeared discriminatory in practice, because according to him ethnic Mexicans
failed to join the police force. Councilmen, Harry Holmes, also showed support for the special
squad, he stated “the Latin-American people should indorse such a movement, because it is to their
advantage that such hoodlums as took part in Sunday night’s crime [the rape of the female youth]
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be removed from the ranks of decent Latin-American citizenry.” In his view, law enforcement was
not discriminating, but instead fighting to preserve good Latin-American citizens from the stigma
that youth crimes brought upon the community.89
With the HPD portrayed as protecting the interest of ethnic-Mexican communities, city
officials and lawmen argued that it was effective enough to control the very real issue of juvenile
delinquency. Because of Herrera’s backlash, Police Chief Payne denied that he formed the LatinAmerican squad; however, he admitted to transferring two white detectives who spoke Spanish to
the homicide squad to work on such cases. One officer transferred was Lt. George Bell, who
worked in the 1942 Latin-American Division.90 These skilled officers claimed they could
sufficiently handle the delinquency outbreak. According to Bell, “the situation [in 1950] is not as
bad as it was during 1943 when a special squad was created to combat the lawless element” and
daily shootings among Mexican-Americans youths.91 Moreover, Chief Payne argued that
budgetary restraints made it difficult for law enforcement to diversify the squad by hiring Mexican
detectives.92 In appearing to be sensitive to ethnic Mexicans, Payne’s transfers implied that
culturally learned and experienced white officers were best trained to patrol the enclaves. Lastly,
these officers only aimed to make a case against gang members like they would do against anyone
else.93
To further invalidate Herrera’s challenge to the police department’s practices, the media
and police officials attacked LULAC’s effectiveness in helping its constituency and effect change.
Houston Chronicle reporter Orie Collins wrote that Houston’s Latin-American citizens earnestly
favored the HPD’s actions to stamp out juvenile “gangsterism,” because LULAC was “more
interested in picnics and dances than in helping clear up this problem.” In fact, Mexican
businessmen Adolph López Jr. favored helping law agencies to end the outbreak of juvenile
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delinquency. López stated that he was a “peaceful and law-abiding” citizen who did not think the
police were discriminating against his people. To López, allowing police to stamp out
“hoodlumism” would “erase the black mark scored against our people all over the nation” and
restore their integrity.94 The media demonstrated through its juxtaposition of LULAC’s activities
against preventive policing, that the ethnic-Mexican community was not as concerned with racism
as it was with the protection of their neighborhood. Moreover, media continued its quest to
highlight LULAC’s ineffectiveness in restoring safety to the community, by attacking the
organization’s workability and solidarity.
Herrera called a mass meeting on March 16, 1950 to inform the public of LULAC’s efforts
to empower the community to address the issues of delinquency, 95 but state officials and news
reporters in attendance denounced the organization and argued that it was not a valid vehicle for
community agency or preventive help. Herrera’s objective for the meeting was to seek “measures
to correct juvenile delinquency and hoodlumism,” by discussing factors that contributed to it, such
as the lack of adequate recreational facilities, the newspapers treatment of “gangsterism,” and how
the community could fight youth crime by collaborating with churches and youth programs.96 The
meeting did attract constituents concerned with the media and the police’s slandering of the
community; however, the gathering digressed from that concern. The Chronicle claimed
delinquency “took second place in a session centered on criticism of newspapers…[and]
restrictions that hamper employment of Latin-American policemen.” Although the HPD’s
discriminatory hiring practices were a sensible concern that limited the community’s ability to
combat delinquency, state officials like Thomas Sutherland, of the Good Neighbor Commission,
criticized LULAC members and argued that they failed to address the problem of Latin-American
delinquency. He claimed, they could not stop talking among themselves about discrimination and
become “just Americans.”97 Rather than listening to the concerns of citizens that feared being
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criminalized and disempowered, officials of the status quo aimed to invalidate LULAC as a voice
for ethnic Mexicans by denigrating the organization and accusing it of evading its responsibility
to acclimate its constituency to the American way.
The media dealt Herrera another blow when the Houston Chronicle pitted him against
fellow LULAC member Felix Tijerina. In March 1953, Herrera called a mass meeting to vocalize
his concern that the crusade against Mexican-Americans delinquency fostered racial tensions
within the police force and promoted the use of violence to control the community. This appeared
true when he represented several teenagers who claimed police brutalized them after their arrest
in the criminal assault of a 27-year-old woman.98 Similar to the 1950 conflict between Herrera and
the police, the Chronicle printed Herrera’s identification of brutality, alongside the objection of
Mexican-restaurant owner and LULACer, Felix Tijerina. The media used Tijerina’s words to
silence Herrera’s effort to represent the community. Tijerina criticized Herrera “as a self-styled
representative of the Mexican people,” exaggerating the discrimination of police against a “few
misguided youth.” Herrera, not the police, caused “undue publicity to be focused on the city's
Latin-Americans.”99 Inadvertently, the press also displayed LULACers’ internal tensions, which
further weakened the image of solidarity in the organization and its ability to handle the issue of
delinquency.
The media incorporated Tijerina in its reports in order to demonstrate that LULAC
supported the police’s actions against delinquency and casted Herrera as not having the
organization and the community’s best interest in mind. Tijerina had worked directly with the force
in the 1940s to dismantle gangs and redirect youths to sports as part of the Good Citizen League.
He also served as a member of the Harris County Grand Jury and claimed he knew firsthand the
HPD’s fair treatment of suspects.100 In other words, Tijerina’s work with law enforcement
demonstrated to readers that Herrera’s accusations of excessive force were unfounded. These
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stories served to portray Herrera as having had no knowledge of police preventive measures, but
also lacking resolve for the delinquency issue. Unlike Herrera, Tijerina was allied with the police
and the status quo. According to historian Arnoldo De Leόn, Tijerina’s political activities leaned
toward cultural accommodation. Since Tijerina had a primarily Anglo clientele, his support for the
police was aimed at drumming up business.101 Silencing Herrera gave law enforcement the free
hand needed to shape the debate regarding the nature of and the appropriate response to crime.102
The HPD could have continued the war-on-crime unhindered, because state and city lawenforcement were erecting a systematic approach to combat delinquency and restore social order.
Herrera unfortunately could not effect change and eradicate the HPD’s war-on-crime
program, because the entire law-enforcement system wanted stricter punitive measures in policing
and in the criminal courts to control delinquency. Law-enforcement officials, like the police
department, moved away from the rehabilitative aspect of the civil guardianship practice, believing
it no longer prevented or decreased crime among youths. One social worker questioned the policy
and asked, “whether [or not] we are doing justice to the child by giving him so many chances.” He
went on to say, “maybe he would be better off if we let him taste punishment from the very start.”103
The criminal courts argued for stiffer penalties.104 In addition, the Harris County Grand Jury called
for law enforcement agencies to take more action, even to the point of harassing “beer joints,”
tourist courts, and drive-ins, known for felonious acts in order to remove “certain infectious and
contaminated areas.” The Grand Jury praised the CPD for instituting an excellent plan for checking
minors when seen in undesirable places, or on the streets.105 In short, Herrera would have failed to
convince the status quo that police discriminated against the community, because the lawenforcement system came together on the issue of youth crime and the need for preventive
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policing. As a united front on crime, these agencies of the status quo casts their support for all of
law enforcement’s effort.106
The Grand Jury’s response to excessive force highlights how supervisory bodies reacted
negatively to oppositions regarding policing. In its 1954 Final Report for the May term, the Harris
County Grand Jury investigated the rampant misconduct of lawmen toward prisoners. The jurors
stated that although “brutality charges in a number of instances, indicated some evidence of rough
physical handling on the part of the officers involved. There was also…evidence of action on the
part of the complainants which contributed to the so-called ‘acts of brutality.’” In addition, the
Grand Jury used the complainant’s admittance to felonious acts at the time of their arrest to
discredit their claim of mistreatment.107 The investigation essentially permitted the informal use
of brutality, because the complainants (as criminals) did not have any civil rights that officers had
to protect or respect. In the likely chance that a complainant could not be held responsible for the
abuse, the jury exonerated the abusive officers by claiming they are unable “to prove anything
sufficient to warrant charges being brought against the persons involved.”108 The Grand Jury’s
justification to not indict officers for misconduct demonstrated how the supervisory bodies
protected the HPD’s practices. Consequently, brutality became an informal crime fighting tool,
acceptable to the racial status quo as a form of rough justice needed to discipline and educate
criminals to Jim Crow.109
More importantly, the law-enforcement system would have resisted the ethnic-Mexican
community’s backlash, because it was influenced by statistical evidence that identified and
supported the broader notion that the city had a “Latin-American Problem.” For instance, in March
1956 the police’s over arresting of ethnic-Mexican youth convinced the juvenile courts that there
was a delinquency problem. Judge J.W. Mills called a meeting to address the problem with local
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officials from the school district, and the juvenile and probation department. They discussed ideas
for preventive measures in addressing the increase of Mexican-juvenile offenders: first and repeat
offender rates rose to 13 percent and 24 percent, respectively they represented 17 percent of the
overall arrest tallies.110 Those attending Judge Mills’s meeting, however, overlooked the fact that
Anglo Americans made up 67 percent of the first offenders.111
The juvenile courts, like the Grand Jury, ignored the police department’s discriminatory
practices that skewed arrest statistics and perceived the youths to be the problem with crime. Left
untouched was the possibility that police could have affected the number of repeat offenders by
arresting the same youth over-and-over. Or even, that since 1955 inflation in delinquency statistics
might have been affected by the shifting categories of traffic and non-criminal offenses that were
considered criminal acts simply because of the age of the perpetrators. 112 More importantly, the
meeting failed to highlight that first-time offender numbers among Mexican juveniles had actually
decreased by 30 percent between 1953 and 1955.113 The juvenile courts, like the grand jury,
perceived a problem with the criminal not the HPD’s practices. Ultimately, the law-enforcement
system supported the police’s war-on-crime over lawlessness and disorder.114
Rather than question the illegality or abuse of police methods that made delinquency appear
as a relevant issue, the statewide law-enforcement system moved to reform the criminal courts and
create rehabilitation programs to restore the racial social order which had been disrupted by postWorld War II delinquency. District judges and authorities supported new state legislation to punish
parents for their children crimes.115 “Let's hitch the horse to the right cart,” Harris County Judge
Campbell said. He continued, “If parents won't supervise their children, if they let them run wild
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and neglect them, they should be punished along with their children.”116 In addition, youths could
expect to face aggressive penalties aimed at teaching them that claiming ignorance would not
excused their actions.117 This new attitude toward youth crime was evident in state legislature’s
creation of the juvenile courts and the Youth Development Council (Y.D.C.) in 1949. Four years
later Houston established its first such court and created the Juvenile Development Crime
Prevention Program (a Juvenile Probation Program) to deal with minor offenses of juveniles. 118
With these new measures in place, the HPD’s Crime Prevention Division increasingly
assigned most of its juvenile referrals to go directly into the Juvenile Development program. The
new probation program focused on restoring the racial order by “rebuilding the parents.”119 Parents
would have to participate in regular interviews and counselling to regain their children. The
Juvenile Development area centers would then scientifically treat the youth for what it deemed to
be behavioral psychoses of juvenile delinquency.120 At the center, “sympathetic” workers would
address the “problems peculiar to the negro, and problems peculiar to the Spanish-American, and
problems peculiar to what may be otherwise classified as “poor whites.”121 In other words,
minority youths would learn adherence to their racial or socioeconomic place within the Jim Crow
system. Juvenile probation, thereby, allowed law enforcement to discipline and rehabilitate the
whole family. By the end of June 1953, 1,584 juveniles were placed on probation.122 Two years
later, 731 of the 3,254 juveniles arrested between January and June were placed on probation.123
Moreover, the Juvenile Courts could now sentence youths to a detention center if probation
was too light of a punishment. The Y.D.C.’s creation of three state training schools in 1949 made
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it possible for juvenile courts to sentence youths to Gainsville for girls, Gatesville for boys, and
the Crockett School for Negro Girls.124 Since the creation of Houston’s Juvenile Court in 1952,
320 youths were sentenced to detention centers. The appearance of Judge J.W. Mills in 1953
increased the number of youths sentenced to detention by 60 percent (536 youths) from the
previous year.125 Youngsters sentenced to detentions raised drastically by 1955. From January to
June of 1955, 447 more were sentenced to the center.126 Of the 996 Mexican-American juveniles
arrested from Jan 1955 to September 1956, 434 youths (43 percent) were placed in a detention
home.127 Judge Mills demonstrated that the courts and police had similar obligations to control the
rise of delinquency by using punitive measures to teach youths a lesson in respect for law and
order.
By 1958, the Houston law-enforcement system’s war on Mexican-American delinquents
indicated some success in curbing youth crime. According to the 1958 Statistical Reports of the
HPD’s Juvenile Division, the overall rate of Mexican-American arrest decreased from 17 to 14
percent, while whites went down by 11 percent. Moreover, ethnic Mexicans only made up 11
percent of the six highest rated criminal offenses: burglary, theft, theft of vehicle, miscellaneous
offense, noncriminal, and suspicion.128 These rates indicated the city’s law-enforcement system’s
competence in restoring order. The preventive policing of the war-on-crime and the creation of
Harris County’s Juvenile Courts, the Juvenile Development Program (probation), and juvenile
homes (detention centers) functioned together to mediate the appropriate punishment and
rehabilitation of families disrupted in post-World War II society.
The American family had changed since World War II, and juveniles’ thriving premature
adult culture caused alarm for the propriety of whiteness. This chapter has shown that delinquency
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placed fear within Anglo society in the 1950s, to distract attention of delinquency among white
youths, Houston’s law enforcement focused on the danger of their Mexican-American counterpart.
However, these youngsters were perceived to be a different sort of criminal, whose disregard for
law and order provoked vicious acts that terrorized the city. Their actions had the potential to
paralyze the status quo, and thus law and order had to be restored to pacify white fears.
Consequently, the law-enforcement system moved away from the social worker aspect of Civil
Guardianship of the 1940s to the war-on-crime to aggressively combat and prevent juvenile crime.
The crusade against delinquency marked a new level of discriminatory police methods
that racially criminalized youths, but also made the ethnic-Mexican community as a whole suspect
of high crime. The HPD used dragnets, special squads, profiling, and excessive force to fight
ethnic-Mexican delinquents; however, it also created the illusion that the city had a “LatinAmerican problem.” Disparities in arrest records indicate ethnic-Mexican youths were over
arrested in comparison to the white and black population which supported the city-wide notion of
a delinquency problem. In addition, it helped the police justify their discriminatory methods and
oppose any backlash from the ethnic community. With the press used to disempower LULACer
John J. Herrera from contesting the war-on-crime, the HPD obtain a free hand to police the
community at their discretion. Unfortunately, Herrera’s protest would not have effected change,
because the entire law-enforcement system reformed its punitive measures to make criminals
culpable for their crime.
The war-on-crime opened the path for Houston police officers to believe their authority
was above law and order. The crusade on delinquency allowed cops to disregard the community’s
complaints, which also encouraged some within the department to believe that they were not public
servants. This was implied when delegates from the Mexican-American community of East End
reached out to Chief L. D. Morrison for help creating a large-scale recreational program to curb
juvenile vandalism in the neighborhood. The chief agreed to assign a Spanish-speaking patrol
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officer to the area, but he was to be a police officer “to work with you not under you” like a social
worker.129
In the following chapter, we shall see that the HPD’s distance from the communities it
served contributed to officers acting above the law and using illegal means to control minorities.
Federal legislation protecting citizens’ due process rights, which were strengthened during the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s, conflicted with lawmen’s principle of police autonomy and
created a subculture that was unsympathetic and invulnerable to complaints.130 Police officers’ use
of illegal methods to maintain the racial order despite national changes, instilled in them the
necessity of the use of “street justice” in regards to the ethnic-Mexican community despite the shift
to the due-process model of policing.
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Chapter 3: “You Might be Trying to Get Your Rights, but not by Stepping on
My Toes”: Police Street Justice and the Suppression of Civil Rights
In July 1959 the Civic Action Committee (CAC), a coalition formed by LULAC and the
American G.I. Forum, and cofounded by attorney and political activist John J. Herrera, protested
the racist practices of lawmen during routine traffic stops. The CAC publicly objected to the
department’s standard practice of writing ‘M’ for ‘Mexican’ on traffic tickets. The CAC drew
upon the whiteness strategy (a political discourse that invoked their legal “white” status to avoid
segregation) in their letter of complaint to request what it perceived as a discriminatory practice to
be stopped.1 The CAC missive stated, “We are certainly not ashamed of our Mexican origin but
when a designation (or symbol) of race is made we belong to the white race.”2 Mayor Lewis Cutrer
and the HPD’s response displayed city authorities’ segregationist platform and their unwillingness
to change discriminatory police practices.3
City officials were indifferent to the CAC’s complaint; the mayor and assistant chief of
police George Becker failed to understand how the practice was inherently racist.4 Mayor Cutrer
responded to the CAC by writing, “We issue hundreds of thousands of tickets, and if every Latin
American were designated as “W” our records would be definitely inaccurate.”5 Assistant Police
Chief George Becker seemed confused that the CAC was offended by the designations, stating,
“Nothing derogatory is intended…when they [Anglo Americans] speak of going out for Mexican
[food]…yet that is technically inaccurate if you want to split hairs about it.”6 This attitude makes
clear the fact that city officials believed that the practice of using an ‘M’ would differentiate a
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person of Latin American origin from other European “Causasoid” groups.7 In light of this notion,
Cutrer attempted to quell the CAC’s concerns by changing the policy and instead having “Latin
American” (LA) not Mexican written on the ticket.8 Although the racially charged “M” for
Mexican was no longer used, discriminatory practices continued.
These discriminatory practices would continue into the early 1960s. As the AfricanAmerican Civil Rights movement challenged the collection of beliefs and practices that defined
Jim Crow in Houston, one way that lawmen resisted these gains were by being more hostile during
traffic stops. The department’s attempt to maintain the racial order was most apparent in a July 4,
1963 police brutality incident involving three African-American youths hitchhiking to nearby
Galveston. Five officers detained the young men at gunpoint and beat them with clubs and
blackjacks behind a store near the police station. In the midst of the attack one officer told the
youths, “You might be trying to get your rights, but not by stepping on my toes.” 9 Adding insult
to injury, the three were then arrested for assaulting the policemen.10
Once the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) became
involved in representing the youths, Mayor Cutrer attempted to quell the incident by seeking to
establish an interracial committee to investigate community complaints of police brutality. A
similar committee established in 1961 proved ineffective to combat such practices, because
civilians were discouraged by the mandatory submission of an affidavit. Minority citizens feared
the extra-legal measures needed to submit their complaint, possibly because it would be evidence
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to incriminate them in courts.11 In addition, the review board would be an internal investigation by
the HPD skewed by police scrutiny. In effect, the community had limited avenues to address their
complaints with the police department. These incidents involving the CAC and the NAACP make
clear the fact that the mayor and police chief were unwilling to reform law enforcement’s
discriminatory practices. Such resistance to institutional change foreshadowed the next decade of
police-community relations.
The Civil Rights Era signaled the decline of the most obvious forms of racial discrimination
of Jim Crow, but the HPD sought to reestablish itself as a “thin blue line” that maintained the racial
order despite national reforms and ushered in a new era of law enforcement. Racial differences
were part of Houston society, and the federal government’s protection of due process and civil
rights dismantled the formal legal structure that sanctioned discriminatory police methods. These
civil reforms only agitated the HPD’s unwillingness to alter attitudes or traditional police practices
that formed during the Jim Crow Era. The need for crime fighting officers remained as juvenile
delinquency rates among minorities in Texas peaked in 1962-1963.12 The law-enforcement system
refused to negate its authority or reform its practices for suspects and prisoners’ rights in the wake
of the civil rights reforms. Instead, police officers erected an informal patrol model of “street
justice” that permitted unlawful acts of excessive force, harassment, and the killing of civilians
and prisoners to reinforce the reputation that officers would deal directly with trouble.13 Police
officers socially accepted street justice as a systemic method of racial oppression meant to control
the minority communities in the aftermath of Jim Crow’s demise.
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This chapter examines law enforcement reforms during the Civil Rights Era and considers
how lawmen manipulated the newest police model of due process to abuse ethnic Mexicans’ civil
rights and forcibly control the pace of social and institutional change.14 The Supreme Court rulings
in Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona ended coercive police practices and guaranteed
procedural due process. Thereafter, the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement released the
Texas Law Enforcement Handbook (The Handbook) in 1968 to instruct all officers of the limits of
their arresting power within the model of due process. 15 An examination of the 1972 Texas Law
Enforcement Handbook demonstrates how lawmen resisted federal reforms in the early 1970s
through the informal practice of street justice. Police officers manipulated due process through the
disguise of the “color of law,” that is, the appearance of enforcing criminal statutes to commit an
unlawful arrest and retroactively make it lawful.16
Although police officers’ use of street justice represented the breakdown of law and order,
lawmen seemingly appeared to comply with police procedure and respect due process. While the
HPD definitely targeted civil rights activists with street justice, this chapter focuses on highlighting
the reaffirmation of police power to control the ethnic-Mexican communities after the collapse of
the old racial order of white supremacy with fear of violence, discrimination, and injustice. By
examining the widespread practice of street justice in police subculture, this chapter shows how
misconduct among law enforcement became the catalyst to the erosion of police-community
relations in the late 1970s.
A nationwide series of judicial rulings, social practices, and federal legislation marked the
dismantling of Jim Crow’s sanctions. Since the 1940s, African-American activists had launched a
series of court battles that challenged the legal foundations of racial discrimination and segregation
that marked the onset of the modern Civil Rights Movement. Among these were the Supreme
14
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Court rulings in Smith v. Allwright (1944) and Sweatt v. Painter (1950), which destroyed the white
primary and outlawed segregation in postsecondary education facilities in Texas, respectively.
This was followed by 1954 Brown v. Board of Education, which overturned the 1896 Plessy v.
Ferguson decision that had served as the foundation for segregation in public education.17
Moreover, in the later 1950s the Texas Democratic Party regrouped toward a liberal shift 18 that
brought to the fore the question of “race” and encouraged action among dispossessed minorities
for political and social equality.19 In Houston, black grassroots leaders employed nonviolent direct
action demonstrations, such as sit-ins, marches, picketing, and boycotts to demand the state and
city governments to segregation and racial discrimination within Jim Crow.20 These actions made
it possible for marginalized groups to obtain a greater voice during what would emerge as the
Second Reconstruction of the South, including Texas.
Within the federal government, liberal politicians waged a war against the racism that
erupted against the Civil Rights movement, which furthered dismantled the de facto conditions of
Jim Crow. Throughout the nation, conservative law enforcement agencies perceived civil rights
advocates as unlawful and viewed their demands as an assault on the existing social order. Police
resistance to black enfranchisement resulted in numerous incidents of civil disorder in the form of
riots or rebellions in 1963 and later in the 1960s.21 The 1964 Civil Rights Act extended the
protection of every citizen’s constitutional rights concerning public accommodations and
employment despite race and color. Its passage also ensured that “law and order” became a central
theme in politics and the federal reform of the law enforcement system.22 A year later the Voting
Rights Act outlawed the poll tax and gave African Americans in the South the opportunity to
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participate in the electoral process as first-class citizens. That same year, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated legislative districting and the limiting provisions of the Texas Constitution.23
In addition, two monumental U.S. Supreme Court rulings transformed traditional police
practice that in effect had sustained Jim Crow. In 1961 Mapp v. Ohio extended protection over
citizens’ rights against overzealous police searches. 24 This ruling declared that evidence obtained
by police through illegal searches or interrogation must be excluded from federal and state courts.
The ruling deemed that using unjustified force while making an arrest or treating a person’s home,
body, and family violently, constituted a denial of the federal constitutional right to due process of
law. Thus, both under federal criminal and civil statutes, police could be liable, fined, and/or
imprisoned for depriving a citizen their rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Five years later, Miranda v. Arizona, guaranteed
procedural due process. These rulings codified norms regarding individual rights into actual legal
rights and dismantled some of the oppressive conditions of the law-enforcement system.25 It also
erected the foundation for a new model of due process. The power of police to maintain the status
quo through ignoring the rights of individual citizens was constitutionally illegal. Thereafter, the
federal government launched its nationwide campaign to restructure law enforcement.
In the aftermath of Jim Crow’s demise, President Lyndon Johnson and his administration
launched a war against crime and poverty that aimed to modernize the law enforcement system.
Johnson’s “Great Society” legislation intended to change the factors that created social unrest in
the nation and redirect police responsibility to the community and law and order. Johnson’s
administration believed poverty was the root cause of crime and injustice in the entire law
enforcement system. Congress supported the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) of 1965
to implement federal influence over local police operations and modernized the entire criminal
justice system.26 The LEAA established federal aid to local law enforcement at the state and local
23
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level to improve the quality of police and increase crime prevention and detection. In addition,
both the National Crime Commission and the state attorney generals formed committees on law
enforcement and criminal justice to consider the “social conditions which foster a sense of injustice
or exploitation [that] also breed crime.”27 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
formed the Police and Public Safety Task Force to improve relations between the police and the
minority groups by “reduc[ing] incidents that can lead to riots, make the police responsive to the
public and give the public the knowledge that the police will fairly enforce the law.” 28 By
maintaining law and order, the LEAA instilled an aspect of police responsibility to the community
and the avoidance of injustice within the War on Crime.
Civil Rights legislation, landmark Supreme Court decisions, and Great Society policies
ensured a higher level of judicial scrutiny and forced police departments to readjust their authority.
Throughout the United States, law-enforcement agencies were customarily localized to allow for
a closer relationship between interested communities. Consequently, traditional police forces were
fragmented and power was widely dispersed resulting in extreme disparities of police competence,
professionalism, integrity, and equity. Police practices had progressed little since the 1931
Wickersham Commission had issued the last presidential report on this issue. In 1967, the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement formed the Police and Public Safety Task Force and
required police departments to increase the amount of basic training for officers to a minimum of
400 hours of classroom work over a period of four to six months. Officers would be train in the
application of the criminal law and strict adherence to its rule.29 It criticized the police use of
excessive force to extract confessions.30

27

Crime and Law Enforcement in the United States, Message from the President of the United States,
March 9, 1966, Attorney General Administration Division (AGAD), Texas State Archives (TSA), Austin, Texas,
RG 302 Records of the Assistant for Information, AC Box 1991/113-6 Folder Law Enforcement (Hereafter cited as
Crime and Law Enforcement in the United States, TSA).
28 The President Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, March 9, 1966,
AGAD, TSA, RG 302 Records of the Assistant for Information, AC Box 1991/113-6 Folder Law Enforcement
(Hereafter cited as The President Commission on Law Enforcement, TSA).
29 Flynn, "Miranda,” 102, 105-106
30 Ibid.

75

Moreover, the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement in 1968 created the first Law
Enforcement Handbook (The Handbook)31 to instruct officers of the new police model of due
process and its restrictions on unlawful arrests and discriminatory practices that traditionally
controlled minority communities in Jim Crow Texas. The Handbook was a pocket-sized manual
for lawmen that set in “simple language what a policeman may and may not do in making an
arrest.”32 It outlined as unlawful three popular arrest methods the HPD employed during its War
on Crime in the 1950s that had inflated the number of ethnic-Mexican delinquents. During the
previous decade, the police department reinvented itself into crime fighters to prevent delinquency.
With society seeking security and protection against criminal youth, police during the War on
Crime gained the autonomy needed to implement aggressive and discriminatory tactics to fight
racial minorities who challenged law and order.33 Now, HPD officers could no longer conduct
dragnets to apprehend large groups of minorities for investigations. Nor could officers arrest
juveniles for suspension or noncriminal offenses, like wandering the streets. The Handbook noted
that an officer making an arrest using his ‘sixth police sense’ or his hunch was unlawful.34
Instead, The Handbook mandated that officers could only officiate an arrest with “probable
cause.” According to the 1972 edition of The Handbook, probable cause should be “based upon
what the arresting officer knows or has heard before or at the time of the arrest.” The discovery of
evidence after the arrest would not make it retroactively a lawful arrest. Unlike in the past, an
officer could not use an individual’s prior criminal record as personal knowledge or reliable
information to constitute probable cause.35 Arrests now had to be made on reasonable grounds that
the offense was committed and that the person being arrested perpetrated it; in this way, an officer
31
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could avoid engaging in unreasonable seizure, and arrest. Police had to be proactive in restoring
law and order; their enforcement of the law had to protect a person’s constitutional right from
unreasonable search, seizure, and arrest.
Probable cause within the due process model not only prohibited traditional discriminatory
arrest practices, it also limited an officer’s power to preside over an arrest. The Handbook highly
opposed police use of the color of law, that is, the appearance of law to commit an unlawful arrest
and make it retroactively legal.36 Police had to convince a magistrate that probable cause existed
in order to obtain an arrest warrant.37 In cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant, the officer still
had to maintain probable cause before legally carrying out search and seizure38 Police officers
could only carry out an arrest for misdemeanor charges if the person apprehended incited violence
or provoked others to break the peace.39 It was essential for police to honor the due process model
when they exercised their power of arrest, because their failure to do so could convict an innocent
man or worse, allow a guilty man to go free.40 Unlike the past arrest practices based on profiling
minorities, an individual now had the “right to forcibly resist anyone trying to arrest him”
unlawfully.41 In short, The Handbook centralized the due process model to protect an individual’s
constitutional rights and liberty. Law enforcement officers who complied with The Handbook
found their power to arrest any alleged suspect greatly circumscribed, especially undermining their
previous disregard of the rights of ethnic and racial minorities.42
Due process signaled an end to the war-on-crime model that define the discriminatory
police practices of the 1950s, and it triggered within the police subculture the need for another
racist model to reinforce law enforcement’s power to control the ethnic community. The protection
of suspects’ rights through due process only fostered a greater sense of the “police-against-the-
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world mind-set.”43 Like other police departments throughout the nation, these new regulations
angered the HPD because officers were now required to maintain a higher level of professionalism
not practiced before, while criminals received undue rights.44
Statewide, police departments increased their hostility toward minority groups. Law
enforcement attitudes reflected nativists’ belief that Mexican nationals were to blame for the
degradation of society. In Houston, the white state quo blamed Mexicans for the increase murder
and robbery rate.45 By the recession of 1973-1974, nativists also blamed Mexican immigrants for
the failure of the market economy and deemed them national outlaws. 46 Simultaneously, law
enforcement racial and social tension escalated against the rise of Black Power activists, who
rallied the community around the central issues of poverty, crime, joblessness, housing, and
education.47 When urban civil disorder once again escalated nationwide in Newark and Detroit
during the summer of 1967, police viewed rioters as “law breakers”48 whose ideology lacked
positive value or contribution to the communities.49 Anglo police officers continued to hold
distorted perceptions of Mexicans-against-whites or blacks-against-whites. This subculture,
moreover, targeted minority communities to control them and prevent crime through the informal
practice of mediating judgement in acts of street-justice.50
Law enforcement throughout Texas invoked the power of the state penal code to resist due
process and reassert its autonomy to use excessive force as needed to impose law and order over
minorities. Before 1857, Texas common law permitted an officer to kill a person who had
committed a felony if “[all] other measures must have been exhausted or the circumstances must
have been such that any other measures than killing the felon would not have been effective in
43

Watson, Race and the Houston Police Department, 68.
Ibid., 87.
45 Ibid., 112, 114.
46 Rodolfo Acuña, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, 6th ed (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007),
44

282.
47

Watson, Race and the Houston Police Department, 75, 87.
Ibid., 88.
49 Hinton, “‘A War Within Our Own Boundaries’” 109; Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battle, 170.
50 David Carter, “Hispanic Perception of Police Performance: An Empirical Assessment,” in Criminal
Justice and Latino Communities, ed. Antoinette Sedillo Lόpez ed., (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 74.
48

78

bringing about his arrest.”51 Another statute of the Texas penal code, section 19.07 for criminally
negligent homicide, would charge the officer with a Class A misdemeanor if an individual’s death
occurred by criminal neglect.52 Under the new procedures of due process, killing was only
justifiable if it was committed at the crime scene or while the person is fleeing the area during an
act of arson, robbery (with the property in hand), or burglary.53
In 1968 the Austin Police Department defended the legitimacy of the state penal code to
deprive a man of his right to live. On March 23, several Austin policemen responded to a report
of auto theft. Consequently, one mile from the crime scene they shot Oscar Balboa (age 16) to
death and critically wounded Valentín Rodríguez (age 19).54 Three years later in 1971, two Austin
police officers killed sixteen-year-old Joe Cedillo Jr. while he fled with stolen tires. In both cases
the Travis County Grand Jury ruled that such excessive force was “justifiable homicide.” In
regards to the Cedillo incident, the grand jury stated that the police could kill based upon the
“remnants of frontier justice which still exist in the Texas penal code.”55 These actions
demonstrated that law enforcement officials used the Lone Star state’s statutes rather than federal
mandates when apprehending minorities and in so doing maintained their authority.
Moreover, invoking the Texas penal code’s notion of frontier justice warranted police
officers’ use of street action and discriminatory practices. For example, the 1971 Tomás Rodríguez
incident in Dallas demonstrated the growing practice of street justice among police. On February
15, police began a search for two Mexican-American men who had taken five deputies captive
during a routine burglary investigation. Eventually three of the hostages were killed. 56 Lawmen
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viewed this turn of events as a consequence of liberal reforms giving minorities more legal rights
that could enabled an open season on police officers. Thereafter the barrio was flooded with
officers making random arrests without probable cause and harassing the community while
searching for the killers. 57 Out-of-uniform police looking for the suspects broke into Rodríguez’s
home without a search warrant, harassed his children, and shot his pregnant wife in the leg.
Rodríguez grabbed a gun and held a standoff with the police. Rodríguez survived the incident, but
thirty-eight bullet holes riddled his apartment. 58 Ultimately, the Dallas Police Department (DPD)
found no connection between him and the suspected murders; they covered their misconduct by
falsifying drug charges against Rodríguez that connected him to the defendants in the slaying.59
This incident highlighted police’s illegal use of the color of law to disguise unlawful arrest
methods and rationalize oppressive tactics of street justice. The Dallas Police officers sought
evidence and preemptively used harassment in an effort to make an unlawful arrest retroactively
lawful. In the aftermath of the killing of the police officers, the DPD ignored procedures and did
not seek a lawful warrant which would have needed a magistrate’s approval that probable cause
existed and that the person accused might have committed a crime. In the absence of these
circumstances, the police officers illegally broke-down Rodríguez’s door to carry out an illegal
search and seizure for evidence that could retroactively justify their unlawful arrest.60 Since they
failed to honor the due process model and consequently unjustly attacked an innocent man,61 police
could argue that Rodríguez’s shooting at them (in an effort to protect himself) placed the lawmen’s
lives in danger. Police use of deadly force as a “matter of self-defense” would be acceptable within
The Handbook.62 By manipulating due process, lawmen fostered a code of silence that helped
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cover up police officers’ use of the color of law and assert the appearance that probable cause
existed.
More importantly, the Rodríguez incident highlighted the police mind-set that identified
ethnic Mexicans as criminals and placed a wedge within police-community relations. According
to Papel Chicano, a Houston community newspaper, police misconduct sent a clear message that
officers wanted to “shield the rest of Dallas from the Mexican American community.” Given this
attitude, Papel Chicano suggested that ethnic Mexicans “stay in their homes after dark…[because]
law officers had declared ‘open season’” on them.63 Police anti-Mexican attitude failed to
distinguish the difference between immigrants and U.S. citizens.64 Similarly in Houston, the
predominantly Anglo law-enforcement agencies sustained a sense of alienation and loathing
against some segments of society that they perceived as failing to uphold the moral standards of
the mainstream, resulting in a skewed interpretation of due process for legal infractions.65
The dismantling of Jim Crow occurred at a time when Houston’s mainstream society relied
on the HPD to control the city’s diversifying demographic. In 1960, Houston stood as the fourthlargest city in the country, and it along with the metropolitan centers of San Antonio and the DallasFort Worth area, housed half of the state’s peoples. Population growth and employment surged as
the petrochemical industry continued to drive the growth sector for the entire Gulf Coast region
and the ship channel became a nationwide premier port. Liberal annexation laws also increased
the city's area to 390 square miles, from its former 75 square miles. Houston’s population had
grown from 600,000 people in 1950 to approximately 938,000 in 1960; within a decade it would
exceed one million. It became more ethnically diverse with African Americans constituting 22.9%
of its population and ethnic Mexicans growing from 7% in 1960 to 12% of the population in 1970.
The expansion of minority communities pushed white residents into the suburbs, where the
majority race lived comfortability away from the visibility of these groups. White flight, however,
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changed the demographic of the inner city as it housed two-thirds of ethnic Mexican and 80% of
the African-American population.66
With more than half of the Anglo population moved away from the central city, 67 police
patrols remained essential to control the concentration of ethnic communities and Houston’s
delinquency rate. Houston, along with Dallas and San Antonio, held delinquency rates frequently
3-5 times higher among their Black and Spanish speaking minorities than those of AngloAmerican children. 68 Ethnic-Mexican communities – which continued to be concentrated in the
inner-city barrios of Northside, the First and Sixth Ward areas, East End, and Denver Harbor –
became known as “ghetto” areas of Houston. Juvenile offenses from these neighborhoods
increased by 1000-1500 each year by 1970. Since the late 1950s, African-American youths in the
Bayou City contributed to 33% of the overall total of juvenile arrests, whereas, they only
comprised twenty-percent of arrests earlier in the decade.69 The study, Juvenile Delinquency in
Texas: A Survey of the Problem, argued that the background of these youths indicated signs “of
low parental skilled [sic] and employment, inferior educational and cultural status...”
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actuality, delinquency was a consequence of economic growth, population density and urban
concentration brought on by metropolitanism.71
Although police unchecked authority to patrol the communities came under threat with the
due process model, a step toward hindering institutional changes was to reinforce the white racial
composition of the force. HPD Police chiefs recruited white males with ingrained patriarchal
attitudes who would favor the use of traditional police practices, attitudes, and customs.72 In 1963
the department had grown from 740 officers to nearly 1,216, and it remained predominately 97%
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Anglo American. 73 Although the HPD grew throughout the 1960s, it maintained a shortage of
lawmen that averaged 1.20 officers to every 1,000 citizens. This shortage defied the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s recommended standard of at least 2.5 police over 1,000 citizens. 74 By
1970, Houston gained a national reputation for being one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas
in the U.S. with the lowest number of policemen per its 500 square miles.75
The department’s low recruitment of officers was directly linked to stipulations that
prevented the employment of minority community members. Despite the demise of a
segregationist society, the HPD implemented more rigid and demanding hiring standards in order
to preserve the racial make-up of the force. For instance, the qualification of mandatory high school
education or equivalent was aimed at disqualifying ethnic Mexicans,76 because in the 1960s
Mexican-origin Houstonians twenty-five years and older were most likely to have completed only
7.4 years of school.77 Similarly, African-American applicants found themselves eliminated during
the screening process because of failure to pass the written test, which often included culturally
biased questions or expected proficiency in areas that were beyond the scope of their limited
education. Another reason many were not hired were because they had relatives with
criminal records.78 So rigid were the standards for recruitment that only twenty men qualified for
admission to the police school in May 1966 despite there being funding for 70 cadets. 79 With
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minorities remaining low on the force, the Houston Police Department and other law enforcement
in Harris County maintained its white makeup.
Keeping policemen numbers low also allowed the HPD and the Harris County Sheriff’s
Department to utilize smaller volunteer and professional auxiliaries from Anglo neighborhoods
that helped solidify the appearance of “frontier law” on the perimeters of Houston. The city police
and the Sheriff's Department supplemented their numbers by relying upon ancillary forces
comprised of reputable white citizens from Houston’s subdivisions of Jersey Village, Southside
Place, South Houston, Bellaire, Piney Point, Hedwig, Hunter’s Creek and Bunker Hill.80 In 1969,
one Houston Chronicle reporter interestingly compared these men’s protection of small “bedroom
cities” to historical and fictional lawmen Wyatt Earp, Matt Dillon, and Bat Masterson. Their
primary duty was crime prevention, and they did receive aid from the city police and the Harris
County Sheriff's Department. 81 Law enforcement essentially mobilized the suburbs’ community
watch to take law into their hands and restore order. The HPD recruitment and Harris County’s
support of professional/volunteer auxiliaries signified an informal campaign to mobilize white
men, invested in law and order, to commit themselves to protecting society after the demise of Jim
Crow.
In their transition to street justice practices, Houston law enforcement invoked the once
hardly used offense of marijuana possession to arrest minorities under the notion of probable cause.
The Texas Uniform Narcotics Act of 1937 made cannabis possession a felony offense equal to
heroin possession and far more serious than possession of “speed” or methamphetamine. Texas
was also the only state where nearly every person convicted for even the most minor marijuana
violation received a sentence of at least two years, with some even being sentenced to the full life
imprisonment for first-offense possession of small amounts of the drug.82
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After the Civil Rights Act and the Supreme Court rulings, Harris County arrests for
possession of marijuana increased. In 1965, police arrested 54 people for the use of cannabis,
while five years later that number had grown to 1094.83 Blacks and Mexican Americans made up
sixty-four percent of Harris County’s drug-convicts, although they only comprised 37.9 percent of
the total population.84 Inflating these higher rates of drug delinquency made it more likely that
police would be assigned to slum areas in the anticipation of trouble.85 Drug control created a guise
of probable cause that made profiling appear lawful. The fundamental severity of mandatory prison
sentences helped to remove criminals from the streets. Moreover, drug control added to the
increase probability that police would scrutinize the entire population for criminal activities.
Houston heightened attitude towards drug offenders was part of a larger “War on Drugs” occurring
nationwide, that we now know was part of President Richard Nixon’s strategy to jail African
Americans and hippies, which his administration targeted as enemies.86
The spike in drug offenses gave law enforcement a larger presence on school grounds,
thereby, offering police a chance to maintain their authority over ethnic-Mexican youth. This new
avenue of control stemmed from the Great Society’s War on Poverty and Crime, which encouraged
the assignment of police patrols in public schools. The federal government encouraged lawenforcement officials to work with after-school programs to monitor young people whose
delinquency could lead to social disorder. While Great Society programs were framed to display
benevolent and equal opportunity initiatives, police used them as a means of maintaining a racial
status quo in the aftermath of Jim Crow.87 The drug problem created the opportunity for the HPD
to increase its presence on the campuses of Houston Independent School District in order to suffuse
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crime-control strategies through harassment. According to a 1970 student forum conducted by the
Education and Prevention Task Force of Project D.A.R.E (Drug Abuse Reaches Everyone),
Houston students complained that police placed too much emphasis on drug use in juveniles and
that harassment of students caused “inconsistency of legislation [and] lack of respect for law.”88
Their complaint resonated truth, as law enforcement was readjusting its policing methods to
manipulate the rhetoric of due process and convey street justice.
Similar to other law-enforcement agencies in Texas, Houston police employed an
ambiguous understanding of due process to pay lip service to federal police reform and maintain
racial control with harassment and fear. Testimonies from Papel Chicano demonstrated that in the
early 1970s law enforcement in Harris County bent the guidelines of the Texas Law Enforcement
Handbook to cover the use of street justice while effectuating arrest over ethnic Mexicans.89 For
example, one testimony inferred that police abused the reasonable use of stop and frisk routines to
justify harassing parties or clubs in the minority communities for drunken individuals likely to
drive. This happened to a married couple (who Papel Chicano did not identify to protect their
identity) while they left a Christmas party in 1970.90
To stop the couple, the police officers likely invoked The Handbook’s stipulation to stop
and investigate a person’s suspicious behavior and examine at close range if they are “dangerous
to the officer or others.”91 Although neither the man nor woman were driving, his intent to drive
acted as probable cause that he could be dangerous to others. In addition, the lawman used the
woman’s resistance to her husband’s unlawful arrest as motive to become violent toward the
suspect.92 Abiding by The Handbook’s regulation that if violence erupted, the peace officer had
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the power to take necessary measures to neutralize the threat of physical harm.93 By manipulating
aspects of the due process model, HPD officers maintained their presence in the ethnic community
and covered their use of excessive force.
Similar to the Dallas Police Department, the HPD employed the color of law in street
justice to inform minority citizens that everyone was subject to police chastisement. In one such
incident, a Houston police officer in 1971 beat a disabled man in his friend’s living room because
he was perceived as “too dangerous” to be in the streets in his mental state.94 Again Papel Chicano
refused to identify the victim to protect his identity, but the account implied that the police
instigated the incident by following the man after he left a local store and chasing him into his
friend’s home where they beat him in front of his neighbors.95 According to The Handbook, a
peace officer could take a mentally ill person into custody, if the officer had reason to believe that
the citizen “is likely to cause injury to himself or others if he is not immediately restrained.” If an
officer believed the disabled person to be violent, he could act to protect the public and himself.96
The officer seemingly appeared to follow the protocol for arresting a disabled person by stating
his belief that the men was too dangerous to be in public.
This act of street justice demonstrated police power, but more importantly, highlighted the
weakness of the minority communities. In effectuating the arrest, the officer barged into the
homeowner’s house, which violated due process guidelines to notify the person before entry.97
Then thirteen other officers were called to harass all the inhabitants within the dwelling. Police
officers aimed to have minorities feel a sense of helplessness with the unlawful beating, entry into
the property, and the calling of reinforcements to help invade it.98 These actions communicated to

93

Texas Law Enforcement Handbook, TSA, 49.
“H.P.D. Attacks Handicapped in Viejitas Living Room,” November 9,1971, Papel Chicano, HMRC,
HPL, RG D 43 (Hereafter cited as “H.P.D. Attacks Handicapped,” Papel Chicano, HMRC).
95 Ibid.
96 Texas Law Enforcement Handbook, TSA, 99.
97 Garth Jones, “The Peace Officers Role,” Houston Chronicle, December 8, 1968.
98 “H.P.D. Attacks Handicapped,” Papel Chicano, HMRC.
94

87

the community that the police were the embodiment of law and order, who can violate their rights
even with due process in place
Most importantly, the HPD used street justice on the ethnic community to invoke
intimidation and fear. This is evident through an incident that occurred the night of November 23,
1970, when two HPD officers attacked Richard Rincón from behind with blackjacks, while he was
on the porch of his mother’s house. Papel Chicano reported that he was “beaten mercilessly” in
front of his wife and sixty-eight-year-old mother Juanita Rincón. The police also abused the elder
Mrs. Rincón when she tried to stop them from abusing her son. One officer drew his pistol on the
entire family, which ceased all resistance and forced their compliance. No crime was apparent in
this incident; it was merely a demonstration of street justice meant to intimidate. 99 By pulling out
a pistol during an unlawful incident of excessive force, the officer ignored The Handbook and
demonstrated his unrestrained power to use his firearm to unduly endanger human life and/or shed
blood.100 Without any crime or probable cause, the officer went against all the stipulations of due
process to punish and vent his wrath upon civilian rights.101 Lawmen indicated they were not there
to protect minority rights, but instead to have the community fear their enforcement of law and
order.
The HPD practice of street justice gradually eroded its relations with the community, as
citizens became polarized by the prevalence of police excessive force and the absence of any
apparatus to control or monitor it. Since the early 1960s, citizens requested review boards to
investigate allegations of police misconduct. The Crime Commission created several review
boards to produce the appearance that the HPD wanted to address police abuse but overall failed
to address the issue.102 For example, the interracial committee formed in 1961 reviewed several
cases of alleged police brutality, but the requirement that complainants submit a mandatory
affidavit discouraged civilians from seeking the committee’s aid. Within weeks of the group’s
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inception, only one complaint had any justification, and eventually the Crime Commission
received no further complaints.103
The HPD challenged the legitimacy of review boards to conduct internal investigations of
the department in order to police itself and protect officers violating due process. In 1965, the
Crime Commission, under Chief Carl Shuptrine, created an “internal affair boards” of nine
policemen, but it never met and was dissolved when he left office later that year.”104 Incoming
Chief of Police Herman Short joined a majority of U.S. police officials in abhorring civilian review
boards. According to the Houston Post, Short was quoted as saying, “There is no great need for
it.” Complaints had ceased for six-month, and if one emerged, Short claimed federal authorities or
the grand jury would thoroughly investigate it. He stated, “If we're wrong, I’ll admit it. If we’re
not, I'm not going to have my officers whipped over the head about it.”105 With reviews boards
gone, citizens had no other recourse but to submit their grievance to the police department for
internal investigation. Consequently, the HPD maintain autonomy to police itself and protect
officers violating due process or harassing the community.
To pacify complaints, the HPD invoked crime control to legitimize their patrol of the
minority communities. HPD arrests made-up seventy-nine percent of Harris County’s entire
criminal offenses for the year of 1968. The 1,583 officers of the department reported 132,708
criminal offenses. At this rate, Houston officers made an average of 83 arrests in comparison to
other Harris County law-enforcement who averaged 45 arrests. In 1969 the HPD reported offenses
increased to 144,906. Minority communities held the highest rates of arrest for crimes against
person and property in 1969.106 The Mexican-American communities of Northside and East End
that were in police districts 8 and 11, respectively, were among the areas in which officers reported
crimes disproportionate to the total population. The seeming crime wave’s appearance helped the
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department validate the emergence of a race problem. The majority of outraged citizens demanded
police protection over the rising crime rate.107
As the HPD gained considerable publicity in the local news for its recalcitrant behavior
(that continually went unpunished), its ties to community eroded because it failed to apprehend
the real criminals and left the barrios to be victimized by wrongdoers.108 One newspaper suggested
that ethnic enclaves were becoming cesspools of lawlessness, where people of color resolved their
disputes with short-barreled .22 pistols. Murder among blacks and Mexican Americans was
particularly receiving national attention because of its rising rates in 1970, with one murder being
committed a day.109 Harris County also received fifty-percent of the Huntsville prison overall
release population, whom moved to Houston for the excellent labor market. The large number of
recidivists contributed to the crime problem in the communities.110 Police contributed to a “climate
of violence” by not protecting the neighborhoods and fostering a frontier society that viewed
human life cheaply. Critics of the HPD claimed police shrugged off these incidences as “ghetto
crimes” and left the neighborhoods to be preyed upon by “gangs and thugs.” 111 Law-abiding
minority citizens felt deep frustration and agonizing fear with the lawless element in their area,
and they were being “conditioned to an attitude that the majority white community is not concerned
with crime in the minority area.”112 The police were supposed to be protectors of the law and model
citizens, but the minority community instead saw them as provocateurs and enemies.
As more people accused the HPD of being unresponsive to the entire population, Police
Chief Short attributed crime to the erosion of morality and took no decisive action to curb police
violence. He employed the media to shift the responsibility for the rising crime rate onto the
community which he “defined crime as the source of moral degeneracy.” Short accused parents of
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failing to control their children, which increased crime.113 Mayor Louie Welch defended the HPD,
stating “disrespectful minorities” were seeking public notice.114 Neither Mayor elect Cutrer nor
Welch understood how the community’s discontent toward police was linked to lawmen’s
discriminatory and illegal practices of street justice that oppressed their social conditions.
Moreover, the status quo had not correlated how police perception of minorities’ inherent
criminality contributed to the over arrest of blacks and Mexican people.115 When the Houston Area
Form questioned Police Chief Short on patrolling methods, he stated he did not want to change
laws but to enforce them. He accused minorities of criticizing police for doing their job. Moreover,
he challenged minorities to vent their anger at the true establishment and “lobby in the political
arena for change.”116
By the early 1970s, the police chief’s resistance to accommodate to social change
contributed to the department’s internal erosion. According to historian Dwight Watson, Police
Chief Short’s “stubbornness and racial biases had helped make the HPD a cauldron of racism” that
was unruly to manage. The white backlash against expanded minority rights paired with street
justice encouraged some police officers to project their racist sentiment outwardly at a wider
sampling of citizens.117 After Chief Short resigned in 1974 following the election of liberal Mayor
Fred Hofheinz, a vacuum of leadership was created (ensuring a virtual rotating door of police
chiefs, with five serving in the post from 1974 to 1977) until B. G. “Pappy” Bond succeeded as
the forty-sixth chief of police in 1976.118 According to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights study,
Police Practice in Houston Texas, Bond used “downward accountability” with his officers, which
meant lower level lawmen were given increase discretion to have “maximum flexibility to deal
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with the unpredictable.” Because of downward accountability, he remained fair to officers
involved in controversial incidents to “shield” his officers from both civil and criminal liability.119
In effect, HPD’s misconduct was not controlled or regulated, which allowed the police subculture
to thrive and further erode the force’s relations with the ethnic community.
The failure to acquire a higher level of professionalism within the rank-and-file assured
another level of internal erosion for the department in the early 1970s. For decades, the HPD failed
to meet the FBI’s standard for police-to-citizen ratio.120 According to Police Practice in Houston
Texas, the strength of the force was “slowly eroding” because it did not recruit enough police
officers to match the increase in the city's population and size.121 The HPD only recruited an
average of 50 officers a year. Low recruitment created another imbalance, the small turnout of
rookies trained in due process policy. By 1977, the HPD had 2,800 officer at which 33.75% had
served 10-20 years and 63% had less than 10 years. A bulk of the officers were not trained in the
due process model.122 While rookies received 720 hours of basic training, which exceeded the
minimum Texas State requirements of 240 hours by three times,123 the department failed to instruct
seasoned officers of new changes regarding night firing policies. These imbalances in
professionalism contributed to a mental fallout that weighed on local police forces over due
process rights. According to Watson, this older generation by the 1970s moved from selfprotection mode to overt criminality because they were “afraid of losing their lives, their jobs, and
their freedom if they made mistakes on the job.”124 Peer pressure acted as another factor that made
misconduct entailed in street justice acceptable and encouraged.125
Lastly, the absence of accountability within the law enforcement system was the most
significant factor that contributed to the erosion within the force and its relationship to the
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community. Law enforcement and the District Attorney for Harris County had an interdependent
relationship, or “marriage,” that relied heavily on police testimony to process its caseload and
obtain convictions. According to Police Practice in Houston Texas, this resulted “in a serious
conflict of interest in obtaining prosecution of police in Harris County.”126 Moreover, the average
Harris County grand juror – usually a professional white male with a college education – had a
stronger likelihood to indict a person of color or ethnic minority suspected of a crime based on an
officer’s loose evidence.127 Between 1966 and 1978, the grand jury refused to indict HPD officers
in 155 deaths: 93 (60%) were black and 16 (10.3%) were Hispanic persons.” 128 According to
Assistant District Attorney Erwine Ernst, most grand juries in Harris County were “nothing more
than a rubber stamp 90 per cent of the time,” who were willing to indict on triple hearsay. 129 The
law enforcement system’s double-standard fostered a knowledge within police subculture that
officers would be acquitted for killing people who had committed something as simple as a routine
traffic violation, such as in the stomping death of Bobby Joe Conner by two HPD officers.130
In considering all the factors of erosion, the law enforcement system operated together to
refuse civilian and prisoner’s rights, which enabled the manipulation of due process and the
prevalence of street justice in the 1970s. Although the federal government dismantled Jim Crow’s
legal foundation, the conservative remnants of the HPD refused to negate police authority or
reform their practices. The need for crime-fighting officers remained essential as arrest practices
indicated an increase of juvenile delinquency and crime among minorities.131 This chapter
examined how lawmen manipulated the police model of due process to abuse their authority and
forcibly control the pace of social and institutional change.132 Houston's police department worked
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to reinforce its rank-and-file with Anglos indoctrinated to the white racial values. Police
throughout the state manipulated the due process model with the color of law. In the process, it
also fostered the informal practice of street justice within police subculture. Without a mechanism
to control police misconduct, street justice represented the breakdown of law and order throughout
the law enforcement system. It also conveyed to minorities the power of police to ignore their
rights without direct challenge.
By the mid-1970s, the prevalence of the police subculture among officers became the
catalyst that eroded the department’s relationship to the ethnic-Mexican community. Abuse of the
color of law, incessant harassment and the violence of street justice caused ethnic Mexicans to fear
police and question their protection. Moreover, the law-enforcement system assured police would
not be accountable. Leadership within the HPD encouraged the prevalence of racism and
misconduct within the force by refusing to erect internal review boards and shielding officers from
prosecution with downward accountability. Similarly, district attorneys and the Harris County
Grand Jury refused to indict officers for excessive force or murder. All these factors created a
police department without legal limitations or respect for individual rights.
Finally, in 1977, the killing of Vietnam Veteran Joe Campos Torres by five HPD officers
exposed both the injustices of the city’s law enforcement and the statewide police abuse of ethnic
Mexicans. The decade of police intimidation and unpenalized misconduct sent a surge of anger
throughout the city. Houston Mayor Fred Hofheinz accused the police of “think[ing] that they are
above the law.”133 He was shocked “that five policemen took part with little or no qualms” in
Torres’s death. Although he had failed to act on past complaints, this demonstration of street justice
indicated to him that police brutality was “the practice rather than the exception.”134 In contrast to
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past examples, hiding behind the color of law and self-defense could no longer protect the officers
involved in the Torres incident; it was too obvious a case of senseless street justice.135 The
following chapter further examines Torres’s death as a watershed moment that opened a path for
Mexican American and Chicano activists to become a viable voice behind the movement for police
accountability and reform.
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Chapter 4: Mobilizing for Joe Torres: The Mexican-American Fight for
Justice against Police Brutality during the Long Civil Rights Movement
On May 5, 1977, six Houston patrolmen conspired to keep their murder of Joe Torres a
secret. Adhering to a code of silence, Officers Louis Kinney, Glen Brinkmeyer, Joseph Janish,
Stephen Orlando, Carless Elliot, and Terry Denson agreed to say that Torres was left at the hospital
the night he drowned. Their conspiracy would cover the dreadful fact that five of the six officers
present that night intentionally beat a defenseless man twice rather than give him aid at the hospital.
Their cover-up would also hide their intention to murder the man, as all the participants knew
Torres was highly intoxicated (he had a blood alcohol level of .255, three times above today’s
standard limit) and badly injured from the two attacks.1 Their abuse of Torres underlined their
intent to violate police department procedure, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and federal
criminal and civil statutes that prohibit a person from depriving another person of his federal
constitutional rights.2 More importantly, the plot would cover-up their intention to lynch Torres to
teach a Mexican a lesson of law and order. Why else did Officer Orlando call Denson to meet for
a second time at “the Hole” to “throw someone in the bayou,” if not to dispose of the body? 3
Officers Denson, Orlando and Kinney persistently urged Elliot to remain quiet after Torres
was discovered on May 8th in the Buffalo Bayou where they had dumped his body three days
earlier. Although Elliot witnessed the incident, but did not participate in the brutality, Denson
warned him that he was “just as guilty” for pushing Torres into the water as the others. 4 Elliot, a
1
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rookie who had been recently trained under new guidelines that stressed an arrestee’s right to due
process, could not take part in the conspiracy. His training had reaffirmed that “the law was for
everyone and that if it happened to me, I would want the truth to be known.” Considerate of
Torres’s right to justice, Officer Elliot turned in a written statement to the police the day after the
meeting at the “hole.”5 His report broke the code of silence and its effect to hinder a thorough
police investigation.
By May 10th, Houstonians learned of the five HPD officers’ actions and drowning death of
Joe Torres. Houston native and State Representative Ben Reyes, in a letter to Mayor Hofheinz that
was released to the press, exclaimed his astonishment that the officers involved were not concerned
that someone would disclose the crime to outside sources. Reyes observed that street justice was
a “type of criminal camaraderie…that can kill innocent persons without any thought of the
consequences.” Reyes observation was correct; street justice thrived among officers because
remnants of “frontier justice” in the Texas Penal Code (which did not reflect recent federal civil
rights legislation) made it difficult to prosecute officers for misconduct, murder, killing, or civil
rights violations of prisoners. In Reyes’s estimation, the HPD was a threat to society. 6 Harris
County District Attorney Bert Graham, who would prosecute Stephen Orlando and Terry Denson
for the higher offense of capital murder (under Section 19 of the Penal Code), implied hope in the
Houston Chronicle that the nature of the crime would show a higher standard of culpable mental
state. He stated “that even the normal establishment citizens who usually think the police can do
no wrong realized they can.”7
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Torres’s lynching resounded throughout the state and shed light on the HPD’s history of
street justice and the overall failure of the law-enforcement system to make officers accountable
for using excessive force. The lynching of Torres was not an isolated incident. In the six-year
period from 1972 to 1978, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice investigated
384 civil rights complaints involving allegations of criminal misconduct by Houston police
officers; of these, 21 involved the death of a person.8 The decades-long practice of oppressive and
discriminatory law-enforcement methods eroded police-community relations. Officer R. B. Carbo
claimed that since the Torres incident, “the department as a whole is having mud slung at it [by
locals].” Another police officer witnessed ethnic Mexicans calling uniformed police officers
names on the streets.9 Mamie García, president of LULAC District Eight Council in Houston,
failed to accept the “wishy wash [sic] garbage” of “how sad the department is.”10
The call for justice and police reform would be primarily spearheaded by LULAC. It would
maneuver the diplomatic channels, structure, and legal counsel in an effort to encounter the twist
and turns of the Torres case over the next two years.11 Although LULAC proclaimed itself as “the
forerunner of rights of citizens of Mexican descent,”12 members also realized the magnitude of
civil and police violations entailed in the Torres incident. García correctly explained the incident
as “bigger than anything else and could be bigger than Raza Unida or maybe LULAC.”13
Mobilization in the Torres case would have to be a united front encompassing various civil, social,
and political organizations in order to obtain justice for him. At Torres’s funeral mass at Our Lady
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of Guadalupe Church on May 11, 1977, the Reverend Jack McGinnis called for a united cause to
obtain justice for the deceased. He told mourners to forgive the officers responsible for his death
and to “struggle for justice” by changing the police system and attacking police misconduct.14
Police violence and the denial of due process created an opportune atmosphere for
Mexican-American activists to challenge excessive force and civil rights violations in the Torres
case and others similar incidents. This chapter focuses on the resurgence of Mexican-American
organizations’ quest for civil rights in the late 1970s. Racial injustice in the law-enforcement
system made ethnic Mexicans aware of their legal repression; subsequently, it influenced a new
ethnic political mobilization to reform law enforcement and challenge the whitewashing of
justice.15 Mexican Americans commandeered tactics from the past decade of political mobilization
and the repression of the Chicano movement era to establish effective measures designed to bring
Torres’s murders to justice.
In this era, street justice and other forms of misconduct ensured that the HPD became a
liability to city authorities and their supporters, which in turn attracted federal attention and eroded
community trust. The HPD was forced to comply with citizens’ demands after Torres’s senseless
lynching. Informed by the past and helped by police erosion, the mobilized efforts shed a national
spotlight on the law enforcement system’s discriminatory practices, which in turn allowed activists
to strategically coordinate their actions to reform the police. These activities resulted in the
establishment of avenues to fight injustice in the aftermath of the state police trial. With the nation
watching the police trials, the officers’ convictions for criminally negligent homicide (a Class A
misdemeanor offense) and lenient sentence provided the response needed to secure intervention
by the U.S. Department of Justice and obtain an indictment for federal civil rights violations.
The activists who organized for Torres learned from the police repression of the Black
Power and Chicano movement of the late 1960s. According to historian Guadalupe San Miguel,
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Houston’s Chicano insurgency was less radical and lacked the characteristic of militant
“takeovers” of other South Texas cities.16 Bayou City Chicanos and grassroots organizations
influenced educational reform the most. Their efforts convinced the courts and school system to
recognize Mexican Americans as a distinct ethnic minority group to be included in the formulation
and implementation of desegregation and school policies.17 Overall, Houston’s industrialization
had erased the socio-economic discontent defined within labor struggles and radical reactions from
grassroots movement. Suburbanization placed distance between the Houston’s Anglos and ethnic
Mexicans.18
The city had the hard racist image that served as a powerful stimulus to galvanized minority
leaders against the social agitations of poverty and political alienation. Ethnic Mexicans were
familiar with the pervasiveness of the long history of violent interactions with law enforcement.
Police engaged in misconduct toward Mexican Americans that cut across age, class, and gender
lines.19 The HPD’s racist attitude prevented officers from distinguishing Mexican immigrants from
Mexican Americans.20 These tensions corresponded to the increase violence by police in order to
repress the Chicano and Black Power movements.
Nationwide, law enforcement linked militant politics and racial taboos of the Black and
Brown Power movement as challenges to the racial hierarchy and viewed them as ideological
heresy.21 The militant ethos of Chicanismo called for ethnic integrity and self-determination of the
barrio, as well as control of the people’s own destiny.22 Police violence confirmed Chicano
intellectual underpinnings that viewed whites as enemies (“gringo”) and brown people needed to
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“advocate armed self-defense against police brutality.”23 Their call for ‘Chicano Power’ wanted
recognition on terms defined by the community to overcome the pervasive racial discrimination
by white society.24
The Chicano movement marked a political shift to a younger generation of high school and
college-age youths who called themselves Chicanos and discarded the model of gradual progress
for direct action protest. 25 Their agenda launched a contentious social movement that held currents
against educational inequality, anti-war, anti-establishment, and anti-assimilation values and
actions.26 Within the city or other parts of the state, class- and youth-inspired movements with
grassroots foundation employed demonstrations, rallies, and school boycotts to express their
resentment toward the status quo.27 According to critical legal scholar Ian Haney Lopez, “law
enforcement equated hate toward whites with hate toward the police...and protest against racism
indicated the subversive politics of communism.” Law enforcement officers were guardians of
democracy. 28
In the latter 1960s, law enforcement reacted with aggression toward minority communities
and neutralized the threats of the Chicano and Black Power movement. 29 National police policy
restored a degree of autonomy to police in the aftermath of the dismantling of Jim Crow System
by funding riot-prevention to breakdown the social movements.30 For instance, police violence at
the National Chicano Moratorium, held in Los Angeles on August 29, 1970, resulted in the Los
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Angeles County Sherriff Department’s killing of journalist Ruben Salazar.31 The next year, the
National Chicano Moratorium Committee dissolved due to incessant police harassment and
brutality.32 Similarly, the Texas Rangers and FBI were employed to surveil the activities of
Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) and La Raza Unida Party (RUP). 33 In 1970 the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission recognized and reported that widespread practice of police
misconduct against Mexican-Americans throughout the Southwest. Police violence created a cycle
of suspicion, resistance, and retaliation within community relations.34 Police repression made
ethnic Mexicans feel alienated from and oppressed by the law, as well as distrustful, fearful, and
hostile toward the institutions responsible for the administration of justice. The law-enforcement
system were viewed as Anglo institutions that withheld fair treatment to Mexican Americans.35
In Houston, the Black Power movement suffered this form of police repression. Black
Power activists disillusioned with nonviolent demonstrations demanded the elimination of
structural inequalities like poverty, crime, inadequate housing, and joblessness. Black Power
activists were ready to arm themselves in self-defense against police brutality.36 In 1967, the HPD
employed repressive tactics over a two-month period to stop the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee’s (SNCC) efforts against police violence. It resulted in a shootout between police and
the activists at Texas Southern University (the city’s historically black university). 37 After Black
Power advocates formed the People Party II in 1970 to protect the community from police, law
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enforcement officers used undercover operatives, illegal wiretaps, and informants to crush the
organization and kill its 21-year old leader, Carl Hampton.38
Police lawlessness and disorder thrived in the years before Torres’s death; surveillance,
illegal wiretapping, covert operations, and tactical-weapon strength were used to neutralize civil
rights activists.39 During 1966 and 1967, city officials had to take disciplinary actions against 110
white officers for mishandling black cases and uttering racial slurs and being offensive to
minorities.40 African-American activists felt the brunt of misconduct; from 1973 to 1977 the HPD
was involved in twenty-six fatal shootings of African Americans.41 Police Chief Herman Short
was also able to secure federal funding to appropriate helicopters, tactical weapons, and
moderately increase the number of police officers.42 The community-wide organization Houston
Area Forum (a nonprofit entity formed in 1968 to serve as a channel of communication between
organized groups, citizens, and local government) found in their study on the HPD that the
community “have come to consider the term ‘law and order’ another way of saying police
brutality’” and “legalized murder.”43 One Papel Chicano reporter explained that being a minority
in Houston was inhumane, because it included being “a product of oppression” and “a limited life
in a racist society” and then “death at the “hand[s] of the oppressor.”44 Police violence contributed
to the politicization of the larger Mexican-American population and launched another facet to the
Civil Rights Movement.45
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Those who eventually organized to bring justice for Torres learned from the suppression
of the Chicano and Black Power movements and assembled new methods to fight police violence.
According to historian Brian Behnken, actions by Texas Mexicans displayed the evolution of a
more sophisticated and mature civil rights struggle against police brutality. 46 The suppression of
the Black Power and Chicano movement contributed to the politicization of the larger MexicanAmerican population and launched another facet to the Civil Rights Movement.47 Since the early
1960s, the Mexican-American generation generally opposed and detested black protest at both the
state and national level.48 Differences between old-line activists and the new Chicano generation
initially divided activists during the onset of street justice. Chicanos politicization was
characterized by the social economic difference manifested in Chicano politics.49 Militant
members viewed older middle-class spokespersons as “self-styled,” complacent, and opportunists
who lacked the political machinery to demand the improvement of the masses. 50 Sympathy and
support for the Chicano movement contributed to the emergence of “ethnic political mobilization”
among Mexican Americans. Ethnic identity became the primary value upon which Mexican
Americans made their political choices and activities. 51
This new political consciousness led to a higher level of political involvement to better
combat the ongoing practice of institutional racism that allowed racial injustice to thrive and police
brutality to remain uncheck.52 For the most part, a majority of activists still displayed appreciation
for the institutions of the United States and believed in achieving equality through
mainstream approaches and the politics of accommodation.53 From 1966 to 1975, Houston
Mexican-Americans increased their political representation by obtaining positions in State House
Legislative Districts and within the office of county justice of the peace. In 1973, the new liberal
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majority in the Harris County Commissioners’ Court worked more closely with MexicanAmerican leaders to redraw the boundaries of the justice of the peace precincts and carved out
Precinct 6 for the community. By 1975, twenty Mexican-Americans served as precinct judges. 54
Across East Texas, minority activists also developed tactics to fight the injustice of police within
the court room.
Texas Mexican-Americans responded to police brutality by invoking the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to due process offered an avenue to legally
challenge police misconduct. For instance, after Austin Police killed youths Oscar Balboa and
wounded Valentin Rodríguez in 1968 after they stole a car, Mexican-American community leaders
hired an attorney to represent the citizens. They argued that the police officers violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shooting the youths blocks away from the theft.
Their violation fell within the federal criminal and civil statutes that prohibit any person, under the
color of law, from depriving another person of their federal constitutional rights. Upholding due
process sometimes required law enforcement to investigate police violence, and offered activists
an opportunity to address demands for accountability. Community leaders in Austin, for example,
demanded police be held accountable and reformed to be sensitive to the community by
implementing an effective program of training for the APD in human relations.55 With due process
to undergird their fight, this offered the groundwork for police accountability and a standard for
protecting citizens’ rights. The state Grand Jury of Travis County followed the Texas Penal Code
over federal law and ‘no-billed’ the officers for civil rights violation. 56 Unfortunately, due process
did not breakdown judicial double-standards that allowed white officers to kill or beat minorities.
Mexican-American community leaders against police excessive force shifted their outlook
to a new racial discourse of equality that challenge institutional racism within the law enforcement
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system.57 Thereafter, the civic group wished it to be “understood that they are concerned with
[police] procedures as citizens of Austin and not merely as Mexican-Americans.” Their discourse
of empowerment enlisted equality and protection of all races – Mexican Americans, blacks, Anglo
– against police misconduct.58 Activists’ discourse of equality was inclusive and invoked citizens’
civil rights to make police violence a legitimate issue to all citizens no matter their race.
Similarly, African Americans from Houston and surrounding areas became cognizant of
the rights that due process ensured prisoners and employed them to charge police with civil rights
violations. Le Roy Barlow of Town Bluff accused three highway patrolmen of beating him in
January 1968.59 John Charles Blood of Houston complained to the FBI that Pasadena police beat
him for nearly four hours while in custody in July 1968. He also filed a $1 million damage suit
against the officers.60 Duane Culberth alleged he was beaten and choked in a jail in Humble,
Texas.61 Upholding due process opened the possibility for an investigation into police violence, as
well as demands for accountability. Culberth highlighted the once futile battle against police by
stating, “The same thing that happened to me must happen to other people every day, but they
don't say anything because they don't think they have a chance to get anything done.” 62 Doublestandards at play in the grand juries and courts led to the officers in these cases to be no-billed.63
Despite an apparent unequal justice system, minorities gained a sense of empowerment and
direction to fight law enforcement injustices.
Mexican-American attorneys also learned to employ aspects of street justice to vindicate
the victim of an unlawful arrest. This was seen in the 1971 police beating case of Richard Ramirez,
a seventeen-year-old youth. Attorney and LULACer John J. Herrera called the secrecy of the code
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of silence to create seal tight story whose validity could not be challenged within the court
hearing.64 Herrera encouraged him to remain publically silent during the court process to prevent
publicity that would only further aid the Houston Police Department in “inventing” evidence. By
protecting his client’s silence, Herrera got Ramirez’s loitering charge dismissed, which in turn
vindicated disturbing the peace and failure to move violations.65
Other attorneys learned to use officers’ violation of due process to vindicate victims of an
unlawful arrest. In November 1971, Aureliano Silva was on trial for the beating death of an Anglo
woman June Grove Gleason, a crime he did not commit. Harris County Sheriff deputies
orchestrated an appearance of a crime by planting evidence against him at the crime scene and
using coercion to force Silva’s confession of the crime. Law enforcement and the prosecution,
thereafter, ignored forensic evidence and shaky alibis that could have opened an investigation
against Gleason’s white boyfriend or husband. The Casa de Amigos in Northside funded Silva’s
legal expenses and obtained Richard Haynes, a noted criminal lawyer, and attorney Rosemary
Sucillo to defend him. They worked on the case for two-years and successfully vindicated Silva
by scrutinizing the prosecution’s evidence and obtaining viable religious testimony. 66
Five years before the Torres murder, brazen examples of street justice informed activists
of other possible strategies to employ in their struggle to reform police misconduct. The July 1973
Dallas police killing of twelve-year-old Santos Rodríguez offered insight into the benefits of mass
64
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demonstration and the effectiveness of unity. Rodríguez was misidentified by police and arrested
for a gas station robbery without a warrant. The officers forced him to play a game of Russian
roulette in order to coerce a confession from him. Consequently, Rodríguez shot himself, which
given the context was tantamount to an execution. The Chicano community in Dallas immediately
responded to Rodríguez’s killing by calling for a local self-defense unit, demands for a law
enforcement review board, and the organization of a march to decry police violence. Four days
after the incident, the protest march commenced in downtown Dallas but it quickly degenerated
into a riot. It gave the Chicano grassroots movement momentum to continue the fight for justice
until 1975.67
Action for Santos Rodríguez’s was undergirded by Chicanismo’s ideology of
“carnalismo,” which helped cement the movement for the next couple of years. Carnalismo was a
rhetoric of brotherhood and unity that encouraged “power in togetherness.”68 It also signaled the
interconnection of family, brotherhood, and members of la raza. 69 The unity of the movement
ensured the indictment of Officer Cain that resulted in a murder conviction and five-year jail
sentence. These grassroots actions encouraged the DPD to hire more minorities and to formulate
an internal affairs division. Eventually, the department hired its first minority deputy police chief.70
The Chicano mobilization for Santos Rodríguez in Dallas offered introspection into the
ineffectiveness of mass demonstration, but it demonstrated the power of ethnic political
mobilization to effect change within the police department.
Moreover, the killing of Ricardo Morales by the Sheriff of Castroville, Texas indicated that
dual prosecution with federal intervention could challenge the whitewashing of justice. Morales
was gunned down by Sheriff Frank Hays in the said town in 1975 after being arrested for outdated
misdemeanor warrants. Sheriff Hays killed Morales in front of his deputy and obtained helped
from his wife, daughter, son-in-law, and sister-in-law to dispose of the body nearly 400 miles
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away.71 The state trial convicted Hays for killing Morales, but resulted in a light prison sentence
of between 2 to 10 years, his wife being fined $49.50 for a misdemeanor charge of dumping and
burying the dead body, and his son-in-law being granted immunity despite being an accomplice in
the murder.72 Notwithstanding the whitewashing of justice, the Attorney General refused
LULAC’s requests to seek federal intervention in the Morales case. The U.S. Department of Justice
did not intervene because it only reviewed state court prosecutions of police abuse that resulted in
acquittals,73 and usually by then the politics of the case had ceased.
By early 1977, incoming U.S. Attorney General Griffin Bell revised the procedure to
become effective in responding to Texas citizens’ complaints against police brutality. New policy
required every allegation of a civil rights violation to be evaluated on its own merits to determine
whether federal prosecution was warranted.74 Subsequently, LULAC member and attorney Ruben
Sandoval of San Antonio served as an attorney on the Morales civil rights case. Sheriff Hayes was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Moreover, Texas became the second state to have
a formal Civil Rights Division located in the Southern District.75 The police state trial for Torres
occurred at an apt time, as the tactics used and refined by grassroots, political, and social
organizations influenced mobilized efforts in 1977.
Mobilizing for Joe Torres demonstrated cohesion across several Mexican American and
Chicano organizations to “struggle for justice” and reform the police. On May 14, LULAC District
Eight invited a wide range of community organizations from the entire city to a press conference.
Mamie García claimed it was attended by lawyers, professionals, different civic organizations, and
people from all racial groups and ethnicities. Also in attendance were representatives from the
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Chicano political party, Raza Unida.76 The participants resolved “to stand together and unite in our
efforts to correct the cancer that has existed in our communities and allowed continued abuse to
our citizen that we have witnessed too long.”77 While the discourse of unity was employed to unite
a wide range of organizations, the formation of two distinct political coalitions with similar
agendas but different goals for reforming the police emerged during this first several months of
mobilized efforts.
Both mobilized political efforts for Torres had the common cause to reform oppressive and
discriminatory practices in the police. The first consisted of LULAC, the Political Association of
Spanish-Speaking Organizations (P.A.S.O.), and the Harris County Hispanic Caucus who had
extensive networks and mainstream channels to protect the interests of the city’s barrios.78 LULAC
state director Ruben Bonilla placed the organization at the forefront of the movement to be
“recognized as the articulate voice of the Spanish-speaking citizens throughout the United States
of America.”79 This coalition’s overall objectives were to abolish discriminatory policies in order
to ethnically diversify the police force and make the department more culturally sensitive to ethnic
Mexicans.
The Coalition for Responsible Law Enforcement (CRLE) was the second political efforts
that formed with an aim to foresee the improvement of police procedures that effected all civilians,
not just the ethnic community. This group was composed of Mexican American and black
representatives.80 In contrast to the first coalition of organizations, the CRLE strove to improve
police procedure that violate all civilian rights and be a vehicle “to provide input and participate
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in a coordinated body in conjunction with police, elected officials, and government agencies.”81 It
also worked with the Community Relations Service division (CRS) of the U.S. Department of
Justice to set-up formal mediation between the HPD and the community spokesperson.82
Mobilized Mexican Americans refused to conduct demonstration. The two political
movements that mobilized for Torres distance themselves from militant grassroots organizations,
like the newly formed People United to Fight Police Brutality and the Barrio Unidos. LULAC
criticized them as “parades and fanfares” seeking public attention from Torres death. 83 Since the
early 1960s, the Mexican-American generation generally opposed and detested protest
demonstrations at both the state and national level.84 Possibly the activists recalled the Dallas
Police riot in the Santos Rodríguez’s murder which occurred because the small Mexican-origin
population lacked the extensive history of Chicano civil rights activism.85 The movement for
Torres was much more sophisticated with established organizations and leaders ready to strategize
the political and legal channels to fight injustice.
Mobilization for Torres employed a discourse of equality to politicize Houston’s populace
around the citywide issue of police violence and injustice.86 LULAC, with the support of Torres’s
family, identified his lynching as an example of police brutality and publicized it as such in an
effort to make it a relevant concern for the entire city. Torres’s parents stated that police
misconduct “happens to blacks and poor whites and Mexican Americans in direct proportion to
their percentage in the [Houston] population.” 87 Their message invoked the recent HPD killing of
two white youths that breached a response from the Anglo population. Between 1975 and 1977,
the HPD angered Anglo citizens with the killings of Billy Joyvies and Randy Webster. By so

81

CRLE Organization, Unknown Date, Ben Reyes Collection, HMRC, HPL, MSS 103, box 6, folder 13
Documents on the Coalition for Responsible Law Enforcement.
82 Police Practice in Houston, BCAH, 118-119.
83 Lynwood Abram, “Parallels in Torres Killing and 1975 Castroville Slaying are Explored,” Houston
Chronicle, May 23, 1977, Vertical File, HMRC.
84 Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battle, 95, 93.
85 Behnken, “‘We Want Justice!,’” 200.
86 Escobar, "The Unintended Consequences of the Carceral State,” 184.
87 Abram, “Parallels in Torres Killing,” Vertical File, HMRC.

111

doing, it demonstrated that the police brutalized all segments of society. These slayings by the
HPD obscured the rules of racial etiquette and exceeded its primary mission of maintaining racial
subordination in the city.88 Consequently, Torres’s parents touched on citizens’ tensions with
police misconduct, competence, and accountability. Their message aimed to appeal to the large
white majority and gain its support in the struggle for police reform and justice. The Torres family
argued that “the law...makes no exception based on the particular occupation of the offender.” By
turning Torres’s lynching into a “community affair,” political organizations identified the HPD as
a citywide enemy in order to unite racially and ethnically diverse Houstonians behind a common
cause.89
To effectively mobilize the population for Torres, LULAC leaders confronted the
mechanisms of the status quo that perpetuated the criminalized imagery of ethnic Mexicans. Media
quickly operated to distort the public’s image of Torres. For instance, the Houston Chronicle
focused on interviews that described Torres as a “bum and a drifter,” an alcoholic, and an
unintelligent “streetwise” man. Officer Terry Denson, on the other hand, was portrayed as the ideal
white American: “nice guy, hard-working, respectful, brotherly, athletic, level-headed,”
recognized by citizens for his police work, and “brought up in a Christian home.” Denson’s college
education became a signifier of his intelligence. Although both men were Vietnam veterans,
Torres’s service was downplayed because he was discharged from the Army for alcoholism.90 This
juxtaposition slandered Torres and associated him with the common perception that ethnic
Mexicans had a criminal nature; in so doing it vindicated Police Officer Denson’s image and
motives. Given this context, when the Houston Post displayed “a general insensitivity to the status
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of LULAC as a viable minority organization,” LULAC State Director Ruben Bonilla, retorted that
the newspaper downplayed police brutality. He argued that it is “quite evident that the Mexican
American is abused and mistreated and that his civil rights are prejudiced and ignored.” 91 Rather
than have their image and voice suppressed within the newspapers, LULAC argued for more public
visibility to empower the city to fight for justice. Activists learned from the past that newspapers
help shatter the solidarity of ethnic Mexican organizations to protest police misconduct, and he
used it now as a vehicle of cohesion.
Mayor Fred Hofheinz and Police Chief B. G. “Pappy” Bond’s efforts to change the
“climate” of accountability during the Torres controversy also offered activists an arena to
challenge Houston’s status quo. These city leaders attempted to restore the HPD’s image as
servants of the law. Bond filed murder charges against Denson on May 9 and fired the other four
officers involved in the Torres beating.92 He and Mayor Hofheinz also proposed the creation of a
special state investigating grand jury to probe police brutality in Houston. 93 To sympathize with
the public outcry, Bond implemented the formation of an internal affairs division to investigate
citizen complaints against the police. To show consideration to national civil reforms, he executed
new training programs for rookie officers and issued “Miranda” warning cards.94 The department’s
history of misconduct, especially during the previous five years, failed to offer much hope that
these reforms would be effective or even long lasting.
Up until the Torres incident the police department failed to be responsive to community
concerns, despite grassroots leaders and activists pressing for inclusion in the HPD investigation
and policy reform process. After the Joyvies incident, Police Chief Bond implemented a temporary
Internal Affairs Division, but refused to meet with community leaders regarding race related
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misconduct.95 The Internal Affairs Division did not become a “full-time” part of the HPD until
Chief Bond retired and Harry Caldwell became chief in June 1977.96 Locals could not trust the
police-operated internal affairs division to conduct a non-bias investigation that would not be
covered in secrecy.97 In addition, the mayor and city council showed no empathy for victims of
violence and refused to appoint an independent fact-finding commission.98 At LULAC’s
insistence, citizens organized a multi-racial committee called the Independent Barrio Commission
to conduct their own investigation into Torres’s death 99 On May 18th it heard testimony from
victims or witnesses of police brutality. It concluded that “it has been common practice for Houston
police to brutalize and terrorize minority communities.” Furthermore, its investigation underscored
locals’ fear of increase racial violence by the police with the new programs and divisions that
would “beef up” the HPD after Torres’s murder.100
LULAC also fought to remove Police Chief Bond from the public arena when he retired
and considered running for mayor in the summer of 1977. After Mayor Hofheinz announced he
would not seek reelection for a third term, Bond declared his intent to run in the November
election. He stated, “My sole interest is making my hometown a better place to live.”101 LULAC
State Director, Ruben Bonilla, quickly condemned ex-chief Bond’s entry into the mayoral race.
To Bonilla, Bond was using the police department’s greatest tragedy as “cheap opportunism.” In
addition, Bonilla argued that Bond had failed to clean-up the police department.102 Under his
95
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leadership, not only had police been involved in a number of controversial killings, but six former
Houston narcotics officers received federal convictions for civil-rights charges stemming from
wiretapping, theft and brutality.103 Federal authorities also enacted an Equal Employment
Opportunity Plan to “correct” the long-standing practice of minimizing the recruitment of
minorities.104
Bonilla called upon the ethnic consciousness of the mobilized efforts and waged a
campaign to prevent Bond’s accession to mayor. He claimed LULAC would organize its people
to wage a “block-by-block, precinct-by-precinct campaign” to defeat Bond. LULAC understood
the swing vote invoked non-whiteness and the power of the multitudes to effect change. Although
Bond maintained he “did everything in the Torres case that a police chief could do,” 105 he retracted
his mayoral candidacy indicating the threat of a Mexican-American voting block discouraged his
plan.
LULAC and the CRLE also took advantage of the incoming chief’s seeming openness to
institute policies within the HPD that would be more sensitive to minorities and citizen rights. To
LULAC, Chief Harry Caldwell had to “demonstrate some capacity for initiating programs that
would improve minority relations.”106 LULAC called for the creation of a bilingual staff to inform
Spanish-speaking applicants how they could qualify to be on the force and inform the MexicanAmerican community of job openings. The chief needed to consider sensitivity training to improve
rookies’ relations with the minority community. LULAC hoped to prevent another Torres incident
by building better communication between police and the Spanish-speaking community.107
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The public backlash to Torres’s death left little room for Police Chief Caldwell to be like
previous men in his position. He proved willing to meet and integrate minority leaders in police
reform. Prior to assuming the head post, Chief Caldwell had been assistant chief of the HPD for a
decade and made attempts to professionalize the force with minority recruitment programs and
community relations division.108 Caldwell also supervised the “Houston Modification” program in
1968 to encourage face-to-face sessions between members of the police force and black citizens.
It was defunct by 1970.109 On August 20, 1977, Caldwell meet with LULAC leaders and assured
them that “lots can be done in a short period of time, it can be done.”110 Consideration to sensitivity
training was another of Caldwell’s concerns and thus he established a basic training program in
the Spanish language for officers at Ripley Civic Center.111 He also implemented the Ripley House
Project to station a police officer in minority communities full-time, thereby, encouraging
recruitment and general community relations.112 Lastly, Caldwell agreed to work with a small
advisory committee of LULAC's choosing that would assist him in reaching the Mexican
community. LULAC established a 5-7-member Advisory Committee made up of seven LULAC
council presidents of Houston. Chief Caldwell proved to be “sensitive to the Mexican American
in Houston,” convincing the organization to continue working with him.113
Similarly, the Coalition for Responsible Law Enforcement (CRLE) negotiated with Chief
Caldwell to implement reforms to police procedures, such as their use of deadly force and a
standardize gun policy. The CRLE saw Caldwell’s ascension to chief as an opportunity to examine
conflicting issues and to identify common interests and goals. It utilized "non-adversary"
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proceeding to maximize citizens and police authorities’ communications to “educate” both parties
to the needs, reactions and perspectives of the other. Chief Caldwell showed consideration to the
CRLE suggestions. His most significant change to policy related to fleeing felons.
Police Chief Caldwell created a new policy that went beyond the CRLE original discussion
to establish a minimum degree of police restraint. On September 19, 1977, the CRLE released a
statement proclaiming that “under no circumstances…will deadly force now be permitted solely
to protect property, even as a last resort, unless the enumerated life-threatening conditions are also
present.” 114 Caldwell also agreed to establish a new firearm policy to regulate and standardize
arms.115 Before the Torres incident, weapon standardization and registration was a sensitive issue
because the city did not supply officers with guns or ammunition.116 Not until 1979 did the HPD
implement a firearms policy that accounted for the discharge of weapons, however.117 In addition
to interjecting their agenda for police reform, mobilized efforts for Torres also strategized to enact
a plan to counter the whitewashing of justice.
Because it was aware of the lack of justice in police brutality cases in the past, the
movement for Torres focused on petitioning the U.S. Department of Justice to intervene and dually
prosecute the police officers for civil rights violations. Days after Torres’s body was discovered,
Municipal Court Judge Rosemary Sucillo helped the Torres family file its official complaint to the
Justice Department and to Barbara Jordan, the U.S. Representative for Houston’s 18th
Congressional district.118 Texas House member Ben Reyes gained permission from the Torres
family to have Attorney Ruben Sandoval and the Civil Rights Litigation Center work on the case
to obtain federal intervention.119 LULAC’s president and vice-president implored Congressman
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Robert Eckhart to expedite a federal investigation, because it was “necessary to preserve
constitutional rights that are being infringed upon under color of law.”120
Political activists started the process to request federal intervention because it knew the
state prosecution of the police would not result in justice.121 Reyes wrote to U.S. Attorney General
Bell to inform him that without checks on police from within the law-enforcement system, citizens
of the minority communities “are seriously questioning the quality of justice in our city” and losing
faith in the law.122 Mexican-American leaders learned from the Morales case that federal
prosecution was a viable option to challenge whitewashing of justice in the state courts. They
successfully convinced the U.S Department of Justice to conduct a separate investigation from the
city’s Internal Affairs Division.123 But, federal prosecutors decided to await the developments in
the state court before seeking indictments against the officers for civil rights violations.124
Obtaining a federal indictment required strategically pinpointing the discriminatory
practices of the law enforcement system that whitewashed justice during the prosecution of exofficers Terry Denson and Stephen Orlando. Moving the trial to Huntsville, located seventy miles
North of Houston and home to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice as well as several prisons,
was one action that helped build a case for federal intervention. A Harris County judge approved
Terry Denson and Stephen Orlando’s defense request to relocate the trial to that city, because an
impartial jury could not be selected in Houston with all the publicity and local anger surrounding
the case. According to the Houston Post, the people of Huntsville believed justice was more likely
with an all-white jury than an all-Mexican one, because the latter “would twist the facts. People
up here don’t seem to be prejudiced.”125 In actuality, Huntsville was the best venue to try police
for racist crimes because it was largely influenced by the “law enforcement mentality” connected
120

Letter from LULAC to Eckhart, BCAH.
To American Association of Univ. Women, BLAC.
122 Reyes to Bell, May 12, 1977, BCAH.
123 Police Practice in Houston, BCAH, 110, 108, 114.
124 "New LULAC Leader raps Bond's Mayoral Bid," Houston Chronicle, June 12, 1977, Ruben Bonilla
Collection, LULAC Presidential Papers Project, BLAC, UL, UTA, box 17 folder 3.
125 Quested in "Torres Dead, Cops Free," Para La Gente, 1 no. 5, Ruben Bonilla Collection, LULAC
Presidential Papers Project, BLAC, UL, UTA, box 19 folder 14.
121

118

to the local prison system.126 The town was also persuaded by common sense notions of race that
automatically labeled Mexican Americans as inferior to white Americans and generally
characterized them as having criminal tendencies, prone to senseless violence, and succumbing to
alcoholism.127 Given this context, the selected all-white jury was going to be biased and
sympathize with the indicted officers.128 Moving the trial to Huntsville insured that racial
portrayals would be represented in the court.
The defense further played into the whitewashing of justice when it portrayed Torres as a
bad Mexican to invoke his “innate criminal nature.” When the trial began on September 13, 1977,
the defense needed to build a case that proved the officers did not intentionally commit the higher
offense of capital murder. Lawyers for the police did not maintain that they acted in self-defense,
for it was too much of an obvious case of brutality.129 Rather, they invoked common sense racist
perceptions of Mexican Americans to criminalize Torres’s character and present his “dangerous
attitude.” His previous arrest record was submitted as evidence to his criminal nature and
endangerment to law enforcement. In 1971, when he was of seventeen years old, police
apprehended Torres for public intoxication and trespassing. According to arresting officer Troy
Allen, Torres “resisted arrest by cursing and kicking him and another officer.” He was charged
with assault. Two years later, he was stopped for a traffic violation and taken into custody for
possession of marijuana. This time he verbally abused the officers then served 10 days in jail.130
The defense also brought forward Torres’s most recent arrest records to highlight the extent
of danger that he posed immediately before his death. Torres was arrested twice months before his
death: December 1976 and March 1977. In the former detainment, he was held for disturbance at
the same lounge (Club 27) as the night of his death. Houston patrolman J. L. Doss testified that
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Torres “took off his shoes and kicked at them karate-style.” More importantly, he threatened to
kill the officer, because he had “just gotten back from Vietnam and was a black belt who had killed
men there.” In the latter incident, he was arrested for both public intoxication and possession of
marijuana. D. H. Bingley, a narcotics detective, claimed he thought Torres was insane for
threatening to use his hands as weapons, kicking an officer in the groin and face. The detective
claimed Torres was so violent that it took four officers to subdue him.131 This imagery made Torres
appear to be a repeated criminal becoming more dangerous. The defense’s depiction built up the
likelihood that Torres would eventually kill an officer and possibly deserved his death.
In an effort at impartiality, District Judge James Warren refused to admit the testimony on
Torres’s character as evidence; however, common sense notions of racism prevailed within the
defense’s arguments. The Houston Post claimed the defense was still “effective in convincing
jurors the alleged victim [was] Campos-Torres and not Joe—an attempt to imply he’s not one of
us, he’s an alien.”132 The defense’s refusal to call Torres by his first name acknowledged their
attempt to depersonalize the victim and revoke his U.S. citizenship. Even without the testimony of
Torres’s character, the defense was successful at provoking racial differences between the victim
and the defendants that are often shared as accepted truths among other whites. 133 This technique
of drawing upon common sense racial notions added a degree of approval to the lynching of an
unwanted Mexican. Torres was a criminal and not an American. The officers’ display of street
justice was a lesson to educate him about law, not an intent to murder him, which helped absolved
them of that charge.
The officers’ act of street justice failed to show intent to murder, which gave the jury an
opportunity to convict the officers on a lesser charge. Although the prosecution attempted to
convict the officers for the higher offense of capital murder, under Section 19 of the Penal Code,
it would have required a higher standard of proof of premeditation and culpable mental state. In
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other words, the prosecution needed to prove the officers intended to kill Torres. Given the
supposed lack of intent to murder, the jury elected to convict the officers under section 19.07,
criminally negligent homicide, of the Texas Penal Code. This statute stated that if a person
committed the death of an individual by criminal neglect, the offense was a Class A
misdemeanor.134 The all-white jury sentenced Torres’s murderers to one-year probation and a onedollar fine for negligent homicide.135
The jury’s lenient sentence maintained the double-standard of justice that protected white
officers from the Texas prison system. According to Gary Taylor of the Houston Post, the jury
attempted to pacify the nature of the crime by reducing to mere embellishment the testimonies of
other officers, who partook in beating Torres.136 Prosecutor Ted Poe suggested the “jurors might
be looking for any excuse to go easy on the former officers and renew their faith in the forces
which protect them.”137 Moreover, the white jurors refused to be badgered by the prosecution to
give a harsher sentences. Jury foreman Mike Bruce stated that the jurors believed the officers
should have gotten a “couple of years in the pen,” but the prosecutors angered the jurors by
referring to them as “palefaces” in their closing arguments.138 Police Chief Harry Caldwell was
cited as saying the jury allowed the laws for whites to prevail, because they refused to be
intimidated by the pressure of the Mexican-American community.139 In other words, even if the
officers were unjustified in killing Torres, racial perceptions of his and all Mexican Americans’
worthlessness was not going to trump the presumptions of protecting white worth.140
The brazen display of injustice offered mobilized efforts for Torres the push needed to put
into place a campaign to secure a federal indictment on civil rights violations. In awaiting the
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trial’s outcome, another coalition was formed to better activate all organizations to react to the
aftermath of injustice. Civic and political Mexican-American organizations coordinated the El
Concilio De La Raza on August 27, 1977. El Concilio included representatives from popular
groups such as LULAC, the American G. I. Forum, the Political Association of Spanish-Speaking
Organizations (PASO), and Image of Houston. As a united front, it was to be the “think-tank” that
communicated and coordinated all the organization on common social issues and how to resolve
them.141
When the state trial was closed, El Concilio de la Raza focused its complaint to the federal
government on the premise that changing trial venues allowed for the whitewashing of justice.
After the trial, El Concilio argued that federal intervention was needed to stop the “overt and
blatant pattern of unequal justice” that changing venues manifested. It maintained that the state
trial was “not justice being sought by the local government, but a way to reduce the punishment
for the offenders and once more make the wanton killing of a Mexican American a simple watter
[sic] of record.”142 Racial injustice defined the American judicial system for men like Torres. He
“spent many days of his life in Vietnam defending those who killed him,” but his service was not
worth more than protecting a white life before Texas law. The activists demanded federal
intervention by the Department of Justice for Joe Torres.143
LULAC argued that intervention was necessary because citizens were living in fear of the
unchecked power of the Texas law enforcement system. In a press release LULAC stated that the
jury sentence demonstrated the erosion of Mexican-American civil and legal liberties.144 It went
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on to say that the trial was “a mockery” upon their rights and insult to the community. Its outcome
proved police had the right “to kill and commit a murder and it puts a slap on a police officer’s
hand.”145 García, president of LULAC District Eight Council, argued to Attorney General Bell that
this lack of justice had citizens living in fear of police impunity to kill Mexican Americans in
Texas. Since May, she wrote, when Torres was discovered, ethnic Mexican men from the
surrounding areas of Wharton, Richmond, and Galveston, Texas were found stabbed or hanged in
their jail cell. All their deaths were ruled accidental.146 The jury’s sentence in the Torres case
demonstrated the erosion of Mexican Americans’ civil and legal liberties, and the reaffirmation of
the uncheck autonomy of the police.147
Lastly, mobilized efforts for Torres martyred him to emphasize the state-wide practice of
killing Mexicans within the law enforcement system. Organizations placed Torres alongside other
victims of police violence that symbolized and politicized racial injustice shared across the state,
such as: Santos Rodríguez, Ricardo Morales, and Juan Zuniga who was hung in the Sierra Blanca,
Texas jail in 1973. LULAC stated, “The results of these cases have proven that the equal protection
of the 14th amendment does not apply to minority races.”148 In addition, LULAC members wore
a “dollar bill [to] symbolize the worth of the life of an American citizen under the Judicial System
of Texas.”149 They resolved to wear it until the U.S. Department of Justice intervened on Torres’s
behalf.150
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This Mexican-American mobilization strategically orchestrated its efforts and gained the
support of the federal government to continue its inquiry after the state trial. U.S. State Senator
John Tower requested Attorney General Bell to prosecute the officer to the “limits of the law.”151
On October 8, Mexican-American political leaders – Antonio Morales of the American GI Form
and LULAC leaders Ruben Bonilla and Ruben Sandoval – met with the special assistant to Justice
Department Attorney General Griffin Bell to discuss the Torres incident and other police brutality
cases of Texas.152 Moreover, a press conference was held in Washington where LULAC spoke
with Senator Bentsen and Senator Tower to pursue federal investigation on the Torres case. Even
President Jimmy Carter met with 2,000 Mexican Americans to see what he could do about the
situation.153 Denson, Orlando, Kinney, and Janish were convicted in a Houston U.S. District Court
in March 1978 for violating Torres’s civil rights, which resulted in his death, and conspiring to
cover the murder. Judge Ross Sterling’s lenient sentences, however, would inform the next
struggle to obtain justice for Torres.
Mexican American organizations learned from the prior state and federal civil rights trials
of the 1970s that law-enforcement would not be held accountable for misconduct, because the city
or state government would not restrict it and the racism of all-white juries created barriers to
prosecuting white officers. The movement that eventually organized for Torres displayed the
evolution of a more sophisticated and mature civil rights struggle against police brutality. Before
the Torres case, Mexican activists commandeered the language of due process and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution to define a discourse of racial unity and civil rights empowerment.
The suppression of the Black Power and Chicano movement contributed to the politicization of
the larger Mexican American population and launched another facet to the struggle for civil rights
in Texas, if not the nation.154 In hindsight the Chicano mobilization for Santos Rodríguez in Dallas
151

Copy of John Tower's [U.S. State Senate] letter to Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, October 7, 1977,
Ruben Bonilla Collection, LULAC Presidential Papers Project, BLAC, UL, UTA, box 19 folder 14.
152 “The Torres Case: ‘Prompt decision’ vowed on U.S. role in case,” Houston Post, October 7, 1977,
vertical file HMRC.
153 District 8 Emergency Meeting, October 10, 1977, BLAC.
154 Escobar, "The Unintended Consequences of the Carceral State,” 184.

124

pointed to the benefits of mass demonstrations to unite the minority community behind police
reform. The killing of Ricardo Morales indicated the benefits of federal intervention to challenge
the whitewashing of justice.
Moreover, this chapter argues that the mobilization for Torres was strategically coordinated
to interject political and social activists into police reform and seek federal aid outside of the city
and state governments. The momentum to reform the police and obtain dual prosecution of the
officers represented a moment in Texas Mexican-American and Chicano history when police
violence, institutional racism, and the absence of justice galvanized ethnic Mexicans under an
effective strategy to reform police and seek justice. Two political movements emerged to abolish
discriminatory policies, improve police procedures, diversify the force, and make the department
more sensitive to the minorities they patrol. Obtaining a federal indictment required strategically
pinpointing the discriminatory practices of the law enforcement system that whitewash justice
during the prosecution of ex-officers Terry Denson and Stephen Orlando.
The mobilization efforts for Torres highlighted the discrimination of the Texas lawenforcement system before the nation and displayed tact and cohesion to successfully obtain the
intervention of the federal government after the injustice of the state trial. The following chapter
will examine the threats of violence that were building from within the community during the
aftermath of the state trial. State Representative Ben Reyes warned that disrespect for
law enforcement and dwindling faith in the administration of justice, both at the state and federal
level, were creating an atmosphere of potential violence. If the U.S. District Courts could not
provide relief, he stated “the alternatives left open are not in the best interest of anyone.” 155 He
assured disappointed Mexican Houstonians after the trial that “what little we…have gotten in
Texas in the way of education and voting rights has come through the federal process.” 156 Bigotry
had long denied ethnic Mexicans justice, and it remained a valid concern among the local
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grassroots movement, despite the promise to prosecute Torres’s murderers for civil rights
violations within the U.S. District Court.
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Chapter 5: “Justice for Torres”: The Moody Park Uprising and How it
Triggered Lasting Change in the Law-Enforcement System
On May 7, 1978, only one year after Joe Torres’s death at the hands of five Houston police
officers, a Cinco de Mayo celebration at Moody Park became a scene of an uprising. The
disturbance was said to have started when HPD officers arrived at the park in response to a fight
between two Mexican American men over a woman. The people then turned on the police. Some
attributed the hostility to an increase of anti-police sentiment among the ethnic-Mexican
community since the recent lenient sentencing rendered in the federal trial against four of the
officers responsible for Torres’s death. According to witness J.J. Garcia of Tejas News, the park,
which is located in the barrio of North Side, became a warzone with surges of combat and breaking
moments of silence.1 The leftist newspaper, The Militant, described the neighborhood as under
strong “armed occupation” from the police dressed in SWAT gear and carrying M-16 guns. The
article claimed police intentions were to “stop further protest against killer cops and police
brutality by terrorizing the community.”2 Fifteen-hundred rioters over turned cars, set businesses
on fire, stabbed a news reporter, and hit one police officer with a car. In between the chaos the
crowd chanted and spray painted on the walls “Justice for Torres.”3
Mexican-American activists and city officials accused the grassroots group People United
to Fight Police Brutality (PUFPB) as instigating the Moody Park Uprising, but its leader Travis
Morales felt otherwise. The PUFPB formed after Torres’s body was discovered; throughout the
year it held meetings and organized rallies and demonstration to unite all people to demand justice
for Torres.4 Demonstrations by PUFPB were declared by LULAC to be “parades and fanfares.” 5
Throughout the year, the group was isolated from the larger mobilized efforts carried out between
1
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political, civil, and social Mexican-American organizations. LULAC and other organizations
minimized the agitations building within the community, while it strategically planned for federal
intervention. The Moody Park Uprising was an example of a community empowering itself in the
aftermath of injustice. This chapter will explore the moments of tensions between policecommunity relations and the court trials for Torres that made the Moody Park Uprising possible.
Unlike past histories, this examination of the Moody Park Uprising shows that the event
was a result of actions that occurred over time and resulted in Mexican American efforts to
continue their struggle for police reform and civil rights.6 While Travis Morales failed to unite
ethnic-Mexican Houstonians under the PUFPB, tensions within local and grassroots organizations
had been building since the state trial. In addition, efforts by Mexican-American political, civil,
and social organizations had been dissipating and their influence over police reform was waning.
The weak verdict in the federal civil rights trial finally agitated all aspects of the mobilization. U.S.
District Judge Ross Sterling’s sentence informed the state and local efforts that injustice prevailed
at all levels of the law enforcement system. I argue that the grassroots’ discontent displayed at the
Moody Park Uprising gave the Mexican American efforts for Torres renewed viability to continue
their struggle and establish lasting changes within the HPD, local government, and the law
enforcement in general.
Similar to historian Brian Behnken’s observation of the Uprising and the Chicano
movement, this chapter demonstrates that the Mexican-American mobilization for Torres
continued its struggle for rights and the reforms of the law-enforcement system.7 The Moody Park
Uprising reminded activists, the nation, and the HPD that police-community relations were still
6
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broken. Mexican-American leaders used the fuel of the uprising to renew their efforts with the
law-enforcement system and bridge its community relations. After the uprising, the federal
government reevaluated the statewide practice of police brutality and considered dual prosecution
in cases involving killings. Desperate to restore faith in the police and the judicial system, the HPD
and Mayor Jim McConn willingly pacified the community and its leaders with broader police
transparency and reform. Community leaders and organizations were reintegrated as a voice of
minorities within advisory councils and community-oriented policing. By the 1980s, the Houston
Police Department was more diversified and cooperative to fit the communities it protected.
Since the state trial against Terry Denson and Stephen Orlando, Mexican-Americans
leaders of the larger political efforts for Torres were aware that the threat of violence was growing
within locals. Protest at the city level by PUFPB was attributed to subversive “outside” elements
attempting to stir up emotions and violence in the aftermath of the Torres case. 8 LULAC wanted
to prevent “outsiders” from speaking for Houstonians and destroying their work. Shortly before
the trial commenced, railroad tracks were vandalized in ethnic neighborhood of East End near
Club 27, the night club where Torres was arrested before his murder. The name of Jose CamposTorres was written on a nearby wall.9 Also, a bomb was reportedly set off at Buffalo Bayou near
the site where Torres downed. Youths were supposedly responsible for the fire.10 LULAC council
leaders disassociated the organization from the violence, and confirmed to Police Chief Caldwell
that the movement was in no way “involved with the Communists or any wrong doing in our
Mexican Communities.”11 State Representative Ben Reyes viewed these acts as warnings that
lenient sentences for Denson and Orlando could provoke violence among Mexican-American
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Houstonians. He warned “people [in Houston] who are not violent people are saying it’s time we
take the law into our own hands. People are talking about arming themselves [against the
police].”12
To prevent conflict between the police and the community, LULAC and its supporters
campaigned for nonviolence and faith in the judicial process. LULAC separated itself from those
promoting violence in order to prevent the police from questioning or insinuating that the
organization was responsible for the acts.13 After the outcome of the state trial, when the
atmosphere among concerned citizens was most volatile, LULAC maintained its nonviolent
stance. It pleaded with city residents to temper their anger because “violence and lawlessness [did]
not justify more violence and lawlessness.”14 The organization remained adamant in its refusal to
participate in demonstrations to the point that LULAC District Eight refused motions for a march
fearing that the peaceful march could be transformed into a radical riot. Local LULAC councils
offered other avenues to empower the community. A moratorium service was held on Sunday,
October 9th, at St. Joseph’s Church to inform the public of the organization and its efforts.15 A
flier was released that reflected the discourse of unity and called for a unified front of the city’s
brown, black, and whites behind the common cause of justice. Citizens were encouraged to believe
in the judicial system by writing letters to the U.S. Department of Justice to proceed against the
five accused police officers.16
By dissociating the political efforts for Torres from militant demonstrations or violence,
LULAC also distanced itself from the hostilities growing within the Torres family against the law
enforcement system. Margaret Torres, the would be martyr’s mother, was “disgusted” by the
verdict and jury’s sentencing. She publically stated, “If we don’t get justice, we’ll just have to try
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to defend ourselves.”17 Torres’s parents became the first violent protesters to take action against
the police. Only three days after the October 9 verdict, the Torreses were apprehended for resisting
arrest. As the couple was leaving a game room in Houston’s East End, they witnessed a policeman
holding his gun to the head of an eighteen-year-old Mexican-American male. Mr. Torres reminded
the officer of his son’s case to imply that his actions constituted misconduct. He told the officer
that he had “no right to shoot a kid.” In addition, Mrs. Torres called for the youth’s safety, shouting,
“You can’t kill him like you did my son.” In response, the officer use his flashlight to beat Mr.
Torres and wounded his scalp, hairline, and face.18 The action of Torres’s parents demonstrated
that the notoriety of their son’s case did not reform police misconduct. Police misconduct and
abuse of the law was reinforced, if not emboldened, by the sentencing. 19 After this incident, the
PUFPB gained Margaret Torres’s support.
The grassroots organization offered the Torres family and locals a sounding board for their
resentment against police and injustice after the state trail. The PUFPB gained popular support,
because it recognized that Houstonians were “tired of unchecked police brutality and [felt] the
Torres case should not be forgotten.”20 Margaret Torres found in the PUFPB an outlet to protest
injustice. After the state trial, she participated with the group and two hundred demonstrators in a
march upon Moody Park to condemn the lenient sentences and call for a federal investigation. One
week later, they held a demonstration at Moody Park and rallied at City Hall. According to
historian Brian Behnken, Margaret Torres and the PUFPB coordinated marches throughout late
1977 until the HPD formally began the operation of a new Internal Affairs Division (IAD), while
the U.S. Department of Justice indicted the HPD officers involved in Torres’ death.21
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LULAC’s opposition to the PUFPB disconnected the larger mobilization for Torres from
locals’ frustration with the law enforcement system and called for immediate action. Mobilized
political efforts failed to understand that the demonstrators were Houstonians who were expressing
the everyday concerns of the minorities within the ethnic communities. Despite their lack of
political influence, local grassroots organizations held similar tactics and aims as MexicanAmerican organizations; the PUFBP organized “people of all races” under nonviolent
demonstrations and demanded the federal government take immediate action. The main difference
between the PUFBP and LULAC was that it wanted to “fight” to “win some Justice” and “not just
talk or investigate.” To the PUFPB and its supporters, the judicial process could not be relied on
because time was a factor that could dissipate the call for prosecution against killer police
officers.22 The grassroots movement highlighted the mistrust that citizens held toward the law
enforcement system, as well as revealed the larger mobilized efforts disconnection from its
constituents.
In addition to losing some support to the PUFPB, the political mobilization for Torres
reached its lowest point when the HPD refused to support it. Once the state trial released the
officers on suspended sentences, Police Chief Caldwell expressed his willingness to move beyond
the Torres incident to the Wall Street Journal. To him, the whole incident needed to be washed of
all its political and racial rhetoric. As he told the newspaper, “all this case amounts to is five police
officers who made a mistake and were called to account for it…but we had 2,803 officers who
didn't. Even Jesus Christ had an 8% attrition rate with his disciples.” 23 Ironically, accusations of
the HPD’s excessive force continued to climb. From July 1977 to June 1978, the Civil Rights
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Section of the FBI Southern Judicial District received the largest caseload of brutality complaints
from its Houston Field Office than in any other field office in the country. 24 Possibly to keep the
forward looking momentum, Caldwell did not speak of the current breaches in police-community
relations. Whether he informed readers to remember the dangers the department face from violent
attacks by citizens. To him, citizens were equally as dangerous because they assaulted and
threatened police officers in the line of duty.25
By December 1977 the efforts of the two political coalition that mobilized for Torres
dissipated and threaten to disband some organizations or make them ineffective. The Coalition for
Responsible Law Enforcement (CRLE) went defunct from December 1977 to May of 1978. Since
its inception, following the discovery of Torres’s body, the CRLE had failed to be recognized by
the HPD as a representative of the community, which would have allowed its communications
with the police department to be mediated by the Community Relations Service of the U.S.
Department of Justice. With the state trial closed, Police Chief Caldwell broke off meetings with
the CRLE owing to his opinion that the members were “getting into areas of police administration
which they did not understand.” By doing so Chief Caldwell was able prevent any kind of oversight
by federal authorities. The plan worked for the CRS stop trying to mediate communication between
the HPD and the CRLE in March 1978. Thereafter, the CRLE, was essentially moribund.26
With all the momentum for Torres dissipating, local LULAC efforts did not comprehend
the impact the case had on the effectiveness of their efforts for Torres. Unlike the CRLE, LULAC
did receive recognition by Caldwell to be the legitimate representative of the Mexican-American
community. In December 1977, Mayor McConn discussed with LULAC the problems in the ethnic
communities and agreed to establish a Mexican-American Advisory Council to meet with him
monthly. This council was to be made-up of various political, social, and civic organizations from
24
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the minority communities. McConn kept his promise, and District Eight appointed Elis Barrera
and Maria Canfield to the mayor’s council in early January 1978. However, owing to LULAC
members fighting amongst each other, they were unable to decide who would comprise a
committee of community organizations. Mamie García, president of LULAC District Eight
Council, stated “up to this time the Community is broken.”27 Without any organizational structure,
the Mexican-American Advisory Council was defunct by March 1978.28
The low period for the political movement was marked by a decline in support from the
media for federal intervention. After the state trial, newspapers throughout the state questioned the
necessity and constitutionality behind the upcoming federal civil rights trials. According to
LULAC’s president Ruben Bonilla, one Corpus Christi Caller reporter “flip-flopped” from their
initial support for the federal intervention. This reporter indicated a growing sentiment among
Houston citizens of the status quo that the upcoming federal civil rights trial was a constitutional
violation of double jeopardy. To Bonilla, this rhetoric defended and protected the civil rights of
five policemen who deprived Joe Torres of his right to life. He reminded The Caller that the State
of Texas failed to establish civil rights law, thereby, according to Bonilla, there was not “a realistic
state enforcement mechanism that will offer our citizens adequate remedies at law.” A stronger
penal civil rights legislation was needed to protect minorities from police racism.29 Similar to the
HPD, The Caller displayed complacency to the situation and believed that the ex-police officers’
state trial verdicts were sufficient penalty. Anglo Americans were ready to let the Torres case rest.
This low period was defined by an overall wean in progress in police-community relations, then
peaked by the disappointment of the civil rights trial in the U.S. District Courts.
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Before the civil rights trials led to the eruption of the community’s violence, it actually
revived activists’ expectations because it judicially addressed the racist intent of the officers who
violated Torres’s rights. At the trial, the prosecution showed that the defendants Louis Kinney,
Joseph Janish, Stephen Orlando, and Terry Denson violated Torres’s rights by beating him,
resulting in his death. The prosecution also showed that the four ex-officers along with Glen
Brinkmeyer conspired to violate Torres’s rights. Unlike the state trial, the federal civil rights case
highlighted the severity of racism that motivated the officers’ misconduct and subhuman treatment
of the victim. The character testimony admitted against Janish and Denson underlined their racist
leanings. As officers of the law, they often used their power to harass Mexicans for enjoyment.30
Officer Elliot’s testimony of the verbal abuse and harassment Torres endured at the hands of Janish
and Denson pointed to their bigoted attitudes and clearly demonstrated the violation of his civil
rights. Elliot, moreover, testified that Denson, Orlando and Kinney conspired after Torres was
discovered.31
With racism on trial, the Torres family raised its hope for justice. Unlike the state trial, the
civil rights tribunal did not admit negative presumptions of Torres’s Mexican identity to be
juxtaposed against the outstanding white police officers who murdered him. Torres, the person,
was the victim to five officers who overstepped the boundaries of the law to act upon their racism.
The prosecution did gain a successful conviction of Denson, Orlando, Kinney, and Janish in all
the indictments of civil rights violations. For a moment, the guilty conviction of Denson, Orlando,
and Janish at the federal civil rights trial even returned hope of fair justice to Margret Torres. To
her the federal trial was a real trial not influenced by racial boundaries, and she stated to her relief
that “justice had come at last to the family.” The convicted faced a possible maximum sentence of
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life in prison for violating Torres’s rights that lead to his death and conspiracy.32 Justice seemed
likely if activists considered the outcome of Sheriff Frank Hays of Castroville, who was given life
imprisonment for the death of Ricardo Morales in 1977.
Federal District Judge Ross Sterling confirmed that injustice prevailed at all levels of the
law enforcement system. Sterling only sentenced the convicted to one year imprisonment for the
civil rights violation, and a suspended ten year imprisonment sentence for conspiracy to five-years
probation. Sterling claimed his sentences were influenced by the fact that Torres’ murder was a
situational offense the defendants would never encounter again. More importantly, he believed a
long period of confinement for the officers would not deter the real problem, the faulty operation
of the HPD.33 Sterling’s rational showed the prevalence of the “good cop” assumptions within the
courts. The officers were upstanding Anglo Americans who made one mistake with Torres. Their
actions outside of that incident showed general “good faith” making their one legal infraction
almost justifiable before the courts.34 Sterling’s rational for the sentence, however, disregarded the
ethnic diversity of Houston that fostered a very current history of police misconduct toward
African Americans and Mexican Americans. In other words, Torres’s murder was not a one-time
situation but a common occurrence.
In upholding the perception of the good-cop, he showed a resistance to accepting that
Denson and the others were bad cops who intentionally violated Torres’ constitutional rights.35
His decision demonstrated the prevalence of common sense notions of race that gave white officers
undue deference in their judgement over the victim’s civil rights. As a U.S. District Judge, Sterling
should have been informed of the 1976 Supreme Court ruling in Washington v. Davis that ruled
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the constitution only prohibited racism that was intentional.

36

In his lenient sentence, he

overlooked this constitutional statute and allowed intentional racism to prevail in order to release
the officers from accountability in Torres’s death. When LULAC heard of the insufficient
sentence, Bonilla exclaimed “the court has set back the civil rights of Mexican-Americans by 10
years.”37 Judge Sterling’s sentence was a step backward from the progress LULAC had made in
obtaining federal intervention. He informed mobilized efforts to the fact the higher levels of the
judicial system continued to whitewash justice to protect the prevalence of racist sentiment and
misconduct among law enforcement. Sterling’s sentence was the final act that revived efforts on
behalf of justice for Torres and allowed it to continue their struggle against the law enforcement
system.
Mexican Americans and Chicano organization demanded reform at the federal level by
increasing ethnic Mexicans’ representation in federal positions and judgeships. Sterling’s sentence
communicated to the larger mobilized efforts that the state and federal judicial system supported
a broader national racial schema that disempowered Mexican Americans and whitewashed police
brutality. LULAC, P.A.S.O., IMAGE, and the American G.I. Forum issued a joint statement
calling on citizens to bring together the State, Congressional, Judicial, and Executive branches
under a monolithic operation and to ensure a single interpretation of civil rights protection. 38 The
outcome of the federal civil rights trial encouraged all aspects of the mobilized efforts to hold
demonstrations to convey their outrage with the injustice of the Torres incident.
Mamie García organized the protest march and rally to unite the two political movements
and the city’s ethnic enclaves. On April 2, 1978, IMAGE, LULAC, the American G.I. Forum, and
P.A.S.O. coordinated two separate marches that commenced from Moody Park in Northside and
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the other from Magnolia Park in East End. Both marches joined in front of Houston’s City Hall
where protesters rallied their grievances and objection to Judge Sterling’s sentence. 39 Prominent
political figures invited to the demonstration included the Attorney General John Hill,
congressional candidate Mickey Leland, U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy, and Martin Luther King
Junior’s widow, Coretta Scott King.40 The rally received endorsements from Houston native U.S.
Representative Barbara Jordon and Mayor Jim McConn; even Police Chief Caldwell publically
stated that the demonstration would not be censored and the traffic blocked for demonstrators.41
At the rally the 1000 protesters were urged to continue working within the political system,
and collectively go to voting polls to protest police racial violence and to seek new state civil rights
law.42 Bonilla spoke of the power of numbers and how a united Mexican-American political front
could “defeat any candidate in any Texas election.” In embracing the power of the vote, political
organizations were trying to grasp any avenue to reassert power in Mexican Americans at some
level of the government. The speeches, however, were mixed with both anger at the racism still
prevalent in judicial injustice and Chicano leaders’ response toward the injustice of the lawenforcement system. LULAC member Ben Reyes, for instance, called Sterling a “racist
redneck.”43 In their minds the outcome of the federal civil rights trial made clear that racism
continued to pervade the apparatuses of the status quo and reinforce Mexican American
subordination to protect whiteness. This reality was a deep-seeded resentment within the
community that manifested in the anger that was the Moody Park Uprising.
After the collective of Mexican-American group made its statement about the march,
disgruntle citizens also voiced their displeasure with the racial injustice that occurred at the Moody
39
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Park Uprising. PUFPB leader Travis Morales juxtaposed the uprising to the historicity of the Cinco
de Mayo celebration. Normally an occasion that remembered Mexican peoples’ defeat of French
oppressors, Morales stated it now represented a day “when thousands of people black, brown and
white stood up to the police who invaded their communities in full riot gear.” After the uprising,
State Representative Ben Reyes accused the group of being “white outside agitators.” Morales
retorted that, “After years and years of oppression, bad living conditions, discrimination and police
brutality…it doesn't take instigators for people to rise up against police invading their
neighborhoods.”44 While the PUFPB did not represent the overall efforts for Torres, it spoke to
the community sentiment that was tired of uncheck police abuse. The reverberations of the
Uprising were heard throughout the nation, and with it, the mobilized efforts gained another
opportunity to struggle for lasting change in the law-enforcement system.
The Moody Park Uprising gave Mexican-American leaders leverage to continue their
campaign to receive government hearings into the state and city-wide practice of police
misconduct against ethnic Mexicans. After the Moody Park Uprising, Houston’s IMAGE,
LULAC, the American G.I. Forum, along with representatives from PADRES of Texas and the
president of Chicano Human Service Workers, requested a hearing with Arthur S. Fleming,
Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Writing that body during the wake of the
Moody Park Uprising on May 12, the organizations stated:
We feel that such hearings will pave the way to restore and ease the tension that exists in the Houston
community and surrounding areas. It is our firm belief that the functions of the Commission in looking into
the denial of equal protection of the law under the administration of justice will be beneficial in providing
the solution and answers that linger in the minds of the Hispanic community and in the community in
general.45

The movement called for a hearing because it needed the federal government to see the problem
and help rebuild police-community relationships; otherwise, the administration of justice would
continue to be unequal. To bring home the prevalence of the practice of misconduct statewide,
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Ruben Sandoval prepared a list of 15 incidents involving the killing of ethnic-Mexican men while
in police custody across eleven Texas counties since November 1976. Included in the list was the
facts that only three of the incident received state action and two received federal action.46
The coalition’s request proved effective, and within the month, both federal and state
agencies conducted hearings to improve police professional standards. The U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights conducted public hearings in Houston from June 12-13, 1978.47 The federal agency
based its decision to investigate Houston because of the number of publicized incidence of police
misconduct and federal investigation, including the Torres, Joyvies, and Webster case. The
community dissatisfaction displayed in the Moody Park Uprising made the Commission concerned
to “the possibility that police-community relations could become a source of wider public violence
in Houston” such as in the urban violence of the 1960s. Houston became part of a national study
on police practices that examined the “context of institutional mechanism which encourage or
discourage misconduct and complaint reconciliation.” In other words, the commission would
determine how to modify the current law-enforcement system to minimize abuse and protect the
right to due process.48
In addition, the Texas legislature created the Texas Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relation to improve cooperation among all levels of government in addressing
the state problem of police professionalism. This commission formed the Committee on
Professional Standards for Local Law Enforcement Officers, which included Houston Mayor Jim
McConn.49 Its primary charge was to consider possible actions by the state that could improve
police professional standards and the protection of individual rights in interactions with police.
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Hearings were conducted in Houston, Dallas and San Antonio in 1978.50 The committee’s hearing
at the University of Houston Downtown Campus on June 16, 1978 covered topics regarding the
feasibility of psychological testing, changes in civil service law, and modifications in state law
with regard to professional police standards.51 Their discussions considered community leaders’
complaints that police needed to be scrutinized appropriately for its problem in professionalism to
prevent law enforcement abuse and improve cooperation among all levels of government.
On June 23, 1978, President Jimmy Carter met with twenty-three Mexican-American
leaders in Houston to reassure them that the federal government would investigate the national
practice of police brutality toward ethnic Mexicans. Present at the meeting was Hector Garcia of
Harris County’s P.A.S.O., Judge Felix Salazar, John Castillo, attorney John J. Herrera, State
Representative Ben Reyes, and Dr. Hector Garcia, founder of American G.I. Forum. These
prominent leaders addressed open cases that needed federal attention, such as the Santos Rodríguez
incident from 1973. Carter informed those in attendance that, “the Department of Justice had
opened for investigation 192 cases of police brutality of Mexican Americans, 50 of which were in
Texas.”52 Carter holding the meeting in Houston demonstrates that the Moody Park Uprising
reverberated to the top of the federal government. Possibly afraid the violence of Houston would
carry across the state, Carter reassured the community that the federal government recognized the
statewide practice of street justice upon ethnic Mexicans. He offered solace to pacify leaders and
maintain the minority support for his administration.
The movements’ threat to mobilize the vote caused enough concern that the president had
Deputy U.S. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti visit Houston to commence talks to repair
police-community relations. In November 1978, Civiletti visited Dallas and Houston because, as
50
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he told the Austin American-Statesmen, “feelings of hate, fear and frustration toward law
enforcement officers have become a sore point for an administration anxious to blaze a trial for
human rights at home as well as abroad.”53 In Houston, he spoke with law-enforcement officers
about barriers that create tensions in community relations like language barriers, profiling, and
deadly force.54 The U.S. Department of Justice established a community relations office in
Houston to encourage cooperation between the community and local and state police.55 This
federal agency began operation in January 1979 and specifically handled conflicts between
minorities and law enforcement officials. The community relations office was an avenue to aid in
rebuilding community trust and relations with the police force. It was made permanent despite
Chief Caldwell’s opposition to it.56
In addition, Civelitti suggested to community leaders to pull away from the federal
intervention and exhaust local and state channels to solve their civil rights problems. According to
Civiletti, it was not “sound or wise to exclusively focus on an outside force as the sole remedy.”
He encouraged Mexican-American leaders to establish better communication with the Justice
Department. Attorney Sandoval was most outspoken against seeking help from local and state law
enforcement for justice. He stated, “I’m tired of state action that is not adequate action, I'm tired
of local action that is inadequate.”57 For Sandoval, federal intervention became a forceful weapon
that could check state and local prejudiced and malpractice.58 Some Mexican-American leaders
were persuaded by Civiletti’s suggestion and refocused their efforts to utilize state and local
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avenues to reform the Texas Penal Code, especially in the aftermath of the convicted officers’
appeals process.
The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling showed that the federal process remained equally
ineffective and as whitewashed as the state courts. The legality of Judge Ross Sterling’s suspended
sentences for conspiracy was brought before two separate appeal panels in 1979. According to
U.S. Criminal Code, a prison term was required for a felony conviction carrying a life term. The
Court of Appeals had to decide if Sterling’s sentence should be thrown out as illegal and if he
should be forced to resentence the convicted officers.59 Both hearings highlighted the judicial
system’s persistent conflicted stance when it came to mediating on police accountability and racist
misconduct. The first appeal panel called in February 1979 overlooked the illegality of the sentence
out of concern the resentencing would be too great a hardship on the defendants. The panel shed a
positive image on the convicted officers, whom they held to be excellent candidates for probation
because of their “impeccable” records.60 The second Court of Appeals panel of fifteen judges met
in October 1979 and rejected the suspended sentences and called for Sterling to resentence the
officers. Sterling complied by adding only a one-day prison sentence for the charge of conspiracy
to the existing one-year prison sentence for civil rights violation.61
The Court of Appeals were the final legal recourse available to obtain justice for Torres,
with this avenue failing to offer a punitive remedy, mobilized efforts gained affirmation to redirect
their attention to reforming state law to ensure that it be more effective in the prosecution of police
misconduct. Leaders organized to amend the Official Oppression Law in Section 39.02 of the
Texas Penal Code to be more in line with the federal civil rights statute, section 242 of title 18. In
February 1979, LULAC’s Ruben Bonilla joined with the Department of Justice and the law
enforcement community to create the Steering Committee on Texas Law Enforcement and
59

“Justice Dept. Argues Probation for 3 in Torres Case ‘Illegal,’” Houston Chronicle, November 11, 1978,
vertical file HMRC.
60 Pete Wittenberg, “Torres Case Sentence Stand despite Illegality, Courts Says,” Houston Post, February
6, 1979, vertical file, HMRC.
61 “Ex-officers Get Year and Day in Re-Sentencing,” Houston Chronicle, October 30, 1979, vertical file
HMRC.

143

Community Relations. It called for amending the state penal code, making it unnecessary for
prosecutors to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer intended to kill the victim.
Proof that the victims’ civil rights were violated resulting in damage, injury or death would
suffice.62 Similarly, Representative Ben Reyes and Craig Washington (a representative of the black
constituency of South Houston) introduced the Reyes-Washington bill to upgrade the Official
Oppression law from a misdemeanor to a felony offense.63
Mexican-American activists learned from the legal barriers that prevented police
accountability, and they acted upon Civelitti’s suggestion to exhaust local and state channels in
solving their civil rights concerns. In order to use state channels, leaders realized that the language
of the Texas Penal Code needed to be reform to make civil rights offenses punishable among peace
officers. Not until later, did State Senator Jack Ogg of Houston get bill S.546 to pass the House of
Representatives making it a criminal offense for peace officers, jailers, and prison guards to violate
the civil rights of persons in custody. It also upgraded such offenses to a second-degree felony if
serious bodily harm occurred, or a first-degree felony if the violation resulted in death.64
In addition, Civelitti’s advice to Mexican-American leaders to establish better
communication with the local police renewed activists’ efforts to repair relations with the HPD.
Upon his visit, Civelitti observed the wedge in police-community relations and communications.
He said, “Perhaps that [sic] needs more to be between the police and the community rather than
between you and me…It looks simply like a matter of communication.”65 His observation pointed
to the decline in relations between the police chief and Mexican-American leaders. For instance,
Chief Caldwell had made a half-hearted effort after the uprising to reestablish relations with
Chairman Hector García of CRLE to restructure the coalition under the Police Advisory
Committee.66 The CRLE and the Houston Council on Human Relations joined efforts under an ad
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hoc Proposal Committee to develop an advisory panel to the mayor and police chief in regards to
police-community relations; it would also be a sound board for the community attitudes and
concerns.67 Although Mayor McConn and Police Chief Caldwell appeared enthusiastic about the
request for a Police Advisory Committee, they failed to follow-up until one year later. 68 Civelitti
noticed in his visit that police-community relations had stalled since the Moody Park Uprising.
Following the failure of the appeals process, and the exhaustion of avenues for federal
intervention, mobilized efforts for Torres worked to reestablish their communication with the HPD
and act as the bridge in community relations. The Houston Chronicle reported that Ben Reyes
believed the event marked, “the beginning of a new multifaceted leadership emerging with a lot of
different people taking on a lot of the efforts.”69 What was apparent was that the two political
mobilized efforts for Torres that once organized under El Concilio de la Raza continued to band
together to reestablish ties to local police and government agencies. Through the period of the
appeals process, these organizations once again formed a unified front and served on councils
established by the police chief and the mayor. On May 10, 1979 the mayor and chief agreed to
institute the “Police Advisory Committee for Continued Improvement.” This committee of fifteen
Houston organizations included representatives from IMAGE, the Houston Council on Human
Relations, and LULAC.70
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Mayor Jim McConn also reactivated the Mexican-American Advisory Council that had
been defunct since early 1978.71 Unlike its first incarnation, which failed because LULAC could
not identify organizations that represented the community, the reactivated council had more
structure that would enable it to carry out ambitious programs and work directly with the mayor.
The new committee consisted of 12 representatives from Houston's Mexican American and
Hispanic groups.72 It included the main organizations that comprised the Torres movement and El
Concilio, as well as the Mexican American Bar Association, Hispanic Chamber of Commerce,
Mexican Chamber of Commerce, Mexican American Precinct Judge, and the Houston Association
of Mexican American Educators.73 The large coalition had the responsibility of advising Mayor
McConn on issues of concern to the Mexican American and Hispanic communities and assist in
determining remedies and solutions for the communities’ problems. They also gave advice on
appointments for political position, boards, and commissions. The Mexican-American Advisory
Council would share pertinent information resulting from meetings with Mayor McConn and
communicate community concerns directly to members of City Council and other City officials.
By May 1979, the Council was awaiting its second meeting with the Mayor.74
Mexican-American mobilization also took on a more grassroots agenda, indicating a
transition in their approach to be more responsive to communities’ concerns. According to the
Houston Chronicle, LULAC District Eight President Mamie García moved the organization away
from conservative paths to taking on more basic “problems like police brutality, drug abuse, and
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unemployment.”75 García was hired in 1978 as the first civilian liaison between the chief of police
and the community. She was active in the minority communities throughout the Torres incident
and police trials to make sure another such incident would not occur in Houston.76 She saw herself
as a community servant, or representative, acting on their behalf. As she exclaimed to the public,
“the police department in Houston is the first of the nation, to have civil Mexican American
working with the Chief of Police. This is our position. This is the principle. We are making
history.” García considered her role as a liaison difficult because the HPD was still stuck in its past
mentality and disliked outsiders. She believed that the department would especially dislike her,
because she was not scared of it.77 García, as a direct mediator between the HPD and the
community, would be a tool to mend tensions and restore trust between the ethnic Mexican
community and their city police.
García position, however, also pointed to the HPD’s new direction toward communityoriented policing. This method of policing grew from the neighborhood watch system of the 1960s,
it promoted personal contact between police officers and individual citizens on the street.78
According to the post-Miranda scholar Police Chief Edward Flynn of Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
police practices like random patrols seldom made people feel safe, foot patrols helped people feel
safer regardless if it directly had an effect on crime.79 Community-oriented policing was
undergirded by civic outreach and residents’ knowledge of any unchecked disorder to enable
officers to respond to criminal activity more quickly.80 In order to fully implement such a model,
the department needed to reestablish its relations to the community. As liaison, García aided Police
Chief Caldwell in reestablishing communication with the neighborhood through the local bi-
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lingual paper, El Mexica. Starting in 1979, García published a weekly column, Del Escritorio of
Mamie García, to make the HPD more transparent for the community.
She used her weekly column to help ease ethnic Mexicans’ anxieties that were brought on
by the HPD’s increased presence in their midst. Community-oriented policing involved having
lawmen interact with residents in their neighborhoods.81 Part of the problem with the old models
of policing were the lack of regular contact with citizen that created estrangement between police
and the communities they served. Since the community had been left out of the planning process
in the past, minority citizens became wary of police invading their community.82 Citizens felt
police neither knew nor cared about their issues with crime.83 The HPD forced more personal
interaction with the community by delivering a service, not law enforcement, to forge a
relationship.84
García highlighted the various community service events police participated within the
minority neighborhoods to smooth this transition. On one occasion, sergeants and the police chief
held a celebration at a school that involved students and was well attended by the community.85
HPD officers also attended the LULAC National Convention, a familial event attended by the
community and assisted by over 200 youths.86 Readers learned that the HPD celebrated Easter
Sunday in 1979 at the Ripley House. The Ripley House was a larger project that Police Chief
Caldwell implemented to encourage recruitment and general community relations in 1977. The
Ripley Civic Center was located in the ethnic enclave of End East and offered officers basic
training in the Spanish language,87 while a full-time police officer was stationed in the minority
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community to increase recruitment and general community relations.88 Police Chief Caldwell
indicated his continued support for this neighborhood initiative, which he made with LULAC, by
holding the HPD’s Easter event at the Ripley House. It was a Charreada, a block party, opened to
the public and where the HPD took horses for the children. 89
García helped Police Chief Caldwell develop an image as an advocate of the ethnicMexican people, who was ready to build relations and mend the past. On May 3, 1979, nearly one
year after the Moody Park Uprising, she reported that Caldwell attended Cinco de Mayo festivities
at the park. Rather than violence erupting, participants played baseball and Caldwell served as
pitcher.90 Caldwell also worked to foster statewide connects with LULAC and attended a
symposium organized by state director Ruben Bonilla. In attendance were over 300 chiefs of police
from Texas and other localities.91 To close the gap between the chief and the community, García
emphasized to her readers that they could write Caldwell to thank him for his work, or if they
wanted to change in the community.92 Caldwell was even named an honorary member of the
Mexican community.93
García’s weekly column emphasized the changes within the department that made it more
capable to meet the needs of the community; however, Houston Mexicans needed to be active in
their own crime prevention. She informed the community that the HPD translated their crime
prevention literature into Spanish, and they should read it to educate themselves on police
misconduct.94 Seven bilingual officers also composed part of the dispatch division, their charges
were to help with crime scenes or juvenile problems.95 She claimed the ethnic-Mexican officers
on the force were highly trained to assist in community issues and empathize with it.96 In order for
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community-oriented policing to unfold, the former needed to respond to the sensitivity training
and assist the latter in crime prevention. After a string of robberies and home invasions, García
wrote, “I have observed during my time that I have worked with the Police Department, that it
takes a lot to help the Hispanic community.”97 She challenged the community to stop asking “Why
doesn’t the HPD hire Mexican Americans?” Rather, she believed that Houston Hispanics should
encourage men and women of good morals and aptitude from the larger community to join the
force.98 García’s proposition emphasized the assistance of the community, so it could not only stop
being a victim to crime but also help the HPD prevent it by working together.99
Lastly, García encouraged citizens to understand the operations of the police, thereby,
making the department more transparent and empowering her constituents to know their rights.
She informed Mexican-American readers who were victims to assault, violence (rape), and
homicide to call the police, make a report, and save their evidence.100 In addition, she outlined
procedure that followed pressing charges for domestic violence,101 and she explained the dispatch
division’s routine when sending a patrol car to a crime scene.102 To build community trust in police
responsiveness, she assured readers that the police will actively address their report and all
divisions would work together.103 More importantly, she let readers know what to expect when
being arrested. In the series called the “Procedure of Arrest of the Houston Police Department,”
García listed the reasons a person could be arrested and what offenses could result in either being
held at the station or being jailed.104 Discussed also was the procedure of placing someone in jail
once they have been convicted, the steps leading to incarceration, and the process of being
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released. In a later article, García explained the arrest authority given by the state to the officer.105
By encouraging citizens to understand the operations of the police, García made the department’s
limitations transparent and encouraged the community to know their rights.
As the liaison, García became an essential instrument for the HPD in the adoption of certain
aspects of community-oriented policing. The department employed her to reach out to the public
in order to gather their concerns. García in turn demonstrated the HPD’s willingness to be more
helpful to the community in addressing their issues. Her updates were instrumental in helping the
neighborhoods feel they could exert informal social control over disorder and redevelop trust in
the local police.106 By 1982, when Police Chief Lee Brown was appointed, changes within the
department and the various components of the public it served contributed to a positive, healthy,
productive relationships with many representatives of the community, even where the Moody Park
Uprising occurred.107
The end of Caldwell and McConn’s leadership signaled a new phase marked by the
department moving away from its past and creating a more responsive law-enforcement agency.
By January 1980, Caldwell’s role as Police Chief had been tarnished by the public fallout regarding
the killings of Joe Torres, Keith Joyvies, and Randall Webster, as well as other instances of police
brutality and corruption allegations. In addition, Caldwell could not adequately address the issue
of minority promotions. The HPD still did not reflect the demographics of the community it served.
By 1981 the city’s African Americans accounted for 27 percent of the population, while Hispanics
mushroomed to 17 percent of the total populace. The increased ethnic diversity caused major
problems between the police and the citizenry. In February 1980, Caldwell tendered his
resignation. Similarly, Mayor McConn was criticized by the City Council for not defending the
Houston’s interest before the state legislature and viewed him as weak and lethargic. 108 The next
105

“Del Escritorio of Mamie Garcia,” El Mexica, October 4, 1979; “Del Escritorio of Mamie Garcia,” El
Mexica, October 11, 1979; “Del Escritorio of Mamie Garcia,” El Mexica, November 8, 1979, El Mexica, HMRC,
HPL, RG D 020.
106 Flynn, "Miranda and the Evolution of Policing," 112.
107 Brown, “Police Use of Deadly Force,” WRC.
108 Watson, Race and Houston Police, 132, 135.

151

mayor selected the first African-American police chief. He built off of Mamie García’s foundation
of community-oriented policing enabling him to effect lasting change in the HPD during the 1980s.
The leadership of Mayor Kathy Whitmire in 1982 ushered in a shift from the traditional
police system to a new era of leadership and policing under Police Chief Lee Brown. His
appointment as chief defied the HPD systematic practice of nepotism. According to historian
Dwight Watson, Mayor Whitmire’s decision to appoint the city’s first African American as chief
illustrated the growing political clout of the two most conservative factions in Houston’s
government: the police and the city council. Dr. Brown was from outside the department and not
connected to the past. Mayor Whitmire believed that Dr. Brown would instill the department with
leadership, direction, and focused management.109 Brown had been chief in Atlanta, Georgia
where he implemented a program of community-oriented policing.110 He was also an educated
man with a Ph.D. in criminology. His scholarship demonstrated an understanding that police
culture must reflect what the department believes as an organization. He understood that the HPD’s
subculture fostered a view of excessive force as an acceptable way of resolving conflict.111 His
formalization of community-oriented policing implemented long-lasting change in the department
and began a great transformation in the relationship between law enforcement and the city’s
residents.112
As Police Chief, Dr. Brown instilled a new police culture that was undergirded by the
discourse of due process and democratic principles. The break-down of confidence in law
enforcement displayed at the Moody Park Uprising signaled “the department's relationship with
many of its citizens was damaged. The general safety of the community was suffering as a result.113
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The new police culture fell in line with the ideology of community-oriented policing and public
service. As servants to the public, officers would “preserve and advance the principles of
democracy.” Brown held the police “must not only respect but also protect the rights guaranteed
to

each

citizen

by

the

Constitution.”

Police

would

be

“living

expressions”

of

a democratic government, whom enter into a contractual arrangement with society that relied on
the highest level of trust. Police authority would come directly from the consent of those being
policed. If an officer failed to uphold the “highest standards of integrity” on the preservation of
human life, the police department would be held accountable. No longer would practices of street
justice, like the code of silence, be allowed to create divisions within police-community relations.
Accountability meant responsiveness to the problems and needs of citizens.114
The HPD was among one of the first large urban departments to implement communityoriented policing and shift from traditional practices that had fostered a reactive system that was
incident driven and offered no informational support to the community or organizational
planning.115 The officer’s role was as a “crime fighter” and “crime prevention specialist.”116
Traditional policing also required a strong supervisory role for management to maintain control.117
Between the years of 1983 - 1986, the HPD participated in a number of projects designed to close
the gap between the tradition value system and the cultural value system required in communityoriented policing.118 The Proactive Planning Program introduced officers to crime analysis and
proactive tactics that would be driven by event planning.119 In the Fear Reduction project, the HPD
participated with Newark, New Jersey to implement a number of strategies to reduce the fear of
crime. The program Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) assigned officers to a particular
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neighborhood to conduct profiling and learn as much as possible about his/or her assigned beat.120
All these projects helped Police Chief Brown further the HPD’s development and allow it to offer
service and delivery in a more personal manner.
These programs helped Police Chief Brown shift the HPD from focusing on arrest and
disorderly behavior to the service-delivery area that made police responsible to learn the causes of
instability in neighborhoods. The Proactive Planning program helped police quell disorder and
stabilize neighborhoods to make them more resistant to serious crime.121 The Fear Reduction
Program increase coordination and specialization of police,122 so they can have “total
involvement…in improving the police relationship with the community.”123 Under this program,
officers are first trained as community organizers and then placed into the community to determine
residents’ issues and how the city government could offer resources to solve those concerns. 124
These programs encouraged pre-determination of the needs of a community to help
implement tactics that could alleviate crime in the neighborhoods.125 The appearance of policecommunity storefronts helped “bring police services to each area based on its particular
needs.” Eventually the department opened up 16 community storefronts strategically located in
minority neighborhoods. DART transformed the role of the officer into “the old cop on the beat
who knew the people in the area he patrolled and was an integral part of the community.” It was
incrementally applied to all parts of the city by 1987.126 In effect, officers also “began to develop
an appreciation for the citizens’ concerns as did the citizens become more knowledgeable of what
the officers could and could not do.”127
120 Fear-reduction strategies included the opening of police community storefronts, the creation of a
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Furthermore, community-oriented policing gave citizens a proactive role in police
relations. Brown held that no longer would police “isolate themselves from the community and
not allow citizens the opportunity to work with them.” Police and the community would share
responsibility, thereby, sharing power. Brown put into place the Police and Citizen Contract
Program (PACC). It developed “collective action that involves both the police and the citizenry”
by underlining “specific agreements from parties to do certain things.” Brown understood that
mobilized efforts for Torres, in seeking federal intervention, developed “an attitude where every
decision about community well-bring is determined by the government.” The PACC was designed
to help citizens move from making demands on the government in regards to police agencies and
the totality of their welfare. The contract program would make citizens more directly involved and
responsible in the alleviation of crime in their neighborhoods. Citizens’ knowledge would be the
essential piece to helping the department solve crimes.128
By the mid-1980s, Police Chief Brown’s new programs changed the face of the HPD and
diversified its composition and practice to fit the communities it served. Chief Brown implemented
a new management system that decentralized the police system among nine facilities, a central
police facility, and eight store front police substations.129 Reorganizing the force required more
units which expanded the number of supervisory positions. In 1974, under the Police Chief’s Bond,
the HPD only had 4 sergeants or lieutenants, because the traditional model required management
to have strong supervision and be control oriented. The force under Chief Brown created a
management system with 53 sergeants, 8 lieutenants and 2 captains.130 Decentralizing operations
made policing a “team effort.”131 The new substations bridged communication with the
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neighborhood by holding monthly meetings with the community and performing citizen outreach
programs.132
The hiring of more minority officers transformed the HPD’s traditional composition into
one that better represented the communities they served. In 1974 Hispanic only comprised 5
percent of the total force, this new model ensured that by 1988 they made-up 11 percent of the
HPD. Some of these officers formed the Chicano Squad to investigate rising homicide rates
involving Hispanics. In 1987 it was acclaimed for its excellence and professionalism in helping
the department have a high clearance rate in the number of cases they solve. Similarly, Brown
formed the Cantina Squad in 1985 as a result of the high homicide rate involving undocumented
aliens and alcohol-related violence in Hispanic taverns.133 So great were the HPD’s changes visà-vis the ethnic-Mexican community that according to the Houston Post, Mayor Kathy Whitmire
in 1987 was ready to “shed the frontier-justice image [the HPD] had acquired in the 1970s with
the Torres case and other revelations of civil rights violation by Houston Police.” She and the City
Council offered the Torres family two $75,000 payments, to his mother and grandmother, in lieu
of the $2.7 million law suit Torres’s father made against the city in 1978.134 The settlement implied
a closure to an era of police brutality, injustice, and racism that pervaded the law enforcement
system in Houston.
This chapter examined the Moody Park Uprising as an event resulting from injustices that
had occurred over time and once it occurred regenerated Mexican-American efforts to continue
their struggle for police reform and civil rights.135 Tensions within local and grassroots
organizations had been building since the state trial of the officers involved in the Torres case. To
prevent conflict between the police and the community, LULAC and its supporters campaigned
for nonviolence and faith in the judicial process. By separating the political efforts for Torres from
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militant demonstrations, LULAC distanced itself from the hostilities growing within the
community against the law enforcement system. Simultaneously, the dissipation of the MexicanAmerican political and social organizations’ strength weakened their influence upon police reform.
The weak verdict in the federal civil rights trial finally agitated all aspects of the
mobilization and regenerated the Mexican-American political action for Torres. U.S. District
Judge Ross Sterling’s sentence informed all those involved that injustice prevailed at all levels of
the law enforcement system. The discontent among political efforts and grassroots groups led to
demonstrations that expressed their anger with racial injustice. The display of grassroots discontent
at the Moody Park Uprising gave Mexican-American efforts for Torres renewed viability to
continue the struggle against the law-enforcement system. Desperate to restore faith in the police
and the judicial system, federal, state, and local agencies were willing to investigate the concerns
of mobilized efforts against the practice of police brutality toward Mexican Americans.
After the uprising, the federal government reevaluated the state-wide practice of excessive
force and considered dual prosecution in cases involving killings. Leaders from MexicanAmerican organization used the fuel of the uprising to renew their efforts with the law enforcement
system through the Police Advisory Council and the Mexican-American Council. Mamie García
helped transition the community and police toward a model of community-oriented policing. As
liaison, she helped Police Chief Caldwell institute police transparency in an effort to rebuild
community relations. She set the foundation for Police Chief Brown to implement communityoriented policing. By the 1980s, efforts for Torres and reforms by Police Chief Brown changed
the face of the Houston Police Department, diversifying it and helping it meet the needs of the
communities it served.
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Conclusion
On the night of August 28, 2015, a white forty-seven-year-old Harris County Sherriff’s
Deputy Darren Goforth was fueling his patrol car in Cypress, an upper-middle class neighborhood
in northwest Houston, when he was ambushed by gun fire. Shannon Miles, a thirty-year-old
African American, shot the officer 15 times, ensuring his death. According to Harris County
Sheriff Ron Hickman, the attack on Goforth was “clearly unprovoked.” He stated, “Our
assumption is that he (Goforth) was a target because he wore a uniform.” Miles had a ten-year
criminal record that included resisting arrest, disorderly conduct with a firearm, and evading
detainment. At least one of those seizures were the result of violence toward the apprehending
officers.136 This shooting occurred against the backdrop of the nationwide “Black Lives Matter”
movement that formed after the police killing of a Black youth, Michael Brown, in Ferguson,
Missouri, as well as the recent protest following Sandra Bland’s suspicious death, three days after
her arrest for a traffic violation, in a county jail 50 miles northwest of Houston.
Sheriff Hickman believed that the heightened national tension over the treatment of blacks
by police influenced Miles’s crime. Possibly fearful that the recent anti-police movement could
perpetuate more violence, he exclaimed, “We’ve heard Black Lives Matter, All Lives Matter.
Well, cops’ lives matter, too.”137 As the nation struggled against white police officers’ excessive
force toward African Americans, Goforth’s death invoked a city legacy of police reform and
community mobilization. Kathleen Goforth, the deceased deputy’s wife, told a local television
station that her husband was “ethical; the right thing to do is what guided his internal compass.”138
In other words, he was an officer who respected the civil rights of the people he protected and
complied with due process procedures. In fact, many citizens in Houston united in support of their
local law enforcement agencies. Two weeks after the death of Deputy Goforth, Houstonians
coordinated their first “Blue Lives Matter” march. Marchers wore blue shirts that read “Police
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Lives Matter,” and their banner invoked a discourse of citywide unity that stated “Undivided we
march.”139
As this study has shown, the Bayou City’s citizens of various racial and ethnic groups have
rarely united in support of their local law enforcement, thus this gathering was significant. Scholars
of Houston’s history have demonstrated that the constraints of race and racism caused contentious
police-community relations. Much of the literature portrays the role of the HPD in the Jim Crow
Era as a mechanism of the status quo unyielding in its dedication to maintain racial subordination
and separation despite social change, until the Joe Torres controversy reformed the racist policies
of the law-enforcement system. Building upon this historiography, “Racial Injustice in Houston,
Texas: The Mexican-American Mobilization against the Houston Police Killing of Joe Campos
Torres,” has highlighted the long-term relations of the police and the community to locate the
moment when policing Jim Crow racialized and oppressed ethnic Mexicans. As such, this study
has examined Mexican-American efforts for Torres as influenced by the history of the HPD’s
protection of white supremacy since the 1930s. With this in mind, rather than view the mobilization
for Torres exclusively as an effort that grew out of the oppression of police violence of the 1960s,
I hold that this movement illuminated a much older history of Mexican Houstonians living with
police racism, discrimination, and injustice that finally transitioned their actions into a successful
strategy for the reform of the HPD by the late 1970s.
My investigation of Houston’s police-community relations focused on the racial
criminalization of ethnic Mexicans across four decades from the 1930s to the early 1970s. To shed
light on how conflict in police-community relations unfolded over time, I analyzed four different
models of policing among the Houston Police Department that reinforced white supremacy and
repressed the ethnic-Mexican community. The HPD implemented these different models to
respond to societal concerns of juvenile delinquency and civil unrest during the Civil Rights Era,
but the practice of over arrest, profiling, and abuse criminalized the ethnic community. While the
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ethnic-Mexican activists I studied found their voice excluded in the patrolling of their communities
by the 1950s, my analysis revealed how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Supreme Court ruling
of Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona gave them the judicial and legal tools necessary to
struggle against police discrimination and violence. Thus, I argued that the 1977 police murder of
Joe Torres represented a culmination of police discrimination and lawlessness over three decades
that had racialized people, oppressed the community, and blocked activists from investigating
discriminatory police practices. My exploration demonstrated that the history of police-community
relations informed mobilized efforts for Torres and allowed it to mature into a successful
movement that played a vital part in the reformation of the Texas law-enforcement system.
Chapter one argued that the implementation of the 1943 Juvenile Court Act allowed a new
bicultural generation of activists and citizens to reverse negative criminal perceptions of their race
and work directly with law enforcement to (re)claim their place within white society. Until 1930,
the whiteness of ethnic Mexicans was protected. The Great Depression, however, engendered an
anti-immigrant movement that racialized them as un-American. Consequently for the first time
Houston ethnic-Mexicans experienced dispossession as deportations and formalized tactics within
the law-enforcement system contested their whiteness. Mexican Americans understood their
ethnicity was being racialized as nonwhite and that the status quo increasingly “Jim Crowed” them
within culture and society. Juvenile delinquency among Mexican-American zoot-suiters and gangs
in the 1940s enabled youth movements to define their American identity and helped them gain
autonomy, which in turn was used to defend their neighborhoods against cultural hegemony and
oppressive systemic racism perpetrated by law enforcement measures. For youths, pachuquismo
was a counter-hegemonic discourse of contestation that encouraged them to stand against the racist
depictions of ethnic Mexicans and the discrimination they witnessed as children or youths in the
1930s. The zoot-suit phenomenon, however, threatened to isolate young people as criminals and
un-American, and city law enforcement officials looked toward Los Angeles to sensationalize the
crime wave and bring heavy handed tactics upon them.
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The enactment of the 1943 Juvenile Court Act helped Houston police officers and activists
to forge better ties between their community and law enforcement. The city and state’s fear of
delinquency among white youths pushed this legislation. White juveniles were deemed “semidelinquents,” who were not bad enough to be processed in the desegregated jail and prison system.
Consequently, the practice of Civil Guardianship was initiated in the Juvenile Court Act and
resulted in police officers being made into social workers and brought back the integrity of
whiteness in a wartime society. In addition, the terms of Civil Guardianship began a period of
amicable police-community relations, which led to the creation of the Latin-American division in
1942. This entity demonstrated law enforcement’s willingness to include at least a few officers of
Mexican descent in the patrolling of their communities. In addition, police, as social workers, were
encouraged to serve youth in ethnic communities by working directly with civic-betterment
groups. Ethnic-Mexican community leaders in return were permitted to incorporate their notions
of Americanism within the methods of the city’s law enforcement. This legislation empowered
Mexican-American activists to control and mediate the patrolling of their community, which
resulted in reversing the derogatory image of youths and decreased crime.
Juvenile delinquency and gang activity was yet again the topic of Chapter two, as the
increase of it among ethnic-Mexican youths during the 1950s led law-enforcement officials to
perpetuate racial perceptions of the group as a whole and led to contentious relations with this
community. Delinquency was a city-wide problem among all juveniles, including white youths. It
stemmed from the Second World War’s disruption of family life and the premature adult
subculture that grew in its aftermath. Houston’s status quo redirected its attention to ethnicMexican delinquents, whom they believed defied society’s norms, were vicious in nature, and held
complete disregard for the authority of law and order. Their misbehavior caused white society to
fear delinquency and demand protection. Law-enforcement officials responded by shifting their
strategy from the social worker model of Civil Guardianship to a larger war-on-crime model.
As this chapter showed, the HPD’s new discriminatory tactics associated ethnic-Mexican
youths with crime and in the process not only racialized them, but the community as a whole. The
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war on juvenile delinquency marked a new level of heavy-handed police methods, because the
law-enforcement system was transformed into a preventive force that would restore order to the
status quo. With the help of city officials and the media, police gained approval for special units
and dragnets to control youths. Their pursuits eventually evolved into profiling and more excessive
force. The over arrest rates of ethnic Mexicans appeared to support the city-wide notion of a
“Latin-American Problem” and became a self-fulfilling prophecy. In effect, police-community
relations declined as law enforcement challenged the validity of Mexican-American organizations
to contest their methods. Police also used media to disempower attorney and LULAC member
John J. Herrera from contesting the war on juvenile delinquency. With public outcry suppressed,
law enforcers defended “rough” interrogation procedures as a crucial tool in the War on Crime.140
It also opened the path for Houston police officers to believe their authority was above the law.
The newest police model of due process was examined in chapter three to consider how
lawmen manipulated it during the Second Reconstruction to deny ethnic Mexicans’ civil rights
and forcibly control the pace of social and institutional change.141 The Civil Rights Era signaled
the demise of overt racial discrimination and oppressive police practices, as federal legislation and
Supreme Court rulings ended their coercive behavior and guaranteed procedural due process.
Federal legislation also scrutinized law enforcement to change the atmosphere of civic disorder
that erupted between civilians and the police. Racial segregation was part of Houston society, and
the federal government’s protection of due process and civil rights dismantled the legal structure
that sanctioned discriminatory law enforcement methods. These civil reforms only reinforced the
HPD’s unwillingness to alter attitudes or traditional police practices. The need for crime fighting
officers remained among law enforcement, and the department refused to redefine its authority or
reform its practices for suspects’ rights.
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To reestablish itself as a “thin blue line” that maintained the racial order despite national
reforms, police officers erected an informal patrol model of “street justice” that permitted unlawful
acts of excessive force, harassment, and even the killing of civilians and prisoners to reinforce the
reputation that officers would deal directly with trouble.142 I scrutinized the 1972 Texas Law
Enforcement Handbook to demonstrate how lawmen manipulated due process through the disguise
of the “color of law.” Although police officers’ use of street justice represented the breakdown of
law and order, lawmen seemingly appeared to comply with police procedure through the color of
law which helped make an unlawful arrest, retroactively lawful.143 The practice and acceptance of
street justice in the police subculture helped reaffirm police power to control the ethnic-Mexican
communities with fear of violence, discrimination, and injustice. Moreover, the law-enforcement
system assured police would not be accountable. All these factors created a police department
without legal limitations or respect for individual rights. This misconduct among law enforcement
became the catalyst in the erosion of police-community relations in the late 1970s.
The resurgence of Mexican-American organizations’ quest for civil rights in the late 1970s
was the topic of Chapter four. The death of Joe Torres at the hands of five HPD officers opened a
path for Mexican American and Chicano activists to become a viable voice in the movement for
police accountability and reform. The eventual mobilization for justice for Torres displayed the
evolution of a more sophisticated and mature civil rights struggle against police brutality. EthnicMexican activists commandeered the language of due process and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution to define a discourse of racial unity and civil rights empowerment. The
suppression of the Black Power and Chicano movements contributed to the politicization of the
larger Mexican-American population and launched another facet to the struggle for civil rights in
Texas.144 A new ethnic political mobilization among Mexican Americans employed federal
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reforms to challenge the whitewashing of justice and legal repression in the law-enforcement
system.145 From these experiences, activists commandeered tactics from the past decade to
establish effective measures designed to bring Torres’s murderers to justice. These activities
successfully unified the mobilized front for justice for Torres to obtain reforms in police
procedures and secure the U.S. Department of Justice to bring charges of federal civil rights
violations against the officers who murdered Torres.
Tensions between the police and the community was the focus of Chapter five, which
explored the causes of the Moody Park Uprising. Unlike past historians, my examination of this
event shows that it resulted from actions that occurred over time. Initially LULAC isolated
grassroots organizations, like the People United to Fight Police Brutality, from the larger mobilized
efforts during the state police trial. In effect, LULAC and other organizations minimized the
agitations building within the community, while it strategically planned for federal intervention.
In addition, efforts by Mexican-American political, civil, and social organizations had been
dissipating and their influence over police reform was waning. Although four of the officers were
convicted for violating Torres’s civil rights, U.S. District Judge Ross Sterling’s lenient sentence
informed the state and local officials that injustice prevailed at all levels of the law enforcement
system. This outcome finally agitated all aspects of the mobilization and pushed activists to take
action.
I showed that the grassroots’ discontent displayed at the Moody Park Uprising gave the
Mexican-American efforts for Torres renewed vitality to continue their struggle and establish
lasting changes within the HPD, local government, and the law enforcement in general. The
Moody Park Uprising was an example of a community empowering itself in the aftermath of
injustice; and it successfully gained national and state officials attention to the broken policecommunity relations in Houston. Mexican-American leaders used the fuel of the uprising to renew
their efforts with the law-enforcement system and bridge its community relations. After the
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uprising, the federal government reevaluated the statewide practice of police brutality and
considered dual prosecution in cases involving killings. The HPD and Mayor Jim McConn
willingly pacified the community and its leaders with broader police transparency and reform in
an effort to restore faith in the law enforcement and judicial systems. Community leaders were
reintegrated as a voice of minorities within advisory councils and community-oriented policing.
By the 1980s, the Houston Police Department had its first African-American police chief, who
formalized community-oriented policing and continued to diversify the force to fit the
communities it protected.
The effectiveness of the HPD’s reform in police-community relations since the Torres
incident can be seen in the present-day “Blue Lives Matter” movement. On July 8, 2016, yet
another African-American man in Dallas, Texas gunned down five police officers. This time,
however, the shooter was a heavily armed sniper (an army veteran), whom officials said
“specifically set out to kill as many white officers as he could.” Similar to the Goforth killing, this
violence occurred against the backdrop of fatal police shootings of black men in Minnesota and
Louisiana, with demonstrations occurring in cities across the nation.146 Houstonians responded on
July 30 with the Second Police Lives Matter Rally. In a display of comradery between the two
cities, the host of the event, People Helping People Texas Foundation (PHPTF), planned to donate
all its proceeds to the families of the five fallen Dallas Police officers recently killed by the sniper.
The PHPTF anticipated that more than 18,000 people would attend what it deemed was a day of
prayer, music, and speakers.147 At one time, Dallas and Houston had been torn apart by the police
killings of Santos Rodríguez and Joe Torres, respectively, but now in both places a wide range of
citizens supported their local law-enforcement agencies.
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This recent turn in police-community relations ensures that this study emerges as a usable
past that can provide valuable insight into these current conflicts. The history of Houston’s ethnicMexican population’s relationship with the city’s police department shows us that conflict between
law enforcement and the community does not occur over a short time period, but instead is an
outcome of police repression and injustice that were permitted to exist over generations, despite
civil rights reforms. New legislation, civil reforms, or Supreme Court rulings designed to curb
abuses are only as viable as local and state law enforcement systems and governments are willing
to permit them to be. Without checks on police violence, or a mechanism to enforce accountability
in misconduct cases, minority communities can and will be continually subjected to
criminalization, police brutality and killings, over arrest, incarceration, and overall injustice. While
I wrote this history to recapture the ethnic-Mexican experience with police racism in my home
town, this study can inform Texas and Borderlands history, urban studies, African and Mexican
American history, as well as contribute to the growing interest in the carceral state. The lives (and
deaths) of such men as Joe Torres, Santos Rodríguez, Ricardo Morales and many others bear
witness to the importance of police accountability, law enforcement diversification, and amicable
police-community relations to effect lasting change.
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